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Abstract
Building a Base for Cyber-autonomy
by
Yan Shoshitaishvili
As software becomes increasingly embedded in our daily lives, it becomes more and
more critical to ﬁnd the vulnerabilities in this software. Worse, since the amount and
variety of this software is rapidly proliferating, manual analysis by rare, talented hackers
cannot scale to keep this software safe.
My ﬁrst foray into what became my dissertation work tried to address a speciﬁc class
of this general problem: backdoors inserted (either due to malice or for later support
and maintenance convenience) into internet-connected embedded devices, such as smart
power-meters. To address the requirement of having to reason about logical bugs and to
analyze enormous amounts of binary code, I created a novel combination of static and
dynamic-symbolic analysis techniques. Combining this with an insight into a new way
to deﬁne a backdoor, I was able to build a system that analyzed ﬁrmware of real-world
devices to identify such vulnerabilities in them.
This ﬁrst foray led into my main contribution: the generalization of this analysis
composition in the form of a principled binary analysis framework built to enable the
seamless combination of diverse program analysis techniques. This framework, angr,
provides a powerful base future research from myself, my lab-mates, and researchers
around the world (as the framework is fully open source). One of the early applications
of the system was the identiﬁcation of authentication bypass vulnerabilities in binary
ﬁrmware using a combination of static analysis and dynamic symbolic execution.
Using angr, we built an autonomous program analysis system that was able to analyze,
ix
exploit, and protect binary code without any human intervention. This system, the
Mechanical Phish, won third place in the Cyber Grand Challenge, a competition created
by DARPA to bootstrap the development of autonomous Cyber Reasoning Systems.
While the system did well, its performance in the Cyber Grand Challenge provided
an insight that shaped the conclusion of my dissertation: even with the current program
analysis techniques combined into a coherent Cyber Reasoning System, serious limitations
still exist. In the ﬁnal work of my graduate studies, I explored the careful reintegration
of human assistance into our analysis automation, in a way that addresses its limitations
without compromising its scalability advantage over manual analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When I was 5 years old, my grandmother gifted me a book called Professor Fortran's
Encyclopedia [1]. It was an illustrated book for children, following the adventures of a
cat (named X), a caterpillar (named Caterpillar), and a sparrow (named Sparrow), led
by their professor (named Fortran), as they learn about computing. This book revealed a
whole new world to me, in which all the basic rules were understood, but where incredible,
awe-inspiring, reason-defying things could nonetheless exist. I have been fascinated by
computers ever since. In my fascination, I aimed to understand them. I ditched many a
class in ﬁrst grade, hid in the stairwell, and read and reread my book. I learned BASIC,
then dug deeper to C and C++ (which I gleaned from the help ﬁles of the Borland Turbo
C++ Compiler), and, in my undergraduate Computer Organization class, x86 assembly
and all the way back up the stream of computational complexity to logic gates.
During this journey, something strange happened. When we crossed the threshold
from assembly to logic gates, somewhere just a bit downstream of adders and multi-
plexers, I realized that the magic that deﬁned computing for me was suddenly gone.
Rather than the expected fascination at the underpinnings of computation, I instead
found dry, boring, predictable logic gates. For any logic gate or, seemingly, collection of
logic gates, the full range of inputs could simply be mapped to the full range of outputs.
There seemed to be no mystery or intelligence. However, just a bit downstream, where
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the term software gains meaning, there was magic, complexity, and a thrilling feeling of
uncertainty. Here, computing felt alive. 1
I am a strong believer in the concept that understanding a mysterious phenomena
makes it all the more magical, and I strove to understand this layer of our digital world.
When you understand the bits comprising the operators and operands of binary software
better than the authors of that software, you make an interesting discovery. You realize
that, by carefully taking advantage corner cases and situations that the authors had not
considered, you can (metaphorically) take a program that was designed to walk and,
through careful manipulation of what it sees, hears, and is prompted to do, you can
make it dance.
For a while, this was enough: I would set up my digital dollhouse and I would play with
my toys. However, as any overseer of a vast and artiﬁcial landscape, I eventually grew
lonely. I needed to go epistemologically deeper. I didn't just want to just understand
what was going on  I wanted to understand how to understand it. I wanted to be
able to create programs that could understand other programs and, in turn, exploit and
manipulate these programs to their own ends.
Of course, I was not the ﬁrst to have this idea. The ﬁeld of program analysis (and
the speciﬁc subﬁeld of binary analysis, where I wanted to operate) has been an active
research area for decades. Researchers had created the building blocks of binary analysis.
I wanted to build on this existing foundation of program analysis and provide that ﬁnal
push, where I could watch one program look at another and show it how to do something
that it never before thought possible.
I eventually achieved this, leading the development of an autonomous system that
was capable of automatically analyzing, exploiting, and defending previously unknown
1I should mention, here, that going too far downstream also results in boredom  of course it makes
sense that a complex programming language can express anything your mind desires. It is speciﬁcally
the border where machines became alive, right there on the binary level, that fascinates me.
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binary software. This system, the Mechanical Phish, competed in the DARPA Cyber
Grand Challenge, the ﬁrst ever hacking contest from which human beings were banned,
ﬁghting six other autonomous Cyber Reasoning Systems" and winning third place and
a spot in history. In many ways, this dissertation is the story of this system.
This journey started, like many a research direction, with an attempt to reuse as
much existing work in the ﬁeld as possible. That is, rather than undertaking the creation
of a binary analysis framework, I tried to identify frameworks that could server as a
base for my research. I had a number of requirements: the framework had to support
multiple architectures (since the proliferation of the Internet of Things has resulted in a
wide range of such architectures in active use), had to be open source (so that we could
extend it over the course of our research), and had to lend itself to a range of analyses
(and to their composition). Unfortunately, at the time, no framework existed that met
these requirements.
Thus, the ﬁrst contribution of my dissertation work became the creation of a princi-
pled binary analysis framework built to enable the seamless development and combination
of diverse program analysis techniques. This framework, angr, provided a powerful base
for my research, and has since been adopted as one of the main binary analysis engines
of researchers and enthusiasts around the world. The philosophy and design behind this
system in detailed in Chapter 3.
My ﬁrst work using angr tried to detect a class of logical vulnerabilities which has
traditionally been diﬃcult to detect automatically: backdoors inserted (either due to
malice or for later support and maintenance convenience) into internet-connected em-
bedded devices, such as smart power-meters. To address the requirement of having to
reason about logical bugs and to analyze enormous amounts of binary code, I created a
novel combination of static and dynamic-symbolic analysis techniques, composing them
3
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by leveraging angr's modular design. Combining this with an insight into a new way to
deﬁne a backdoor, I was able to build a system that analyzed the ﬁrmware of real-world
devices to identify such vulnerabilities in them. This technique is described in Chapter 4.
A later (and more high-proﬁle) application of angr was the aforementioned Cyber
Reasoning System, the Mechanical Phish, which leveraged angr to great eﬀectiveness for
the autonomous analysis, exploitation, and defense of binary code. Interestingly, how-
ever, its performance in the Cyber Grand Challenge provided an insight that shaped
the concluding chapter of my dissertation: even with the current program analysis tech-
niques combined into a coherent Cyber Reasoning System, serious limitations still exist.
In the ﬁnal work of my graduate studies, I explored the careful reintegration of human
assistance into our analysis automation, in a way that addresses its limitations with-
out compromising its scalability advantage over manual analysis. I present this work in
Chapter 5.
My journey was enlightening, rewarding, and humbling. In the course of my graduate
studies, I saw the ﬁrst staggering steps toward the realization of autonomy in program
analysis. I ﬁnish the PhD program with a newfound sense of the profound complexity of
understanding, but also with the hope of supporting future researchers in their endeavors
to push my work ever-forward. Perhaps there is another kid, somewhere out there,
growing tired of his digital dollhouse.
1.1 Permissions and Attributions
1. The content of chapters 2 and 3 is the result of a collaboration with Ruoyu Wang,
Christopher Salls, Nick Stephens, Mario Polino, Andrew Dutcher, John Grosen,
Siji Feng, Christophe Hauser, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna, and has
previously appeared in the 2016 edition of the IEEE Symposium on Security and
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Privacy.
2. The content of chapter 4 is the result of a collaboration with RuoyuWang, Christophe
Hauser, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna, and has previously appeared in
the 2015 edition of the Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium.
3. The content of chapter 5 is the result of a collaboration with Michael Weissbacher,
Lukas Dresel, Christopher Salls, Ruoyu Wang, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni
Vigna, and will appear in the 2017 edition of the ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security.
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Setting the Stage
Program analysis began quite soon after the invention of computing itself. The ﬁrst
device widely considered as conforming to some modern deﬁnition of a computer is the
Analytical Engine, developed by Charles Babbage in the late 1830s. Shortly thereafter,
Ada Lovelace published a set of notes about the Analytical Engine and proposed the
ﬁrst known complex program for it [2]. In one of these notes, Note G, Ada Lovelace
provided an example of an execution of her program. At each instruction in the example,
Ada produced an arithmetic expression, in terms of the input variables into the program,
of each modiﬁed variable. I consider this, from a popular science viewpoint, to be the
ﬁrst symbolic trace in history. Thus, the underpinnings of, for example, symbolic-assisted
fuzzing, can be traced back to 1842.
Further developments in program analysis were made over a hundred years later,
when Alan Turing proposed that we might be able to develop a principled way to check
programs for bugs [3]. While reading this work in the course of writing this dissertation,
I was struck by the pronoun used for the program checker in Turing's paper: he, not
it. In the 1940s, program analysis was a manual task, done by humans. In fact, in what
can be viewed as the invention of (manual) fuzzing in the 1950s, programmers began to
test programs by inputting decks of punch cards taken from the trash [4].
Eventually, automation made its way into the ﬁeld. In 1975, the ﬁrst paper describing
6
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symbolic execution, in a system called SELECT, was published [5]. 1977 saw the inven-
tion of Abstract Interpretation, providing a great boon to static analysis [6]. Finally, the
ﬁeld of fuzzing saw automation in 1981 [7].
Program analysis has continued to be an active area of research in the decades since.
Techniques, prototypes, frameworks, and entire commercial products have been proposed,
developed, and abandoned long before I started the research in this dissertation.
In this section, I will set the stage for the state of research, as it was when I started
my work. Through the rest of my dissertation, I will discuss the contributions that I
made to this state of the art, and will talk about what is left to do.
Bug-hunting vs Program Veriﬁcation. The automated analysis of programs
can be used toward a number of purposes, including the automatic identiﬁcation of
vulnerabilities in software, which is my ﬁeld of interest. However, it is important to
diﬀerentiate this goal from Program Veriﬁcation, which is the assurance of the correctness
of a program. In short, vulnerability identiﬁcation seeks to be able to say This program
is unsafe., while program veriﬁcation seeks to say This program is safe. In both
cases, the lack of a positive result does not imply a negative result. Approaches for
vulnerability discovery cannot guarantee that a program is safe if they do not ﬁnd a
bug (due to the lack of soundness leading to false negatives), and program veriﬁcation
approaches cannot guarantee that a program is buggy if they cannot verify its safety
(due to over-approximation leading to false positives).
In this chapter, I will mostly talk about techniques for vulnerability detection, al-
though the static techniques I discuss (many of which are implemented by angr) can
support program veriﬁcation tasks.
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2.1 Analysis Trade-oﬀs
It is not hard to see why binary analysis is challenging: in a sense, asking will it
crash? is analogous to asking will it stop?, and any such analysis quickly runs afoul
of the halting problem [8]. Program analyses, and especially oﬀensive binary analyses,
tend to be guided by carefully balanced theoretical trade-oﬀs to maintain feasibility. For
example, we can explore two such trade-oﬀs:
Replayability. Bugs are not all created equal. Depending on the trade-oﬀs made by
the system, bugs discovered by a given analysis might not be replayable. This boils down
to the scope that an analysis operates on. Some analyses execute the whole application,
from the beginning, so they can reason about what exactly needs to be done to trigger a
vulnerability. Other systems analyze individual pieces of an application: they might ﬁnd
a bug in a speciﬁc module, but cannot reason about how to trigger the execution of that
module, and therefore, cannot automatically replay the crash.
Semantic awareness. Some analyses lack the ability to reason about the program in
semantically meaningful ways. For example, a dynamic analysis might be able to trace
the code executed by an application but not understand why it was executed or what
parts of the input caused the application to act in that speciﬁc way. On the other hand,
a symbolic analysis that can determine the speciﬁc bytes of input responsible for certain
program behaviors would have a higher semantic understanding.
In order to oﬀer replayability of input or semantic insight, analysis techniques must
make certain trade-oﬀs. For example, high replayability is associated with low coverage.
This is intuitive: since an analysis technique that produces replayable input must un-
derstand how to reach any code that it wants to analyze, it will be unable to analyze
as much code as an analysis that does not. On the other hand, without being able to
replay triggering inputs to validate bugs, analyses that do not prioritize bug replayability
8
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suﬀer from a high level of false positives (that is, ﬂaw detections that do not represent
actual vulnerabilities). In the absence of a replayable input, these false positives must
be ﬁltered by heuristics which can, in turn, introduce false negatives.
Likewise, in order to achieve semantic insight into the program being analyzed, an
analysis must store and process a large amount of data. A semantically-insightful dy-
namic analysis, for example, might store the conditions that must hold in order for speciﬁc
branches of a program to be taken. On the other hand, a static analysis tunes semantic
insight through the chosen data domain  simpler data domains (i.e., by tracking ranges
instead of actual values) represent less semantic insight.
Analyses that attempt both reproducibility and a high semantic understanding en-
counter issues with scalability. Retaining semantic information for the entire application,
from the entry point through all the actions it might take, requires a processing capacity
conceptually identical to the resources required to execute the program under all possible
conditions. Such analyses do not scale, and, in order to be applicable, must discard infor-
mation and sacriﬁce soundness (that is, the guarantee that all potential vulnerabilities
will be discovered).
Aside from these fundamental trade-oﬀs, there are also implementation challenges.
The biggest one of these is the environment model. Any analysis with a high semantic
understanding must model the application's interaction with its environment. In mod-
ern operating systems, such interactions are incredibly complex. For example, modern
versions of Linux include over three hundred system calls, and for an analysis system to
be complete, it must model the eﬀects of all of them.
9
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2.2 Static Vulnerability Discovery
Static techniques reason about a program without executing it. Usually, a program
is interpreted over an abstract domain. Memory locations containing bits of ones and
zeroes contain other abstract entities (at the familiar end, this might simply be integers,
but, as we explain below, these can include more abstract constructs). Additionally,
program constructs such as the layout of memory, or even the execution path taken, may
be abstracted as well.
Here, we split static analyses into two paradigms: those that model program proper-
ties as graphs (i.e., a control-ﬂow graph) and those that model the data itself.
Static vulnerability identiﬁcation techniques have two main drawbacks, relating to
the trade-oﬀs discussed in Section 2.1. First, the results are not replayable: detection by
static analysis must be veriﬁed by hand, as information on how to trigger the detected
vulnerability is not recovered. Second, these analyses tend to operate on simpler data
domains, reducing their semantic insight. In short, they over-approximate: while they
can often authoritatively reason about the absence of certain program properties (such
as vulnerabilities), they suﬀer from a high rate of false positives when making statements
regarding the presence of vulnerabilities.
2.2.1 Vulnerability Detection with Flow Modeling
Some vulnerabilities in a program can be discovered through the analysis of graphs
of program properties.
Graph-based vulnerability discovery. Program property graphs (e.g., control-ﬂow
graphs, data-ﬂow graphs and control-dependence graphs) can be used to identify vul-
nerabilities in software. Initially applied to source code [9, 10], related techniques have
since been extended to binaries [11]. These techniques rely on building a model of a bug,
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as represented by a set of nodes in a control-ﬂow or data-dependency graph, and iden-
tifying occurrences of this model in applications. However, such techniques are geared
toward searching for copies of vulnerable code, allowing the techniques to beneﬁt from
the preexisting knowledge of an already existing vulnerability. Unlike these techniques,
the focus of this chapter is on the discovery of completely new vulnerabilities.
2.2.2 Vulnerability Detection with Data Modeling
Static analysis can also reason over abstractions of the data upon which an application
operates.
Value-Set Analysis. One common static analysis approach is Value-Set Analysis
(VSA) [12]. At a high level, VSA attempts to identify a tight over-approximation of
the program state (i.e., values in memory and registers) at any given point in the pro-
gram. This can be used to understand the possible targets of indirect jumps or the
possible targets of memory write operations. While these approximations suﬀer from a
lack of accuracy, they are sound. That is, they may over-approximate, but never under-
approximate.
By analyzing the approximated access patterns of memory reads and writes, the
locations of variables and buﬀers can be identiﬁed in the binary. Once this is done, the
recovered variable and buﬀer locations can be analyzed to ﬁnd overlapping buﬀers. Such
overlapping buﬀers can be, for example, caused by buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities, so each
detection is one potential vulnerability.
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2.3 Dynamic Vulnerability Discovery
Dynamic approaches are analyses that examine a program's execution, in an actual
or emulated environment, as it acts given a speciﬁc input. In this section, we will focus
speciﬁcally on dynamic techniques that are used for identifying vulnerabilities, rather
than the general binary analysis techniques on which they are based.
Dynamic techniques are split into two main categories: concrete and symbolic exe-
cution. These techniques produce inputs that are highly replayable, but vary in terms of
semantic insight.
2.3.1 Dynamic Concrete Execution
Dynamic concrete execution is the concept of executing a program in a minimally-
instrumented environment. The program functions as normal, working on the same
domain of data on which it would normally operate (i.e., ones and zeroes). These analyses
typically reason at the level of single paths (i.e., what path did the program take when
given this speciﬁc input). As such, dynamic concrete execution requires test cases to be
provided by the user. This is a problem, as with a large or unknown dataset (such as
ours) such test cases are not readily available.
Fuzzing
The most relevant application of dynamic concrete execution to vulnerability discov-
ery is fuzzing. Fuzzing is a dynamic technique in which malformed input is provided
to an application in an attempt to trigger a crash. Initially, such input was generated
by hardcoded rules and provided to the application with little in-depth monitoring of
the execution [13]. If the application crashed when given a speciﬁc input, the input was
considered to have triggered a bug. Otherwise, the input would be further randomly
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mutated. Unfortunately, fuzzers suﬀer from the test case requirement. Without care-
fully crafted test cases to mutate, a fuzzer has trouble exercising anything but the most
superﬁcial functionality of a program.
Coverage-based fuzzing. The requirement for carefully-crafted test cases was par-
tially mitigated with the advent of code-coverage-based fuzzing [14]. Code-coverage-
based fuzzers attempt to produce inputs that maximize the amount of code executed in
the target application based on the insight that the more code is executed, the higher the
chance of executing vulnerable code. American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [15], a state-of-the art
fuzzer responsible for the discovery of many recent vulnerabilities, uses a code coverage
metric as its sole guiding principle, and its success at ﬁnding vulnerabilities has driven
an increase of interest in fuzzing in recent years.
Coverage-based fuzzing suﬀers from a lack of semantic insight into the target appli-
cation. This means that, while it is able to detect that a certain piece of code has not
yet been executed, it cannot understand what parts of the input to mutate to cause the
code to be executed.
Taint-based fuzzing. Another approach to improve fuzzing is the development of
taint-based fuzzers [16, 17]. Such fuzzers analyze how an application processes input
to understand what parts of the input to modify in future runs. Some of these fuzzers
combine taint tracking with static techniques, such as data dependency recovery [18, 19].
Others introduce work from protocol analysis to improve fuzzing coverage [20].
While a taint-based fuzzer can understand what parts of the input should be mutated
to drive execution down a given path in the program, it is still unaware of how to mutate
this input.
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Dynamic Symbolic Execution
Symbolic techniques bridge the gap between static and dynamic analysis and provide
a solution to cope with the limited semantic insight of fuzzing. Dynamic symbolic execu-
tion, a subset of symbolic execution, is a dynamic technique in the sense that it executes
a program in an emulated environment. However, this execution occurs in the abstract
domain of symbolic variables. As these systems emulate the application, they track the
state of registers and memory throughout program execution and the constraints on those
variables. Whenever a conditional branch is reached, execution forks and follows both
paths, saving the branch condition as a constraint on the path in which the branch was
taken and the inverse of the branch condition as a constraint on the path in which the
branch was not taken [21].
Unlike fuzzing, dynamic symbolic execution has an extremely high semantic insight
into the target application: such techniques can reason about how to trigger speciﬁc de-
sired program states by using the accumulated path constraints to retroactively produce
a proper input to the application when one of the paths being executed has triggered a
condition in which the analysis is interested. This makes it an extremely powerful tool in
identifying bugs in software and, as a result, dynamic symbolic execution is a very active
area of research.
Classical dynamic symbolic execution. Dynamic Symbolic Execution can be used
directly to ﬁnd vulnerabilities in software. Initially applied to the testing of source
code [22, 23], dynamic symbolic execution was extended to binary code by Mayhem [24]
and S2E [25]. These engines analyze an application by performing path exploration until
a vulnerable state (for example, the instruction pointer is overwritten by input from the
attacker) is identiﬁed.
However, the trade-oﬀs discussed in Section 2.1 come into play: all currently proposed
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symbolic execution techniques suﬀer from very limited scalability due to the problem of
path explosion: because new paths can be created at every branch, the number of paths
in a program increases exponentially with the number of branch instructions in every
path. There have been attempts to survive path explosion by prioritizing promising
paths [26, 27] and by merging paths where the situation is appropriate [28, 29, 30].
However, in general, this challenge to pure dynamic symbolic execution analysis engines
has not yet been surmounted, and (as we show later in this chapter), most bugs discovered
by such systems are shallow.
Symbolic-assisted fuzzing. One proposed way to address the path explosion problem
is to ooad much of the processing to faster techniques, such as fuzzing. This approach
leverages the strength of fuzzing, i.e., its speed, and attempts to mitigate the main weak-
ness, i.e., its lack of semantic insight into the application. Thus, researchers have paired
fuzzing with symbolic execution [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Such symbolically-guided fuzzers
modify inputs identiﬁed by the fuzzing component by processing them in a dynamic sym-
bolic execution engine. Dynamic symbolic execution uses a more in-depth understanding
of the analyzed program to properly mutate inputs, providing additional test cases that
trigger previously-unexplored code and allow the fuzzing component to continue making
progress (i.e., in terms of code coverage).
Under-constrained symbolic execution. Another way to increase the tractability of
dynamic symbolic execution is to execute only parts of an application. This approach,
known as Under-constrained Symbolic Execution [37, 38], is eﬀective at identifying po-
tential bugs, with two drawbacks. First, it is not possible to ensure a proper context for
the execution of parts of an application, which leads to many false positives among the
results. Second, similar to static vulnerability discovery techniques, under-constrained
symbolic execution gives up the replayability of the bugs it detects in exchange for scal-
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ability.
2.4 Simple Motivating Example
To demonstrate the various challenges of binary analysis, we provide a concrete exam-
ple of a program with multiple vulnerabilities in Listing 1. For clarity and space reasons,
this example is simpliﬁed, and it is meant only to expose the reader to ideas that will be
discussed later in the chapter.
Observe the three calls to memcpy: the ones on lines 10 and 30 will result in buﬀer
overﬂows, while the one on line 16 will not. However, depending on the amount of
information tracked, a static analysis technique might report all three calls to memcpy as
potential bugs, including the one on line 16, because it would not have the information
to determine that no buﬀer overﬂow is possible. Additionally, while the report from a
static analysis would include the locations of these bugs, it will not provide inputs to
trigger them.
A dynamic technique, such as fuzzing, has the beneﬁt of creating actionable inputs
that will trigger any bugs found. On the other hand, simple fuzzing techniques typically
only ﬁnd shallow bugs and fail to pass through code requiring precisely crafted input. In
Listing 1, dynamic techniques will have diﬃculty ﬁnding the bug at line 10, because it
requires a speciﬁc input for the condition to be satisﬁed. However, because the overﬂow
on line 30 can be triggered through random testing, fuzzing techniques should be able to
ﬁnd an input which triggers the bug.
To ﬁnd the bug on line 10, one could introduce an abstract data model to reason
about many possible inputs at once. One such approach is Dynamic Symbolic Execution
(DSE). However, dynamic symbolic techniques, while powerful, suﬀer from the path
explosion problem, where the number of paths grows exponentially with each branch
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and quickly becomes intractable. A symbolic execution will detect the bug on line 10
and generate an input for it using a constraint solver. Additionally, it should be able to
prove that the memcpy on line 16 cannot overﬂow. However, the execution will likely not
be able to ﬁnd the bug at line 30, as there are too many potential paths which do not
trigger the bug.
1 int main(void) {
2 char buf[32];
3
4 char *data = read_string();
5 unsigned int magic = read_number();
6
7 // difficult check for fuzzing
8 if (magic == 0x31337987) {
9 // buffer overflow
10 memcpy(buf, data, 100);
11 }
12
13 if (magic < 100 && magic % 15 == 2 &&
14 magic % 11 == 6) {
15 // Only solution is 17; safe
16 memcpy(buf, data, magic);
17 }
18
19 // Symbolic execution will suffer from
20 // path explosion
21 int count = 0;
22 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
23 if (data[i] == 'Z') {
24 count++;
25 }
26 }
27
28 if (count >= 8 && count <= 16) {
29 // buffer overflow
30 memcpy(buf, data, count*20);
31 }
32
33 return 0;
34 }
Listing 1: An example where diﬀerent techniques will report diﬀerent bugs.
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2.5 The DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge
Historically, evaluating the eﬀectiveness of proposed techniques in program analysis
has been a tough problem. This was caused by several reasons, among which were the
diﬃculty of building support for complex real-world programs into analysis engines and
the lack of a standardized dataset for evaluation.
In October of 2013, DARPA announced the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge [39].
Like DARPA Grand Challenges in other ﬁelds (such as robotics and autonomous vehi-
cles), the CGC pitted teams from around the world against each other in a competition in
which all participants must be autonomous programs. A participant's goal in the Cyber
Grand Challenge is straight-forward: their system must autonomously identify, exploit,
and patch vulnerabilities in the provided software.
The organizers of the Cyber Grand Challenge put much thought into designing a
competition for automated binary analysis systems. For example, they addressed the
environment model problem by creating a new OS speciﬁcally for the CGC: the DE-
CREE OS. DECREE is an extremely simple operating system with just 7 system calls:
transmit, receive, and waitfd to send, receive, and wait for data over ﬁle descriptors,
random to generate random data, allocate and deallocate for memory management,
and terminate to exit.
Despite the simple environment model, the binaries provided by DARPA for the
CGC have a wide range of complexity. They range from 4 kilobytes to 10 megabytes
in size, and implement functionality ranging from simple echo servers, to web servers,
to image processing libraries. DARPA has open-sourced all the binaries used in the
competition thus far, complete with proof-of-concept exploits and write-ups about the
vulnerabilities [40].
Because the simple environment model and ready presence of ground truth makes
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it feasible to accurately implement and evaluate diverse binary analysis techniques, and
because the binaries vary greatly in size and complexity and attempt to model real
security ﬂaws, the CGC dataset has provided the community with one of the ﬁrst tailor-
made experimental datasets for binary analysis. As such, the work presented in this
dissertation is primarily evaluated on CGC binaries.
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A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy
Despite the rise of interpreted languages and the World Wide Web, binary analysis
has remained an extremely important topic in computer security. There are several
reasons for this. First, interpreted languages are either interpreted by binary programs
or Just-In-Time (JIT) compiled down to binary code. Second, core OS constructs
and performance-critical applications are still written in languages (usually, C or C++)
that compile down to binary code. Third, the rise of the Internet of Things is powered
by devices that are, in general, very resource-constrained. Without cycles to waste on
interpretation or Just-In-Time compilation, the ﬁrmware of these devices tends to be
written in languages (again, usually C) that compile to binary.
Unfortunately, many low-level languages provide few security guarantees, often lead-
ing to vulnerabilities. For example, buﬀer overﬂows stubbornly remain as one of the
most-common software ﬂaws despite a concerted eﬀort to develop technologies to miti-
gate such vulnerabilities. Worse, the wider class of memory corruption vulnerabilities,
the vast majority of which also stem from the use of unsafe languages, make up a sub-
stantial portion of the most common vulnerabilities [41]. This problem is not limited to
software on general-purpose computing devices: remotely-exploitable vulnerabilities have
been discovered in devices ranging from smartlocks, to pacemakers, to automobiles [42].
Another important aspect to consider is that compilers and tool chains are not bug-
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free. Properties that were proven by analyzing the source code of a program may not hold
after the very same program has been compiled [43]. This happens in practice: recently, a
malicious version of Xcode, known as Xcode Ghost [44], silently infected over 40 popular
iOS applications by inserting malicious code at compile time, compromising the devices
of millions of users. These vulnerabilities have serious, real-world consequences, and
discovering them before they can be abused is paramount. To this end, the security
research community has invested a substantial amount of eﬀort in developing analysis
techniques to identify ﬂaws in binary programs [45]. Such oﬀensive (because they ﬁnd
attacks against the analyzed application) analysis techniques vary widely in terms of
the approaches used and the vulnerabilities targeted, but they suﬀer from two main
problems.
First, many implementations of binary analysis techniques begin and end their ex-
istence as a research prototype. When this happens, much of the eﬀort behind the
contribution is wasted, and future researchers must often start from scratch in terms
of implementation of work based upon these approaches. This startup cost discourages
progress: every week spent re-implementing previous techniques is one less week devoted
to developing novel solutions.
Second, as a consequence of the amount of work required to reproduce these systems
and their frequent unavailability to the public, replicating their results becomes impracti-
cal. As a result, the applicability of individual binary analysis techniques relative to other
techniques becomes unclear. This, along with the inherent complexity of modern oper-
ating systems and the diﬃculty to accurately and consistently model the applications'
interaction with their environment, makes it extremely diﬃcult to establish a common
ground for comparison. Where comparisons do exist, they tend to compare systems with
diﬀerent underlying implementation details and diﬀerent evaluation datasets.
In an attempt to mitigate the ﬁrst issue, we have created angr, a binary analysis
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framework that integrates many of the state-of-the-art binary analysis techniques in
the literature. We did this with the goal of systematizing the ﬁeld and encouraging
the development of next-generation binary analysis techniques by implementing, in an
accessible, open, and usable way, eﬀective techniques from current research eﬀorts so that
they can be easily compared with each other. angr provides building blocks for many
types of analyses, using both static and dynamic techniques, so that proposed research
approaches can be easily implemented and their eﬀectiveness compared to each other.
Additionally, these building blocks enable the composition of analyses to leverage their
diﬀerent strengths.
Over the last year, a solution has also been introduced to the second problem, aimed
towards comparing analysis techniques and tools, with research reproducibility in mind.
Speciﬁcally, DARPA organized the Cyber Grand Challenge, a competition designed to
explore the current state of automated binary analysis, vulnerability excavation, exploit
generation, and software patching. As part of this competition, DARPA wrote and re-
leased a corpus of applications that are speciﬁcally designed to present realistic challenges
to automated analysis systems and produced the ground truth (labeled vulnerabilities and
exploits) for these challenges. This dataset of binaries provides a perfect test suite with
which to gauge the relative eﬀectiveness of various analyses that have been recently pro-
posed in the literature. Additionally, during the DARPA CGC qualifying event, teams
around the world ﬁelded automated binary analysis systems to attack and defend these
binaries. Their results are public, and provide an opportunity to compare existing oﬀen-
sive techniques in the literature against the best that the competitors had to oﬀer1.
Our goal is to gain an understanding of the relative eﬃcacy of modern oﬀensive tech-
niques by implementing them in our binary analysis system. In this chapter, we detail
1The top-performing 7 teams each won a prize of 750, 000 USD. We expect that, with this motivation,
the teams ﬁelded the best analyses that were available to them.
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the implementation of a next-generation binary analysis engine, angr. We present sev-
eral oﬀensive analyses that we developed using these techniques (speciﬁcally, replications
of approaches currently described in the literature) to reproduce results in the ﬁelds of
vulnerability discovery, exploit replaying, automatic exploit generation, compilation of
ROP shellcode, and exploit hardening. We also describe the challenges that we overcome,
and the improvements that we achieved, by combining these techniques to augment their
capabilities. By implementing them atop a common analysis engine, we can explore
the diﬀerences in eﬀectiveness that stem from the theoretical diﬀerences behind the ap-
proaches, rather than implementation diﬀerences of the underlying analysis engines. This
has enabled us to perform a comparative evaluation of these approaches on the dataset
provided by DARPA.
In short, we make the following contributions:
1. We reproduce many existing approaches in oﬀensive binary analysis, in a single,
coherent framework, to provide an understanding of the relative eﬀectiveness of
current oﬀensive binary analysis techniques.
2. We show the diﬃculties (and solutions to those diﬃculties) of combining diverse
binary analysis techniques and applying them on a large scale.
3. We open source our framework, angr, for the use of future generations of research
into the analysis of binary code.
3.1 Analysis Engine
The analyses that we described in Chapter 2 were proposed at various times over the
last several years, implemented with diﬀerent technologies, and evaluated on disparate
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datasets with varying methodologies. This is problematic, as it makes it hard to under-
stand the relative eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent approaches and their applicability to diﬀerent
types of applications.
To alleviate this problem, we have developed a ﬂexible, capable, next-generation
binary analysis system, angr, and used it to implement a selection of the analyses we
presented in the previous sections. This section describes the analysis system, our design
goals for it, and the impact that this design has had on the analysis of realistic binaries.
3.1.1 Design Goals
Our design goals for angr are the following:
Cross-architecture support. With the rise of embedded devices, often running ARM
and MIPS processors, modern software is made for varying hardware architectures.
This is a departure from the previous decade, where x86 support was enough for
most analysis engines: a modern binary analysis engine must be able to perform
cross-architecture analyses. Furthermore, 32-bit processors are no longer the stan-
dard; a modern analysis engine must support analysis of 64-bit binaries.
Cross-platform support. In a similar vein to cross-architecture support, a modern
analysis system must be able to analyze software from diﬀerent operating sys-
tems. This means that concepts speciﬁc to individual operating systems must be
abstracted, and support for loading diﬀerent executable formats must be imple-
mented.
Support for diﬀerent analysis paradigms. A useful analysis engine must provide
support for the wide range of analyses described in earlier sections. This requires
that the engine itself abstract away, and provide diﬀerent types of memory models
as well as data domains.
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Usability. The purpose of angr is to provide a tool for the security community that
will be useful in reproducing, improving, and creating binary analysis techniques.
As such, we strove to keep angr's learning curve low and its usability high. angr is
almost completely implemented in Python, with a concise, simple API that is easily
usable from the IPython interactive shell [46]. While Python results in constant-
time lower performance than other potential language choices, most binary analysis
techniques suﬀer from algorithmic slowness, and the language-imposed performance
impact is rarely felt. When language overhead is important, angr can run in the
Python JIT engine, PyPy for a signiﬁcant speed increase.
Our goal was for angr to allow for the reproduction of a typical binary analysis
technique, on top of our platform, in about a week. In fact, we were able to reproduce
Veritesting [28] in eight days, guided symbolic execution in a month, AEG [47] in a
weekend, Q [48] in about three weeks, and under-constrained symbolic execution [38] in
two days. It is hard to produce an implementation eﬀort estimate for dynamic symbolic
execution and value-set analysis, as we implemented those while building the system
itself over two years.
In order to meet these design goals, we had to carefully build our analysis engine. We
did this by creating a set of modular building blocks for various analyses, being careful
to maintain strict separation between them to reduce the number of assumptions that
higher-level parts of angr (such as the state representation) make about the lower-level
parts (such as the data model). This makes it easier for us to mix and convert between
analyses on-the-ﬂy. We hope that it will also make it easier for other researchers to reuse
individual modules of angr. In the next several sections, we discuss the technical design
of each angr submodule.
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3.1.2 Submodule: Intermediate Representation
In order to support multiple architectures, we translate architecture-speciﬁc native
binary code into an intermediate representation (IR) atop which we implement the anal-
yses. Rather than writing our own IR lifter, which is an extremely time-consuming
engineering eﬀort, we leveraged libVEX, the IR lifter of the Valgrind project. libVEX
produces an IR, called VEX, that is speciﬁcally designed for program analysis. We used
PyVEX, which we originally wrote for Firmalice [49], to expose the VEX IR to Python.
By leveraging VEX, we can provide analysis support for 32-bit and 64-bit versions of
ARM, MIPS, PPC, and x86 (with the 64-bit version of the latter being amd64) pro-
cessors. Improvements are constantly being made by Valgrind contributors, with, for
example, a port to the SPARC architecture currently underway.
As we will discuss later, there is no fundamental restriction for angr to always use
VEX as its IR. As implemented, supporting a diﬀerent intermediate representation would
be a straightforward engineering eﬀort.
3.1.3 Submodule: Binary Loading
The task of loading an application binary into the analysis system is handled by
a module called CLE, a recursive acronym for CLE Loads Everything. CLE abstracts
over diﬀerent binary formats to handle loading a given binary and any libraries that it
depends on, resolving dynamic symbols, performing relocations, and properly initializing
the program state. Through CLE, angr supports binaries from most POSIX-compliant
systems (Linux, FreeBSD, etc.), Windows, and the DECREE OS created for the DARPA
Cyber Grand Challenge.
CLE provides an extensible interface to a binary loader by providing a number of base
classes representing binary objects (i.e., an application binary, a POSIX .so, or a Win-
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dows .dll), segments and sections in those objects, and symbols representing locations
inside those sections. CLE uses ﬁle format parsing libraries (speciﬁcally, elftools for
Linux binaries and pefile for Windows binaries) to parse the objects themselves, then
performs the necessary relocations to expose the memory image of the loaded application.
3.1.4 Submodule: Data Model
The values stored in the registers and memory of a SimState are represented by
abstractions provided by another module, Claripy.
Claripy abstracts all values to an internal representation of an expression that tracks
all operations in which it is used. That is, the expression x, added to the expression 5,
would become the expression x + 5, maintaining a link to x and 5 as its arguments.
These expressions are represented as expression trees with values being the leaf nodes
and operations being non-leaf nodes.
At any point, an expression can be translated into data domains provided by Claripy's
backends. Speciﬁcally, Claripy provides backends that support the concrete domain (in-
tegers and ﬂoating-point numbers), the symbolic domain (symbolic integers and symbolic
ﬂoating point numbers, as provided by the Z3 SMT solver [50]), and the value-set ab-
stract domain for Value Set Analysis [12]. Claripy is easily extensible to other backends.
Speciﬁcally, implementing other SMT solvers would be interesting, as work has shown
that diﬀerent solvers excel at solving diﬀerent types of constraints [51].
User-facing operations, such as interpreting the constructs provided by the backends
(for example, the symbolic expression x + 1 provided by the Z3 backend) into Python
primitives (such as possible integer solutions for x + 1 as a result of a constraint solve)
are provided by frontends. A frontend augments a backend with additional functionality
of varying complexity. Claripy currently provides several frontends:
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FullFrontend. This frontend exposes symbolic solving to the user, tracking constraints,
using the Z3 backend to solve them, and caching the results.
CompositeFrontend. As suggested by KLEE and Mayhem, splitting constraints into
independent sets reduces the load on the solver. The CompositeFrontend provides
a transparent interface to this functionality.
LightFrontend. This frontend does not support constraint tracking, and simply uses
the VSA backend to interpret expressions in the VSA domain.
ReplacementFrontend. The ReplacementFrontend expands the LightFrontend to add
support for constraints on VSA values. When a constraint (i.e., x + 1 < 10) is in-
troduced, the ReplacementFrontend analyzes it to identify bounds on the variables
involved (i.e., 0 <= x <= 8). When the ReplacementFrontend is subsequently
consulted for possible values of the variable x, it will intersect the variable with
the previously-determined range, providing a more accurate result than VSA would
otherwise be able to produce.
HybridFrontend. The HybridFrontend combines the FullFrontend and the Replace-
mentFrontend to provide fast approximation support for symbolic constraint solv-
ing. While Mayhem [24] hinted at such capability, to our knowledge, angr is the
ﬁrst publicly available tool to provide this capability to the research community.
This modular design allows Claripy to combine the functionalities provided by the
various data domains in powerful ways and to expose it to the rest of angr.
3.1.5 Submodule: Full-Program Analysis
Program state representation. The angr module is responsible for representing
the program state (that is, a snapshot of values in registers and memory, open ﬁles, etc.).
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The state, named SimState in angr terms, is implemented as a collection of state plugins,
which are controlled by state options speciﬁed by the user or analysis when the state is
created. Currently, the following state plugins exist:
Registers. angr tracks the values of registers at any given point in the program as a
state plugin of the corresponding program state.
Symbolic memory. To enable symbolic execution, angr provides a symbolic memory
model as a state plugin. This implements the indexed memory model proposed by
Mayhem [24].
Abstract memory. The abstract memory state plugin is used by static analyses to
model memory. Unlike symbolic memory, which implements a continuous indexed
memory model, the abstract memory provides a region-based memory model which
is used by most static analyses.
POSIX. When analyzing binaries for POSIX-compliant environments, angr tracks the
system state in this state plugins. This includes, for example, the ﬁles that are open
in the symbolic state. Each ﬁle is represented as a memory region and a symbolic
position index.
History. angr tracks a log of everything that is done to the state (i.e., memory writes,
ﬁle reads, etc.) in this plugin.
Inspection. angr provides a powerful debugging interface, allowing breakpoints to be
set on complex conditions, including taint, exact expression makeup, and sym-
bolic conditions. This interface can also be used to change the behavior of angr.
For example, memory reads can be instrumented to emulate memory-mapped I/O
devices.
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Solver. The Solver is a plugin that exposes an interface to diﬀerent data domains,
through the data model provider (Claripy, discussed below). For example, when
this plugin is conﬁgured to be in symbolic mode, it interprets data in registers,
memory, and ﬁles symbolically and tracks path constraints as the application is
analyzed.
Architecture. The architecture plugin provides architecture-speciﬁc information that
is useful to the analysis (i.e., the name of the stack pointer, the wordsize of the
architecture, etc). The information in this plugin is sourced from the archinfo
module, that is also distributed as part of angr.
These state plugins provide building blocks that can be combined in various ways to
support diﬀerent analyses.
Additionally, angr implements the base unit of an analysis: the SimEngine abstrac-
tion allows the implementation of diﬀerent techniques to take an input state, apply the
eﬀects of a block of code under some domain, and generate an output state (or a set
of output states, in case we encounter a block from which multiple output states are
possible, such as a conditional jump). Again, this part of angr is modular: in addition
to a SimEngine to process the VEX translations of basic blocks, angr currently allows
the user to provide a handcrafted state-modiﬁcation function written in Python (termed
a SimProcedure), providing a powerful way to instrument blocks with Python code. In
fact, this is how we implement our environment model: system calls are implemented as
Python functions that modify the program state.
The analyst-facing part of angr provides complete analyses, such as dynamic symbolic
execution and control-ﬂow graph recovery. The entry point into these analyses is the
Project, representing a binary with its associated libraries. From this object, all of the
functionality of the other submodules can be accessed (i.e., creating states, examining
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shared objects, retrieving intermediate representation of basic blocks, hooking binary
code with Python functions, etc.). Additionally, there are two main interfaces for full-
program analysis: Path Groups and Analyses.
Simulation Manager. A SimulationManager is an interface to dynamic symbolic exe-
cution  it tracks paths as they run through an application, split, or terminate.The
creation of this interface stemmed from frustration with the management of paths
during symbolic execution. Early in angr's development, we would implement ad-
hoc management of paths for each analysis that would use symbolic execution. We
found ourselves re-implementing the same functionality: tracking the hierarchy of
paths as they split and merge, analyzing which paths are interesting and should be
prioritized in the exploration, and understanding which paths are not promising and
should be terminated. We uniﬁed the common actions taken on groups of paths,
creating the SimulationManager interface. Furthermore, we designed customiz-
able plugins, called ExplorationTechniques, that can change certain behavior of
SimulationManager objects (path prioritization, pruning, merging, etc).
Analyses. angr provides an abstraction for any full program analysis with the Analysis
class. This class manages the lifecycle of static analyses, such as control-ﬂow graph
recovery, and complex dynamic analyses as those presented in Section 3.5.
When angr identiﬁes some truth about a binary (i.e., the basic block at address X
can jump to the basic block at address Y ), it stores it in the knowledge base of the
corresponding Project. This shared knowledge base allows analyses to collaboratively
discover information about the application.
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3.1.6 Open-Source Release
We started to work on angr with the goal of developing a platform on which we
could implement new binary analysis approaches. As we faced the unexpected challenges
associated with the analysis of realistic binaries, we realized that such an analysis engine
would be extremely useful to the security community. We have open-sourced angr in
the hope that it will provide a basis for the future of binary analysis, and it will free
researchers from the burden of having to re-address the same challenges over and over.
angr is implemented in just over 70, 000 lines of code, usable directly from the IPython
shell or as a python module, and easily installable via the standard Python package
manager, pip.
The open-source release of angr includes the analysis engine modules (as described in
Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.5) on top of which we implemented the applications discussed in
Section 3.7. Of the latter, we have open-sourced our control-ﬂow graph recovery, the static
analysis framework, our dynamic symbolic execution engine, and the under-constrained
symbolic execution implementation. While we plan to release the other applications in
the future, they are currently in a state that is a mix of being prototype-level code and
being actively applied toward the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge.
angr has been met with extreme enthusiasm by the community. In the ﬁrst 2 years
after the open-source release, we gathered about 1700 stars (measures of persons valuing
the software) on GitHub across the diﬀerent modules that make up the system. angr has
been used in industry prototypes and many a research papers around the world, and is
becoming a standard part of security courses. More importantly, we are starting to see
signiﬁcant contributions back to the project from the community at large, enabling angr
to function on more targets more eﬀectively.
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3.2 IR Translation
Because software is made for devices with widely diverse architectures, binary analysis
systems must be able to carry out their analysis in the context of many diﬀerent hardware
platforms. To address this challenge, Firmalice translates the machine code of diﬀerent
architectures into an intermediate representation, or IR. The IR must abstract away
several architecture diﬀerences when dealing with diﬀerent architectures:
Register names. The quantity and names of registers diﬀer between architectures, but
modern CPU designs hold to a common theme: each CPU contains several general
purpose registers, a register to hold the stack pointer, a set of registers to store
condition ﬂags, and so forth. The IR must provide a consistent, abstracted interface
to registers on diﬀerent platforms.
Memory access. Diﬀerent architectures access memory in diﬀerent ways. For example,
ARM can access memory in both little-endian and big-endian modes. The IR must
be able to abstract away these diﬀerences.
Memory segmentation. Some architectures, such as x86, which is beginning to be
used in embedded applications, support memory segmentation through the use of
special segment registers. The chosen IR needs to be able to model such memory
access mechanisms.
Instruction side-eﬀects. Most instructions have side-effects. For example, most oper-
ations in Thumb mode on ARM update the condition ﬂags, and stack push/pop
instructions update the stack pointer. Tracking these side-eﬀects in an ad hoc
manner in the analysis would be error-prone, so the IR should make these eﬀects
explicit.
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There are many existing intermediate representations available for use, including
REIL [52], LLVM IR [53], and VEX, the IR of the Valgrind project [54]. We decided to
utilize VEX due to its ability to address our IR requirements and an active and helpful
developer community. However, our approach would work with any intermediate rep-
resentation. To reason about VEX IR in Python, we implemented Python bindings for
libVEX. We have open-sourced these bindings [55] in the hope that they will be useful
for the community.
VEX is an architecture-agnostic representation of a number of target machine lan-
guages, of which the x86, AMD64, PPC, PPC64, MIPS, MIPS64, ARM (in both ARM
and Thumb mode), ARM64, and S390X architectures are supported. VEX abstracts ma-
chine code into a representation designed to make program analysis easier by modeling
instructions in a uniﬁed way, with explicit modeling of all instruction side-eﬀects. This
representation has four main classes of objects.
Expressions. IR Expressions represent a calculated or constant value. This includes
values of memory loads, register reads, and results of arithmetic operations.
Operations. IR Operations describe a modiﬁcation of IR Expressions. This includes
integer arithmetic, ﬂoating-point arithmetic, bit operations, and so forth. An IR
Operation applied to IR Expressions yields an IR Expression as a result.
Temporary variables. VEX uses temporary variables as internal registers: IR Ex-
pressions are stored in temporary variables between use. The content of a tempo-
rary variable can be retrieved using an IR Expression.
Statements. IR Statements model changes in the state of the target machine, such as
the eﬀect of memory stores and register writes. IR Statements use IR Expressions
for values they may need. For example, a memory store statement uses an IR
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Expression for the target address of the write, and another IR Expression for the
content.
Blocks. An IR Block is a collection of IR Statements, representing an extended basic
block in the target architecture. A block can have several exits. For conditional
exits from the middle of a basic block, a special Exit IR Statement is used. An
IR Expression is used to represent the target of the unconditional exit at the end
of the block.
Relevant IR Expressions and IR Statements for an analysis are detailed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The IR translation of an example ARM instruction is presented in Table 3.3. In
the example, the subtraction operation is translated into a single IR block comprising
5 IR Statements, each of which contains at least one IR Expression. Register names
are translated into numerical indices given to the GET Expression and PUT Statement.
The astute reader will observe that the actual subtraction is modeled by the ﬁrst 4 IR
Statements of the block, and the incrementing of the program counter to point to the next
instruction (which, in this case, is located at 0x59FC8) is modeled by the last statement.
3.3 CFG Recovery
We will describe the process that angr uses to generate a CFG, including speciﬁc
techniques that were developed to improve the completeness and soundness of the ﬁnal
result.
Given a speciﬁc program, angr performs an iterative CFG recovery, starting from
the entry point of the program, with some necessary optimizations. angr leverages a
combination of forced execution, backwards slicing, and symbolic execution to recover,
where possible, all jump targets of each indirect jump. Moreover, it generates and stores
35
A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy Chapter 3
a large quantity of data about the target application, which can be used later in other
analyses such as data-dependence tracking.
This algorithm has three main drawbacks: it is slow, it does not automatically handle
dead code, and it may miss code that is only reachable through unrecovered indirect
jumps. To address this issue, we created a secondary algorithm that uses a quick dis-
assembly of the binary (without executing any basic block), followed by heuristics to
identify functions, intra-function control ﬂow, and direct inter-function control ﬂow tran-
sitions. The secondary algorithm, however, is much less accurate  it lacks information
about reachability between functions, is not context sensitive, and is unable to recover
complex indirect jumps.
In the reminder of this section, we discuss our advanced recovery algorithm, which
we dub CFGAccurate. We then discuss our fast algorithm, CFGFast, in Section 3.3.7.
3.3.1 Recovering Control Flow
The recovery of a control-ﬂow graph (CFG), in which the nodes are basic blocks of
instructions and the edges are possible control ﬂow transfers between them, is a pre-
requisite for almost all static techniques for vulnerability discovery.
Control-ﬂow recovery has been widely discussed in the literature [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61].
CFG recovery is implemented as a recursive algorithm that disassembles and analyzes a
basic block (say, Ba), identiﬁes its possible exits (i.e., some successor basic block such as
Bb and Bc) and adds them to the CFG (if they have not already been added), connects
Ba to Bb and Bc, and repeats the analysis recursively for Bb and Bc until no new exits
are identiﬁed. CFG recovery has one fundamental challenge: indirect jumps. Indirect
jumps occur when the binary transfers control ﬂow to a target represented by a value in
a register or a memory location. Unlike a direct jump, where the target is encoded into
36
A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy Chapter 3
the instruction itself and, thus, is trivially resolvable, the target of an indirect jump can
vary based on a number of factors. Speciﬁcally, indirect jumps fall into several categories:
Computed. The target of a computed jump is determined by the application by carrying
out a calculation speciﬁed by the code. This calculation could further rely on values
in other registers or in memory. A common example of this is a jump table: the
application uses values in a register or memory to determine an index into a jump
table stored in memory, reads the target address from that index, and jumps there.
Context-sensitive. An indirect jump might depend on the context of an application.
The common example is qsort() in the standard C library  this function takes
a callback that it uses to compare passed-in values. As a result, some of the jump
targets of basic blocks inside qsort() depend on its caller, as the caller provides
the callback function.
Object-sensitive. A special case of context sensitivity is object sensitivity. In object-
oriented languages, object polymorphism requires the use of virtual functions, often
implemented as virtual tables of function pointers that are consulted, at runtime,
to determine jump targets. Jump targets thus depend on the type of object passed
into the function by its callers.
Diﬀerent techniques have been designed to deal with diﬀerent types of indirect jumps,
and we will discuss the implementation of several of them in Section 3.3. In the end,
the goal of CFG recovery is to resolve the targets of as many of these indirect jumps as
possible, in order to create a CFG. A given indirect jump might resolve to a set of values
(i.e., all of the addresses in a jump table, if there are conditions under which their use
can be triggered), and this set might change based on both object and context sensitivity.
Depending on how well jump targets are resolved, the CFG recovery analysis has two
properties:
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Soundness. A CFG recovery technique is sound if the set of all potential control ﬂow
transfers is represented in the graph generated. That is, when an indirect jump is
resolved to a subset of the addresses that it can actually target, the soundness of the
graph decreases. If a potential target of a basic block is missed, the block it targets
might never be seen by the CFG recovery algorithm, and any direct and indirect
jumps made by that block will be missed as well. This has a cumulative eﬀect:
the failure to resolve an indirect jump might severely reduce the completeness of
the graph. Soundness can be thought of as the true positive rate of indirect jump
target identiﬁcation in the binary.
Completeness. A complete CFG recovery builds a CFG in which all edges represent
actually possible control ﬂow transfers. If the CFG analysis errs on the side of
completeness, it will likely contain edges that cannot really exist in practice. Com-
pleteness can be thought of as the inverse of the false positive rate of indirect jump
target identiﬁcation.
A CFG recovery analysis that produces an empty graph would be considered complete,
and an analysis that produces a graph in which every instruction points to every other
instruction is considered sound. 2 While the ideal is somewhere in between, this is
diﬃcult to achieve with a scalable algorithm. Thus, diﬀerent analyses require a diﬀerent
compromise between the two.
A further diﬃculty of control-ﬂow graphs is accurately measuring code coverage, which
is the measure of how much code is discovered by a control-ﬂow graph. This is often
complicated by the presence of dead code, code which is unreachable by any jumps.
2Xu et. al. deﬁnes soundness and completeness of a CFG in the opposite way, where an empty graph
is sound and a full graph is complete [56]. In this chapter, we stick to the deﬁnition in Section 3.3.1.
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3.3.2 Assumptions
angr's CFGAccurate makes several assumptions about binaries to optimize the run
time of the algorithm.
1. All code in the program can be distributed into diﬀerent functions.
2. All functions are either called by an explicit call instruction (or its equivalents),
or are preceded by a tail jump (an optimization, often used to reduce stack space
for recursive functions, in which a call at the very end of a function is changed to
a jump so that the newly called function simply reuses the return address of its
caller) in the control ﬂow.
3. The stack cleanup behavior of each function is predictable, regardless of where it
is called from. This lets CFGAccurate safely skip functions that it has already
analyzed while analyzing a caller function and keep the stack balanced.
These assumptions place constraints on the types of binaries that angr is designed
to analyze. Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 require that the binary being analyzed is not
obfuscated and behaves in a normal way. We can remove those assumptions when
analyzing obfuscated or abnormal binaries, but this would lead to a higher run time of
the CFG recovery.
Our CFG recovery code is built upon techniques proposed by related literature [56,
57, 58, 59, 60]. However, these techniques make assumptions that are overly strict or are
unrealistic for real-world binaries. Speciﬁcally, we do not assume any of the following,
unlike the work that our CFG recovery is based on:
1. All functions return to the next instruction after their call-site [56].
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2. The jump target of an indirect branch is always determined by a control ﬂow path,
not by a program state or context [56]. For example, some existing literature
assumes that indirect jumps are all computed, as opposed to being passed in as a
function pointer from prior contexts.
3. Expressions for jump targets of indirect jumps must match a set of common id-
ioms [57],[58]. Unlike existing work, we make no assumptions on the type of oper-
ations that can be applied to pointers.
4. The stack pointer is the same before entering a function as it is after returning from
it.
5. No two functions overlap (in other words, they cannot share basic blocks [60].)
CFGAccurate handles functions that share code.
6. Additional information, such as symbol tables or relocation information, is avail-
able [59].
The actual algorithm to recover a control-ﬂow graph from a binary is described in
the next few sections.
3.3.3 Iterative CFG Generation
Unfortunately, no single technique meets CFGAccurate's goal of recovering a complete
and sound CFG. Thus, CFGAccurate constructs a CFG by interleaving a series of tech-
niques to achieve speed and completeness. Speciﬁcally, four techniques are used: forced
execution, lightweight backward slicing, symbolic execution, and value set analysis. The
CFG to be iteratively recovered by these techniques, C, is initialized with the basic block
at the entry point of the application.
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Throughout CFG recovery, CFGAccurate maintains a list of indirect jumps, Lj, whose
jump targets have not been resolved. When the analysis identiﬁes such a jump, it is added
to Lj. After each iterative technique terminates, CFGAccurate triggers the next one in
the list. This next technique may resolve jumps in Lj, may add new unresolved jumps to
Lj, and may add basic blocks and edges to the CFG C. CFGAccurate terminates when
a run of all techniques results in no change to Lj or C, as that means that no further
indirect jumps can be resolved with any available analysis.
3.3.4 Forced Execution
angr's CFGAccurate leverages the concept of Dynamic Forced Execution for the ﬁrst
stage of CFG recovery [56]. Forced Execution ensures that both directions of a conditional
branch will be executed at every branch point.
CFGAccurate maintains a work-list of basic blocks, Bw, and a list of analyzed blocks,
Ba. When the analysis starts, it initializes its work-list with all the basic blocks that are
in C but not in Ba. Whenever CFGAccurate analyzes a basic block from this work-list,
the basic block and any direct jumps from the block are added to C. Indirect jumps,
however, cannot be handled this way. Under forced execution, the targets of indirect
jumps may diﬀer from those of an actual run of the program because forced execution
will execute code in an unexpected order. Thus, each indirect jump is stored in the list
Lj for later analysis.
As it cannot resolve any indirect jumps, this analysis functions as a fast-pass CFG
recovery analysis to quickly seeds the other analyses with detected basic blocks and
unresolved indirect jumps.
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3.3.5 Symbolic Execution
The main issue with dynamic forced execution is the presence of indirect jumps, as
there is no way to make sure that the target of an indirect jump is correctly resolved. On
the one hand, an indirect jump may be completely unresolvable (i.e., the forced execution
resulted in a state where the jump target is read from uninitialized memory), which leaves
a broken control ﬂow transition in the recovered CFG. On the other hand, an indirect
jump may also be partially solvable (i.e. our analysis only retrieves a portion of all the
possible jump targets).
For each jump J ∈ Lj, CFGAccurate traverses the CFG backwards until it ﬁnd the
ﬁrst merge point (that is, multiple paths converging on the way to the indirect jump) or
up to a threshold number of blocks (empirically, we found a reasonable threshold to be
8). From there, it performs forward symbolic execution to the indirect jump and uses a
constraint solver to retrieve possible values for the target of the indirect jump.
CFGAccurate considers a jump successfully resolved if the computed set of possible
targets is smaller than a threshold size. We use a value of 256 for this threshold but
we have found that, in practice, in the cases where jumps are not resolved successfully,
this value is unconstrained (meaning, the set of possible targets is bounded only by the
number of bits in the address).
If the jump is resolved successfully, J is removed from Lj and edges and nodes are
added to the CFG for each possible value of the jump target.
3.3.6 Backward Slicing
angr's forced execution and symbolic execution analyses fail to resolve many of the
unresolved jumps due to the lack of context. Those analyses are carried out in a context-
insensitive manner: if a function takes pointer as an argument, and that pointer is used
42
A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy Chapter 3
as the target of an indirect jump, the analyses will be unable to resolve it.
To achieve better completeness, our CFG generation requires a context-sensitive com-
ponent. We accomplish this with backward slicing. CFGAccurate computes a backward
slice starting from the unresolved jump. The slice is extended through the beginning of
the previous call context. That is, if the indirect jump being analyzed is in a function Fa
that is called from both Fb and Fc, the slice will extend backward from the jump in Fa
and contain two start nodes: the basic block at the start of Fb and the one at the start
of Fc.
CFGAccurate then executes this slice using angr's symbolic execution engine and uses
the constraint engine to identify possible targets of the symbolic jumps, with the same
threshold of 256 for the size of the solution set for the jump target. If the jump target is
resolved successfully, the jump is removed from Lj and the edge representing the control
ﬂow transition, and the target basic blocks are added to the recovered CFG.
3.3.7 CFGFast
The goal of the fast CFG generation algorithm is to generate a graph, with high code
coverage, that identiﬁes at least the location and content of functions in the binary. This
graph lacks much of the control ﬂow, so it is not complete. However, such a graph can
still be useful for both manual and automated analysis of binaries.
CFGFast carries out the following steps:
Function identiﬁcation. We use hard-coded function prologue signatures, which can
be generated from techniques like ByteWeight [62], to identify functions inside
the application. If the application includes symbols, specifying the locations of
functions, they are also used to seed the graph with function start positions. Ad-
ditionally, the basic block representing the entry point of the program is added to
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the graph.
Recursive disassembly. Recursive disassembly is used to recover the direct jumps
within the identiﬁed functions.
Indirect jump resolution. Lightweight alias analysis, data-ﬂow tracking, combined
with pre-deﬁned strategies are used to resolve intra-function control ﬂow transfers.
Currently CFGFast includes strategies for jump table identiﬁcation and indirect call
target resolution.
The goal is to quickly recover a CFG with a high coverage, without a concern for
understanding the reachability of functions from one another.
3.3.8 Using the CFG Recovery
angr exposes the CFG recovery algorithms as two analyses: CFGFast and CFGAccurate.
These analyses output CFG data to angr's knowledge base, as discussed in Section 3.1.5.
This data can then be used in the course of manual analysis or later automated analyses.
3.4 Value Set Analysis
Once a CFG is generated, more advanced analyses can be run. One of these is Value-
Set Analysis [12]. Value-Set Analysis (VSA) is a static analysis technique that combines
numeric analysis and pointer analysis for binary programs. It uses an abstract domain,
called the Value-Set Abstract domain, for approximating possible values that registers
or abstract locations may hold at each program point.
VSA analyzes a program until it reaches a ﬁx-point for all program points in the
function. This ﬁx-point represents a tight over-approximation of all values that any
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register or abstract memory location can have at any point in the function. With respect
to, for example, a memory write to a computed address A, consulting the values of A in
the computed ﬁx-point will contain a complete list of all possible write targets.
The original VSA design, proposed by Balakrishnan et al. [12], does not perform well
when analyzing real-world binaries. To make VSA work on such binaries, we had to
develop a number of improvements to increase the precision of our analysis.
Creating a discrete set of strided-intervals. The basic data type of VSA, the strided
interval, is essentially an approximation of a set of numbers. It is great for approx-
imating a set of normal concrete values. However, if those values are used as jump
targets in the program, the over-approximating nature of strided-intervals yields
unsoundness in our recovered CFG by creating control ﬂow transitions to addresses
that should not be jump targets. To eﬀectively solve this problem, we developed
a new data type called strided interval set, which represents a set of strided in-
tervals that are not unioned together. A strided interval set will be unioned into
a single strided interval only when it contains more than K elements, where K
is a threshold that can be adjusted. In our model discussed in Section 2.1, this
threshold controls a trade-oﬀ of semantic insight versus scalability  a higher value
of K allows us to maintain high precision, but comes at a cost of increased analysis
complexity.
Applying an algebraic solver to path predicates. Tracking branch conditions helps
us constrain variables in a state after taking a conditional exit or during a merging
procedure, which produces a more precise analysis result. Aﬃne-Relation Analysis
has been proposed as a technique to track these conditions [63]. However, it is
both complicated to implement (generally leading to support for very few arith-
metic operations in constraint expressions), and is computationally expensive in
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reality.
Our solution is to implement a lightweight algebraic solver that works on the strided
interval domain, based on modulo arithmetic which take care of some of the aﬃne
relations. When a new path predicate is seen (i.e., when following a conditional
branch), we attempt to simplify and solve it to obtain a number range for the
variables involved in the path predicate. Then we perform an intersection between
the newly generated number range and the original values for each corresponding
variable. This allows us to continuously reﬁne the result of our value-set analysis
as new branch conditions are encountered, increasing the precision of the eventual
ﬁx-point.
Adopting a signedness-agnostic domain. As originally proposed, VSA operates on
a signed strided interval domain, which assumes all values are signed. That is, for
an n-bit strided-interval with l as its lower bound and h as its upper bound, we
always have l ∈ [−2n−1, 2n−1 − 1] ∧ h ∈ [−2n−1, 2n−1 − 1] ∧ l ≤ h. However, this
results in heavily over-approximated results of unsigned arithmetic calculations. In
fact, this over-approximation is exacerbated by the fact that, since jump addresses
are unsigned, the computation of jump addresses generally relies on unsigned values
(i.e., in the case of unsigned comparisons). The solution to this problem is to adopt
a signedness-agnostic domain for our analysis. Wrapped Interval Analysis [64] is
such an interval domain for analyzing LLVM code, which takes care of signed and
unsigned numbers at the same time. We based our signedness-agnostic strided-
interval domain on this theory, applied to the VSA domain.
We use VSA for memory corruption detection in three phases. First, we collect all
read and write access patterns in the program during the VSA. On top of those access
patterns, we perform a variable recovery for variables on both the stack and heap regions.
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Our implementation is similar to the variable recovery in TIE [65]. Next, we scan all
stack and heap regions to ﬁnd abnormal buﬀers, including a) overlapping buﬀers, and b)
out-of-bound buﬀers. Then we simply report all abnormal buﬀers as potential memory
corruptions.
3.4.1 Using VSA
The main interface that angr provides into a full-program VSA analysis is the Value
Flow Graph. The VFG is an enhanced CFG that includes the program state representing
the VSA ﬁx-point at each program location. Depending on the parameters passed to the
VFG analysis, this can include a single function, a tree of function calls, or the entire
program.
The program states contained in the VFG present memory in an abstract layout
provided by angr (speciﬁcally, the SimAbstractMemory memory model), with values in
memory represented by value-sets, as provided by Claripy. We performed our buﬀer
overlap analysis over the data contained in these program states by analyzing the range
of values that memory accesses may take.
3.5 Symbolic Execution
The dynamic symbolic execution module of our analysis platform is mainly based
on the techniques described in Mayhem [24]. Our implementation follows the same
memory model and path prioritization techniques. This module represents one of the
core functionalities of angr, other analyses, such as Veritesting and under-constrained
symbolic execution, use it as a base.
We use Claripy's interface into Z3 to populate the symbolic memory model (specif-
ically, SimSymbolicMemory) provided by angr. Individual execution states through a
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program are managed by SimState objects, provided by angr, which have plugins to
track the actions taken by the program, the path predicates, and various other informa-
tion. Groups of these paths are managed by angr's SimulationManager functionality,
which provides an interface for managing the splitting, merging, and ﬁltering of paths
during dynamic symbolic execution.
angr has built-in support for Veritesting [28], implementing it as a Veritesting anal-
ysis and exposing transparent support for it with an option passed to SimulationManager
objects. This advanced state merging technique helps mitigate the problem of exponen-
tial state explosion by statically (and selectively) merging paths.
3.5.1 Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution
We implemented under-constrained symbolic execution (UCSE), as proposed in UC-
KLEE [38], and dubbed it UC-angr. UCSE is a dynamic symbolic execution technique
where execution is performed on each function separately. Since the analysis cannot
reason about how to get to the speciﬁc function, detections by UCSE are not replayable.
Because each function is generated without its context (i.e., the arguments and global
variables with which it is called in actual executions), the analysis is not accurate and
suﬀers from false positives.
UCSE tags missing context in the state as under-constrained. When such under-
constrained data is used as a pointer, a new under-constrained region is created and
the pointer is directed at the new region. This on-demand memory allocation enables
code that manages complex data structures to be analyzed. When a security violation
is identiﬁed (i.e., a write to the saved return address on the stack), the values involved
are checked for their under-constrained status. Under certain conditions (i.e., if all data
involved is under-constrained), the violation is ﬁltered out as a false positive.
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We made two changes to the technique described in UCSE:
Global memory under-constraining. The original UC-KLEE implementation does
not treat access to global memory as under-constrained. However, such memory
is part of the program context that is impossible to predict with UCSE, since,
when analyzing a given function, global data could have already potentially been
overwritten. Thus, we mark all global data as under-constrained, allowing us to
lower our false positive rate.
Path limiters. The original UC-KLEE implementation had several built-in limitations
to prevent a path explosion. For example, they would limit the depth of under-
constrained pointer dereferences to avoid a search through an under-constrained
linked list never terminating. We added an additional limiter: we abort the analysis
of a function when we ﬁnd that it is responsible for a path explosion. We detect this
by hard-coding a limit (in our experiments, we used an empirically-determined limit
of 64 paths) and, when a single function branches over this many paths, we replace
the function with an immediate return, and rewind the analysis from the call site
of that function. This keeps the analysis tractable by avoiding path explosions, but
makes the analysis even less accurate.
False positive ﬁltering. We introduced several additional false positive ﬁlters into our
implementation of UC-angr. Speciﬁcally, when we detect an exploitable state,
we attempt to ensure that the state is not incorrectly made exploitable by a lack
of constraints on under-constrained data. First, we perform a constraint solve
with an additional constraint, E, that expresses the fact that the state is not
exploitable (i.e., if the security violation was an overwrite of the return address, we
constrain the state so that the return address could not have been overwritten).
Then, we constrain each under-constrained value to its possible solution from this
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unexploitable state. We call these constraints U . Finally, we remove the constraint
E, keeping the constraints U , and check that the state can still be exploited. If it
can, this means that the function likely has some inherent ﬂaw, and the ﬂaw does
not necessarily depend on missing data from the context. Note that the ﬂaw could
still be a false positive due to missing constraints, or due to the limited context on
data that is not under-constrained.
UC-angr is implemented as a SimState plugin that tracks under-constrained data
accesses and carries out the required relocations. Once this plugin is initialized, under-
constrained symbolic execution can be performed using the same SimulationManager
paradigm as dynamic symbolic execution.
3.5.2 Symbolic-Assisted Fuzzing
While we give a summary of our symbolic-assisted fuzzing implementation here, the
full approach, called Driller, is detailed in a separate paper [36].
Our implementation of symbolic-assisted fuzzing uses the AFL fuzzer as its foundation
and angr as its symbolic tracer. By monitoring AFL's performance, we can decide when
to begin symbolically-tracing the inputs that AFL has created. To make this decision, we
act on the rate at which the fuzzer is discovering new state transitions. If AFL reports
that it has discovered no new state-transitions after performing a round of mutations
of the input, we assume the fuzzer to be having trouble making progress, and invoke
angr on all paths AFL has deemed as unique (i.e., any path that has a jump, identiﬁed
by a tuple of the source and destination address, that no other path has), looking for
transitions that AFL was unable to ﬁnd inputs for.
Driller's symbolic component is implemented using angr's symbolic execution en-
gine, so as to symbolically trace paths based on the concrete inputs provided by AFL.
50
A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy Chapter 3
This avoids the path explosion problem inherent to symbolic execution, as each concrete
input corresponds to a single (traced) path, and these inputs are heavily ﬁltered by AFL
to ensure that only promising ones are traced. Each concrete input corresponds to an
individual path in a SimulationManager. At each step of the SimulationManager, every
branch is checked so as to ensure that the most recent jump instruction leads to a path
previously unknown to AFL. When such a jump is found, the SMT solver is queried to
create an input that would drive execution to the new jump. This input is fed back to
AFL, which goes on to mutate it in future fuzzing steps. This feedback loop allows us
to balance expensive symbolic execution time with cheap fuzzing time, and mitigates
fuzzing's low semantic insight into program operation.
3.6 Exploitation
Vulnerability discovery analyses actually discover crashing inputs. Triaging these
crashing inputs  that is, understanding which crashes represent actual security issues,
is outside of the scope of most such approaches. However, some work does exist on the
reproduction and analysis of the discovered vulnerabilities. In this section, we go through
the process of reproducing an identiﬁed crash, automatically generating the exploit to
verify the security impact of the crash, and hardening the exploit to make it resilient in
the presence of modern mitigation techniques.
3.6.1 Background: Crash Reproduction
Most vulnerability discovery analyses execute a tested application in less-than-realistic
conditions. For example, many fuzzers will de-randomize execution. That is, they will
hard-code any sources of randomness, such as the PID of the executable, the current time,
and so on. This is done for two main reasons. First, in most modern fuzzing approaches,
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there is an implicit assumption that the same input, provided to two instantiations of
an application, will produce the same result both times. Second, the modeling of ran-
domness in other techniques, such as dynamic symbolic execution, is not a well-explored
research area.
Because of de-randomization, the crashes reported by vulnerability discovery tech-
niques might not be trivially replayable outside of the analysis environment. Consider
the case of an application that generates a random token and requires the token to be
provided by the user before entering an unsafe section of code and crashing. In the de-
randomized analysis environment, the generated token will always have the same value,
and the crashing input identiﬁed by the analysis will always take the same path, result-
ing in a crash. However, outside of the analysis environment, the token will always be
diﬀerent, and the previously-crashing input might instead take a non-crashing path.
Crashing inputs that are not trivially replayable generally fall into two categories.
Missing data. Vulnerability discovery techniques sometimes manage to guess correct
response values without having ﬁrst received them from the application. The token
in our example is always a constant value in the de-randomized environment, and an
analysis engine such as a fuzzer might accidentally guess it without ﬁrst retrieving
it from the program. When replaying the resulting crashing input outside of the
analysis environment, the token value will not match and the crash will not occur.
Missing relationships. Techniques with low semantic insight, such as fuzzing, are un-
able to recover the relationships between data retrieved from the program and
subsequent data provided to it. In our example, even though the crashing input
might cause the application to provide the token to the user, so it can later be
used to cause the crash, the output of the fuzzer lacks the relationship between the
token value that the application provides to the user and the token value that the
52
A Principled Base for Cyber-autonomy Chapter 3
user must provide to the application.
In the case of missing data, the input is simply not replayable outside of the analysis
environment, and a new crashing input might be found. Analyses exist that specialize in
the identiﬁcation of data leaks [19], but we have not yet implemented such analyses in
angr.
In the latter case, the de-randomized crashing input must be converted into an in-
put speciﬁcation that deﬁnes how to communicate with an application in terms of the
relationship between data received from the application and data later provided to it.
One approach that does this is Replayer [66], which computes preconditions on program
paths to understand how to reproduce a program path under real-world conditions.
3.6.2 Background: Exploit Generation
With a productive vulnerability excavation engine utilizing one or more of the meth-
ods described above, many crashes might be produced for a tested application. However,
not all of these crashes will be exploitable. An example of a non-exploitable input is a
NULL-pointer dereference. Because modern operating systems disallow the mapping of
memory at address 0, these previously-exploitable situations have been reduced to non-
exploitable crashes. Understanding whether a crash is exploitable helps with the triaging
of bugs (that is, understanding which bugs to investigate and ﬁx ﬁrst).
The obvious way to test if a crash would be exploitable is to try to exploit it. To
this end, several systems have been proposed that attempt to take a crashing input and
automatically convert it into an exploit for the application [67, 47, 68].
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3.6.3 Background: Exploit Hardening
In recent years, binary hardening techniques, such as non-executable stack regions
and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), have severely reduced the eﬃcacy
of traditional exploits, such as those generated by ﬁrst-generation automatic exploita-
tion engines. Thus, even an exploitable vulnerability might be mitigated by modern
protections.
Current automatic exploitation techniques were designed before the widespread adop-
tion of modern mitigation techniques, and modern software protections make the exploits
they produce non-functional. To circumvent this, approaches have been created to auto-
matically harden the exploits generated using current techniques against such defenses.
Such techniques work by translating a traditional, shellcode-based exploit into an equiva-
lent exploit utilizing Return-Oriented Programming [69]. As such, an automatic approach
to constructing Return-Oriented Programs is required, and several such approaches have
been developed [70, 48].
3.6.4 Implementation: Crash Reproduction
We implemented the approach proposed by Replayer [66] to recover missing relation-
ships between input values (i.e., values that the attacker sends) and output values (i.e.,
values that the attacker leaks from the application).
Our implementation of Replayer is built atop our symbolic execution engine. We can
deﬁne the problem of replaying a crashing input as the search for an input speciﬁcation is
to bring a program from an initial state s to a crash state q. Our algorithm takes, as input,
the program P , an initial state sa (i.e., the state at the entry point of the executable), the
crash state qa, and the input ia that brings sa to qa in the instrumented (de-randomized)
environment, but does not properly replay in an uninstrumented environment. Our
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implementation symbolically executes the path from sa to qa, using the input ia. It
records all constraints that are generated while executing P . Given the constraints, the
execution path, the program P , and the new initial state sb, we can symbolically execute
P with an unconstrained symbolic input, following the previously recorded execution
path until the new crash state qb is reached. At this point, the input constraints on
the input and output can be analyzed, and relationships between them can be recovered.
This relationship data is used to generate the input speciﬁcation is, allowing the crashing
input to be replayed.
The implementation proposed by Replayer has two main limitations in its application
to crash reproduction. First, as we discuss in Section 3.6.1, it is possible that a given
crash does not retrieve all of the data that is required to properly replay the crash.
Replayer is unable to handle these cases, and new crashing inputs must be found.
Second, Replayer uses only the exact path, as executed by the application in the
de-randomized environment while processing the crashing input, to generate the input
speciﬁcation. If the execution trace of a binary changes, based on the exact value of
random data, then Replayer cannot compute the correct input. For example, if the
random cookie introduces path predicates, by causing the execution of a speciﬁc path
through a decoding function, replaying execution with that exact path will constrain the
cookie to a value that might diﬀer from the initial one. When this happens, the replayed
cookie will not be correct, and the replaying attempt will fail. As we will discuss later,
AEG is facing a similar limitation. This suggests that research in this area could make
progress for both of these tasks.
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3.6.5 Implementation: Exploit Generation
By implementing algorithms similar to those described in AXGEN [68], AEG [47]
and Mayhem [24], we were able to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the current state of the
art in automatic exploit generation. Our implementation allows us to create exploits for
vulnerabilities, allowing the attacker to take control of the program's execution by over-
writing a saved instruction pointer (e.g., by overwriting function pointers, or exploiting
buﬀer overﬂows on the stack).
Vulnerable States. Unlike AEG/Mayhem, but similar to AXGEN, we generate
exploits by performing concolic execution on crashing program inputs using angr. We
drive concolic execution forward, forcing it to follow the same path as a dynamic trace
gathered by concretely executing the crashing input applied to the program. Concolic
execution is stopped at the point where the program crashed, and we inspect the symbolic
state to determine the cause of the crash and measure exploitability. By counting the
number of symbolic bits in certain registers, we can triage a crash into a number of
categories such as frame pointer overwrite, instruction pointer overwrite, or
arbitrary write, among others.
Instruction Pointer Overwrite Technique. The simplest exploitable bug we can
encounter is where symbolic bits appear in the instruction pointer at crash time. When
detecting that symbolic bits are contained in the instruction pointer, we can constrain
our instruction pointer to point to either a controlled sequence of instructions, such
as shellcode, or a ROP gadget that pivots the stack to a symbolic buﬀer where we can
execute a ROP chain (generated by our exploit hardening step). angr itself handles many
of the implementation details discussed in AEG and AXGEN, such as taint tracking and
path condition building, allowing us to limit ourselves to ﬁnding symbolic memory buﬀers
and applying constraints to register values to generate an exploit, as proposed by these
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approaches.
Exploiting CGC Binaries. The Cyber Grand Challenge hosts the game on a
custom OS which includes only 7 system calls. The lack of system calls which can
execute programs and open ﬁles means exploitation within the Cyber Grand Challenge
is limited to demonstrating register control and the ability to read and write memory.
By DARPA standards, two type of exploits exist for the CGC:
• A Type 1 exploit demonstrates that the attacker controls a general purpose register
and the instruction pointer register.
• A Type 2 exploit demonstrates that the attacker can perform a controlled read
from the process memory space.
Out of the 126 binaries we applied AEG to, we succeeded in exploiting only a total of 4
binaries. For only two of these binaries, we were able to generate a Type 2 exploit. Both
of these Type 2 exploits were unable to be hardened with ROP and resorted to jumping
to shellcode. Additionally, AEG was only able to generate 2 hardened, ROP Type 1
exploits. We believe these results show that much more work in the ﬁeld of automated
exploit generation is to be done, and that the current methods are not well-applicable to
modern vulnerabilities.
Challenges Faced. Here we demonstrate some of the challenges that our tool faced
while attempting to exploit Cyber Grand Challenge binaries, using CROMU00019 [40]. We
will focus on the exploitation of the second vulnerability mentioned in this challenge's
README (speciﬁcally, a buﬀer overﬂow on the stack that exists during the decoding of an
attacker-supplied string).
The major issue we ran into during exploit generation was the presence of path
predicates that constrained each byte of the overﬂowing data to being a single value,
despite the values of these bytes being chosen based on symbolic input. CROMU00019
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demonstrates this in its decode function. Each byte of the payload takes a branch of
the switch statement contained in decode, placing restrictive predicates on our path
representing the vulnerable state. While the arms of this switch statement are taken
based on symbolic data, the data returned is concrete, and each of these arms represents
a separate path through the program. The traditional AEG approach assumes the ability
to place the proper constraints on symbolic data to carry out control ﬂow hijacking, but
this behavior requires ﬁnding the single path through the decode function which places
our desired bytes into the output buﬀer.
The solution to this problem would be to search for a single path which performs a
desirable control ﬂow hijack out of the many paths which present vulnerable conditions.
However, modern exploit generation capabilities do not have this capacity, and cases like
these prevent many of the stack buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities presented in the CGC
Qualiﬁer event from being exploited with the current state-of-the-art automatic exploit
generation.
3.6.6 Implementation: Exploit Hardening
To harden exploits against modern mitigation techniques, we implemented a ROP
chain compiler based on the ideas in Q [48]. This means that we can automatically
generate ROP payloads to fulﬁll an end goal, such as writing data to memory or calling an
arbitrary function in a library. This section focuses on the diﬀerences and improvements
we made over Q itself.
Our approach comprises the following steps:
Gadget discovery. We scan all executable code in the application, at every byte oﬀset,
to identify ROP gadgets and classify them according to their eﬀects. For example,
the instruction sequence: mov [ebx], eax; pop ebx; ret would be classiﬁed as
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a memory write and a register load. To carry out the classiﬁcation, our analysis
leverages the action history provided by angr's Path objects and symbolic relations
provided by Claripy.
Gadget arrangement. The ROP chain compiler then determines arrangements of gad-
gets that can be used to perform high-level actions. For example, a gadget that
pushes data to the stack can be paired with a gadget that pops data to create an
arrangement that moves data from one register to another.
Payload generation. After the ROP compiler identiﬁes the requisite set of gadget ar-
rangements, it combines these gadgets into a chain to carry out high-level actions
(such as executing attacker-speciﬁed system calls with speciﬁed arguments). This
is done by writing gadget arrangements into a program state in angr, constrain-
ing their outputs to the provided arguments, and querying the SMT solver for a
solution for their inputs.
Our implementation diﬀers from Q in minor ways. First, Q made no use of the
stack as scratch storage space. It is not clear why this is: one explanation is that their
analysis platform did not support the modeling of stack operation, while another is that
the approach remains more general if we assume that the stack is not necessarily pointed
to by the stack pointer (and, thus, in an unknown location). In our integrated system,
we could identify whether the stack pointer was pointing to the stack, since we had this
metadata from the exploit that we generated with our implementation of AEG.
Another improvement has to do with the gadget classiﬁcation. Q used a value sam-
pling method to identify speciﬁc classes of gadgets, which led to some number of missed
gadgets chains due to the limited coverage of the sample data. In our approach, we
symbolically analyze every gadget, using careful caching techniques to keep the analysis
fast.
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3.7 Comparative Evaluation
By leveraging angr's design, we were able to reproduce the binary analysis techniques
that we have discussed, on the same codebase, enabling a comparative evaluation of their
eﬀectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done before: previous
comparisons were carried out on diﬀerent implementations, leaving the possibility of
diﬀerences in results being introduced by implementation diﬀerences. With the exception
of the fuzzer itself (AFL), our analyses are all implemented on the same analysis engine
and share over 90% of the same code base with each other.
We use a corpus of CGC binaries, released by DARPA for the CGC Qualiﬁcation
Event, to carry out our evaluation. As discussed in Section 2.5, these binaries vary
widely in complexity, but utilize a simple environment model, designed by DARPA to
reduce the implementation eﬀort of analysis systems.
We evaluate the techniques that we implemented for CFG recovery, dynamic and
static vulnerability discovery, crash replay, exploitation, and exploit hardening. A sum-
mary of the analyses we implemented and evaluated, along with the literature on which
they are based and the sections in this chapter in which they are described, is produced
in Table 3.4.
3.7.1 CFG recovery
As the CFG is used as a pre-requisite for other analyses in angr, it is important to
understand how well angr's CFG recovery performs. As we discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 3.3, angr has two CFG recovery algorithms: CFGAccurate relies on a base approach
of forced execution and provides two methods of indirect jump resolution (backwards slic-
ing and symbolic back-traversal), while CFGFast mainly uses recursive disassembly and
heuristics to quickly identify functions and inter-function control ﬂow.
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To understand the eﬀectiveness of these recovery techniques, we compared CFGFast
and CFGAccurate against the CFG recovery of a state-of-the-art commercial tool, IDA
Pro 6.9, on CGC binaries. While little details about how IDA Pro recovers the CFG are
available, based on descriptions in previous work [56] as well as our observations, we be-
lieve that IDA Pro disassembles a binary recursively, uses symbols and other heuristics to
determine locations of functions throughout a binary, and then utilizes some lightweight
data-ﬂow analyses to further solve the targets of indirect jumps. This makes it more sim-
ilar, conceptually, to CFGFast than to CFGAccurate. As ground truth CFG information
is not available, we evaluate our results in terms of the relative number of recovered basic
blocks and control ﬂow transfers between the results of IDA's and our CFG recovery.
We ﬁrst evaluate the completeness of our CFG, comparing the blocks and edges
identiﬁed by CFGFast and the graph generated by IDA Pro. Table 3.5 shows our results.
CFGFast has a slightly better code coverage than IDA Pro, and recovers more edges.
We believe that this is because the lightweight data-ﬂow analyses and heuristics that
are used by CFGFast are more advanced than those used by IDA. Manual analysis of
recovery results on a few binaries indicates that CFGFast is more aggressive in terms
of code recovery: while IDA Pro believes certain parts of code are not reachable and
refuses to disassemble it as code, CFGFast identiﬁes such locations as code. A possible
explanation for this is that our approach might be overly aggressive, and as such, it might
mis-identify such locations. However, we have not identiﬁed such cases when analyzing
CGC binaries.
As some binary analyses require reachability information from the entry point, we
have also included a comparison against the reachable portion of a CFG generated by IDA
Pro (that is, a CFG comprising those blocks for which a path from the entry point can be
determined) against the CFG recovered by angr's CFGAccurate analysis. Table 3.5 shows
our results. By improving the forced execution technique with backward slicing, angr
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substantially improves its ability to reconstruct the CFG. However, since CFGAccurate
does not leverage ad hoc heuristics, the resulting CFG's code coverage is not as high
as IDA Pro's. To achieve a better coverage, the user can provide CFGAccurate with all
recovered functions from CFGFast as starting points.
3.7.2 Evaluation of Vulnerability Analysis Techniques
In Sections 3.4 through 3.5.2, we describe the implementation of several vulnerability
discovery techniques. Here, we present the result of a comparative evaluation of these
techniques as applied to the CGC dataset. We ran these evaluations with a timeout of
24 hours, which is the time period of the DARPA competition from which we retrieved
the evaluation dataset.
We provide a summary of these results in Table 3.7. Additionally, to provide a better
context for the number of crashes identiﬁed by our techniques, we have included the
number of crashes identiﬁed by the competitors at the actual CGC Qualiﬁcation Event,
in Table 3.6. The overall scores of the teams relied on more than just crash counts, so the
placement in the qualifying event is not correlated with the position of the competitors.
Two of these competitors, the ﬁrst-place team [72] and the seventh-place team [73], have
written blog posts describing their techniques in the competition. Both teams used a
symbolically-assisted fuzzing technique, conceptually similar to Driller. Note that, while
our implementation of Driller identiﬁes the same number of vulnerabilities as the ﬁrst
place team, this is a coincidence (likely driven by the similarity between the techniques).
Dynamic symbolic execution. We chose to evaluate dynamic symbolic execution
both alone and in the presence of the Veritesting path explosion mitigation technique.
We describe the implementation details of these approaches in Section 3.5.
As expected, dynamic symbolic execution frequently succumbed to the path explosion
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problem. In total, the standard approach identiﬁed vulnerabilities in 16 of the CGC
binaries. Veritesting, which is designed to partially mitigate the path explosion problem,
identiﬁed only 11, for a combined count of 23 applications in which vulnerabilities were
identiﬁed.
We were initially surprised to ﬁnd that, despite the better results, the Veritesting
approach found less vulnerabilities than dynamic symbolic execution alone. Investigat-
ing these four binaries, we identiﬁed an interesting trade-oﬀ inherent to Veritesting.
Veritesting uses eﬃcient path merging to combat path explosion, which is responsible for
its ability to explore deeper paths in the binary before path explosion renders further
progress impossible. However, such path merging introduces complex expressions (e.g.,
if the value of register eax diﬀers between two merged paths, the value of the merged
path must be a complex expression encoding both previous values) and overloads the
constraint solver. Thus, the solve times of the constraint solver tend to increase as more
and more of these merges are done. As constraint solving is an NP-complete problem, the
increased complexity leads to vulnerabilities becoming unreachable within a reasonable
time. The result of this is that Veritesting is able to identify shallow bugs that dynamic
symbolic execution otherwise experiences a path explosion with, but overwhelms the
constraint solver for longer paths.
Symbolic-assisted fuzzing. Assisted fuzzing has proven to be extremely eﬀective in
the literature. In Section 3.5.2, we discuss an implementation of a symbolic-assisted
fuzzing method, dubbed Driller [36].
This symbolic-assisted fuzzer uses AFL for the fuzzing component. Each input that
AFL produces is traced in the dynamic symbolic execution engine to identify code sections
that could be reached by careful mutation of the input. This careful mutation is carried
out by the symbolic constraint solver, and the input is reintroduced to AFL for further
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execution and mutation. Because the individual inputs traced by the DSE engine do not
branch (as all the input is concrete), there is no path explosion during tracing, and AFL
limits the number of inputs passed to the DSE engine by ﬁltering out all the inputs that
do not increase code coverage.
It should be mentioned that AFL alone is able to identify vulnerabilities in a signif-
icant amount of the CGC services. In fact, of the 77 vulnerabilities that our symbolic-
assisted fuzzer detected, 68 were detected by AFL alone. The remaining 9 were found
through the use of symbolic assistance.
DSE vs. fuzzing. The diﬀerence between the results of the various dynamic sym-
bolic execution approaches are surprising. One might reasonably expect DSE to identify
roughly as many vulnerabilities as symbolically-assisted fuzzing, and more than fuzzing
alone. In reality, fuzzing identiﬁed almost three times as many vulnerabilities. In a sense,
this mirrors the recent trends in the security industry: symbolic analysis engines are crit-
icized as impractical while fuzzers receive an increasing amount of attention. However,
this situation seems at odds with the research directions of recent years, which seem to
favor symbolic execution.
Analyzing the crashing inputs that these approaches did ﬁnd, we identiﬁed an inter-
esting result: the exploits found by dynamic symbolic execution engines tend to represent
short paths. This result is presented in Figure 3.1. By spot-checking several applications
where dynamic symbolic execution (even with Veritesting) failed to ﬁnd vulnerabilities,
we have concluded that this is due to an increase in analysis complexity, exponentially
proportional to the length of the path.
Speciﬁcally, given a path A, there is a chance pa that A will split at the end of the next
conditional jump, and A1 will follow the path that takes the jump, while A2 will follow
the path that does not. At the next conditional jump, there is a chance that A1 and A2
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Figure 3.1: Length of crashing paths discovered by fuzzing vs. dynamic symbolic execution.
will fork as well. Thus, the amount of resulting paths to analyze increases exponentially,
and the chance that an unreasonable number of paths will have to be analyzed at any
point is exponentially proportional to how many basic blocks have been executed by the
analysis. As a result, the typical dynamic symbolic execution approach is best for ﬁnding
shallow crashes that do not require the execution of many basic blocks. Deep crashes,
on the other hand, tend to be hidden and made unreachable by the path explosion.
To further understand the relative eﬀectiveness of the techniques, we calculated the
code coverage of the generated test cases. We found that symbolic execution (includ-
ing Veritesting) covered an average of 330 blocks per binary (with a median of 260),
while fuzzing covered 689 (with a median of 402) and symbolic-assisted fuzzing covered
698 (with a median of 406). These results yield another interesting conclusion: if the
paths generated by fuzzing or symbolic-assisted fuzzing were combined into a graph, it
would represent a CFG with more code coverage than the one recovered by CFGAccurate
(and, by virtue of each edge in the graph being reachable by deﬁnition, with perfect
completeness), implying a need for further improvement of the accurate CFG recovery
algorithm.
Under-constrained symbolic execution. We extended angr to support under-constrained
symbolic execution to better understand how eﬀective such techniques are on our dataset.
These details are presented in Section 3.5.1.
UC-angr reported 371 vulnerabilities in the CGC binaries. However, as this approach
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analyzes functions without their context, it suﬀers from similar problems as static analy-
ses: the results contain a large number of false positives, and the results are not replayable
(that is, they do not generate crashing inputs, but instead point out the location of vul-
nerabilities). In fact, we identiﬁed 346 false positives in UC-angr's results, leaving 25
true positives and resulting in a false positive rate of 93%, which is in line with those
reported by UC-KLEE [38].
Static buﬀer overlap detection. To be able to compare the diﬀerent types of vulner-
abilities identiﬁed by fuzzing, symbolic execution, and other static analyses, we imple-
mented a VSA-based memory corruption detection analysis. We describe it in detail in
Section 3.4.
Similarly to UC-angr, our VSA results are not replayable and suﬀer from false posi-
tives. In total, VSA was able to identify 27 actual vulnerabilities in CGC binaries while
producing 130 false positives, resulting in a false-positive rate of 82.8%.
Non-replayable vs replayable analyses. Another surprising result is the compara-
tively low performance of non-replayable techniques (VSA and under-constrained sym-
bolic execution). While these techniques, freed from the replayability requirement, can
achieve more coverage in their analysis, we found that the context they lacked resulted
in an enormous amount of false positives in this dataset. To keep the false positive
rate reasonable, we had to implement aggressive false positive ﬁltering (as discussed in
Section 3.5.1), which ﬁltered out many true positives as well.
The improvement of static analysis techniques on real binaries appears to be an area
in need of research attention, and we are considering it as a direction for future work.
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3.7.3 Exploitation Evaluation.
After a crash is identiﬁed by the above approaches, we attempt to replay and exploit
it to understand its severity.
Crash replay. As we discuss in Section 3.6.1, crashing inputs identiﬁed by vulnerability
discovery analyses might not be trivially replayable due to environmental data (such as
the random seed) having been de-randomized by the analysis. We analyzed crashes for
each CGC binary, using the reference crashing inputs provided by DARPA for binaries
where we were unable to identify vulnerabilities with our vulnerability identiﬁcation
techniques. Of these crashing inputs, 6 were not trivially replayable. That is, rather
than simply replaying the crashing input provided to us by the vulnerability identiﬁcation
engines, we had to re-analyze the interaction with the binary to recover challenge-response
components present in these binaries.
Interestingly, DARPA imposes a limitation on the authors of CGC binaries from the
CGC Qualifying Event that disallows control ﬂow from being impacted by random data.
This means that the limitation of Replayer discussed in Section 3.6.4, the introduction
of diﬀerent path predicates due to diﬀerent values of random data, does not apply to its
operation on CGC binaries. Though angr did hang on one of the applications, manual
analysis revealed this to be an implementation issue, rather than one with the approach
and, as expected, Replayer was able to recover the input speciﬁcation of the remaining
5.
While 6 binaries are not a large dataset, this result suggests that current techniques
in this area are able to adequately handle binaries in the absence of control ﬂow variance
caused by random data. Further work is needed to evaluate, and possibly extend, these
techniques on real-world binaries with more complex control ﬂow.
Automatic exploit generation. After identifying the crash and running it through
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Replayer, we are left with an input speciﬁcation that reliably crashes the target applica-
tion. However, such inputs might still not be exploitable. For example, crashes caused
by null pointer dereferences, of which there are many in the CGC dataset, are not ex-
ploitable on modern systems. To separate exploitable from non-exploitable inputs, we
attempt to generate an exploit from the crash.
We attempted to automatically generate exploits for all of the CGC applications, us-
ing techniques proposed in the AEG system [47]. However, we were surprised to ﬁnd that
only 4 crashing exploits could be weaponized into exploits using these techniques. Look-
ing deeper into the binaries, we understood why. First, the goal of the CGC Qualiﬁcation
Event was to ﬁnd crashes for the binaries, not exploits. As such, many of the vulnerabili-
ties in these binaries are not actually exploitable (i.e., null-pointer dereferences). Second,
as the CGC binaries model a wide range of realistic exploitation scenarios, we found that
the techniques proposed by AEG were not applicable to the majority of them.
The current state of the art in this ﬁeld is fairly basic, and it appears in these results.
Further research is required into this ﬁeld to enable the automatic exploitation of complex
vulnerabilities.
Exploit hardening. Even an exploitable vulnerability might be mitigated by modern
protections. As a result, exploit hardening is required, and has been investigated by
recent work. We reimplemented the techniques proposed by Q [48] and attempted to
harden the exploits generated by AEG.
The Q implementation was able to harden 2 of the 4 exploits that AEG generated.
Our analysis as to why the remaining two exploits could not be hardened revealed that
the Q approach does not utilize enough information in the binary. In these two examples,
there is not enough attacker-controlled data on the stack and a stack pivot is required to
use attacker-controlled data in other parts of the program. The Q approach has no basis
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for reasoning about such operations and, as a result, these exploits cannot be hardened.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented angr, a system that implements, in a uniﬁed framework,
a number of techniques for the automated identiﬁcation and exploitation of vulnerabilities
in binaries. We presented, in a systematized fashion, the diﬀerent analyses and the
challenges we encountered when including them in our framework. By implementing these
approaches in a single system, we were able to meaningfully compare their eﬀectiveness
on a dataset that was created for the evaluation of these techniques. The results of this
evaluation can be used as a basis to highlight research directions, and to improve existing
techniques.
We made angr open-source, so that the community can build on top of it and focus
on addressing open challenges in the ﬁeld of binary analysis.
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IR Expression Evaluated Value
Constant A constant value.
Read Temp The value stored in a VEX tem-
porary variable.
Get Register The value stored in a register.
Load Memory The value stored at a memory ad-
dress, with the address speciﬁed
by another IR Expression.
Operation A result of a speciﬁed IR Opera-
tion, applied to speciﬁed IR Ex-
pression arguments.
If-Then-Else If a given IR Expression evaluates
to 0, return one IR Expression.
Otherwise, return another.
Helper Function VEX uses C helper functions
for certain operations, such as
computing the conditional ﬂags
registers of certain architectures.
These functions return IR Ex-
pressions.
Table 3.1: A list of relevant VEX IR Expressions for Firmalice's analysis.
IR Statement Eﬀect
Write Temp Set a VEX temporary variable to
the value of the given IR Expres-
sion.
Put Register Update a register with the value
of the given IR Expression.
Store Memory Update a location in memory,
given as an IR Expression, with
a value, also given as an IR Ex-
pression.
Exit A conditional exit from a basic
block, with the jump target spec-
iﬁed by an IR Expression. The
condition is speciﬁed by an IR Ex-
pression.
Table 3.2: A list of relevant VEX IR Statements for Firmalice's analysis and their
eﬀects on the program state.
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ARM Assembly VEX Representa-
tion
subs R2, R2, #8
t0 = GET:I32(16)
t1 = 0x8:I32
t3 = Sub32(t0,t1)
PUT(16) = t3
PUT(68) =
0x59FC8:I32
Table 3.3: An example of a VEX IR translation of a machine code instruction located
at 0x59FC4. VEX converts register names to numerical identiﬁers: 16 refers to R2
and 68 refers to the program counter.
Technique Based On Described In
Dynamic Symbolic Execution Various [22, 24, 71] 2.3.1, 3.5
Veritesting Veritesting [28] 2.3.1, 3.5
Under-constrained DSE UCSE [38] 2.3.1, 3.5.1
Symbolic-Assisted Fuzzing Driller [36] 2.3.1, 3.5.2
Static Analyses VSA [12] 2.2.2, 3.4
Crash Replay Replayer [66] 3.6.1, 3.6.4
Exploit Generation AEG [47] 3.6.2, 3.6.5
Exploit Hardening Q [48] 3.6.3, 3.6.6
Table 3.4: Analyses implemented and evaluated in this chapter, the literature on which
they are based, and the sections of this chapter in which they are discussed.
Approach Functions Function Edges Blocks Block Edges Bytes Time (s)
M A M A M A M A M A M A
IDA Pro 6.9 48 52.96 76.5 99.62 829 3589.93 1188 6487.68 14037 104779.66 1.14 1.80
angr - CFGFast 61 70.08 88 118.74 843 3609.45 1193 6538.52 14296 105007.49 0.87 5.01
IDA Pro 6.9 - reachability 37 40.96 74 90.76 496 1043.81 759 1693.01 7874 21721.85 1.14 1.80
angr - forced execution 31 33.24 48 55.22 349.5 413.85 612 751.96 6125 13963.5 23.50 36.96
angr - symbolic back traversal 32 33.76 50 56.28 368 635.41 645 1089.78 6323 10883.51 27.22 34.10
angr - backward slicing 30 32.80 47.5 53.89 344.5 653.56 594 1178.98 6109.5 14641.85 24.78 79.46
Table 3.5: Evaluation of CFGFast's and CFGAccurate's recovered CFG versus the CFG
recovered by IDA Pro. The median number (M) and average number (A) of each value
across all binaries are shown.
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CGC Qualifying Position Binaries Crashed
First 77
Second 12
Third 57
Fourth 9
Fifth 23
Sixth 57
Seventh 44
Eighth (did not qualify) 39
Ninth (did not qualify) 65
Table 3.6: Number of crashed binaries for the top 9 competitors in the CGC Qualiﬁ-
cation Event.
Technique Replayable Semantic Insight Scalability Crashes False Positives
Dynamic Symbolic Execution Yes High Low 16 0
Veritesting Yes High Medium 11 0
Dynamic Symbolic Execution + Veritesting Yes High Medium 23 0
Fuzzing (AFL) Yes Low High 68 0
Symbolic-Assisted Fuzzing Yes High High 77 0
VSA No Medium High 27 130
Under-constrained Symbolic Execution No High High 25 346
Table 3.7: Evaluation results across all vulnerability discovery techniques.
72
Chapter 4
Application of Cyber-autonomy to the
Detection of Authentication Bypass
Vulnerabilities
Over the last few years, as the world has moved closer to realizing the idea of the Internet
of Things, an increasing amount of the things with which we interact every day have been
replaced with embedded devices. These include previously non-electronic devices, such
as locks1, lightswitches2, and utility meters (such as electric meters and water meters)3,
as well as increasingly more complex and ubiquitous devices, such as network routers and
printers. These embedded devices are present in almost every modern home, and their
use is steadily increasing. A study conducted in 2011 noted that almost two thirds of US
households have a wireless router, and the number was slated to steadily increase [74].
The same report noted that, in South Korea, Wi-Fi penetration had reached 80%. The
numbers are similar for other classes of devices: it has been predicted that the market
penetration of smart meters will hit 75% by 2016, and close to 100% by 2020.
These examples are far from inclusive, as other devices are becoming increasingly
intelligent as well. Modern printers and cameras include complex social media function-
1For example, the Kwikset Kevo smart lock.
2Most popularly, Belkin's WeMO line.
3Such as the ION, a smart meter manufactured by Schneider Electric.
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ality, smart televisions are increasingly including Internet-based entertainment options,
and even previously-simple devices such as watches and glasses are being augmented with
complex embedded components.
The increasingly-complex systems that drive these devices have one thing in com-
mon: they must all communicate to carry out their intended functionality. Smart TVs
communicate with (and accept communication from) online media services, smart locks
allow themselves to be unlocked by phones or keypads, digital cameras contact social
media services, and smart meters communicate with the user's utility company. Such
communication, along with other functionalities of the device, is handled by software
(termed ﬁrmware) embedded in the device.
Because these devices often receive privacy-sensitive information from their sensors
(such as what a user is watching, or how much electricity they are using), or carry out a
safety-critical function (such as actuators that lock the front door), errors in the devices'
ﬁrmware, whether present due to an accidental mistake or purposeful malice, can have
serious and varying implications in both the digital and physical world. For example,
while a compromised smart meter might allow an attacker to determine a victim's daily
routine or otherwise invade their privacy based on their energy usage, a compromised
smart lock can permit unauthorized entry into a victim's home (or, in a corporate setting,
a compromised badge access veriﬁer can allow entry into extremely critical physical areas
of an organization). In fact, this is not just a theoretical concern: there have already
been examples of smart-home invasions [75].
Firmware is susceptible to a wide range of software errors. These include memory
corruption ﬂaws, command injection vulnerabilities, and application logic ﬂaws. Memory
corruption vulnerabilities in ﬁrmware have received some attention [76, 77], while other
vulnerabilities have, as of yet, been relatively unexplored in the context of ﬁrmware.
One common error seen in ﬁrmware is a logic ﬂaw called an authentication bypass
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or, less formally, a backdoor. An authentication bypass occurs when an error in the
authentication routine of a device allows a user to perform actions for which they would
otherwise need to know a set of credentials. In other cases, backdoors are deliberately
inserted by the manufacturer to get access to deployed devices for maintenance and
upgrade. As an example, an authentication bypass vulnerability on a smart meter can
allow an attacker to view and, depending on the functionality of the smart meter, modify
the recorded energy usage of a victim without having to know the proper username and
password, which, is generally kept secret by the utility company. Similarly, in the case
of a smart lock, an authentication bypass could allow an attacker to unlock a victim's
front door without knowing their passcode.
Authentication bypass vulnerabilities are not just a theoretical problem: recently pub-
licized vulnerabilities in embedded devices describe authentication bypass ﬂaws present
in several devices' ﬁrmware [78, 79], and a recent study has suggested that up to 80%
of consumer wireless routers are vulnerable to known vulnerabilities [80]. In fact, an
authentication bypass in Linksys routers was used by attackers to create a botnet out of
300,000 routers in February 2014 [81].
Detecting authentication bypasses in ﬁrmware is challenging for several reasons. To
begin with, the devices in question are usually proprietary, and, therefore, the source
code of the ﬁrmware is not available. While this is a problem common to analyzing
binary software in general, ﬁrmware takes it one step further: ﬁrmware often takes the
form of a single binary image that runs directly on the hardware of the device, without an
underlying operating system4. Because of this, OS and library abstractions do not exist
in some cases, and are non-standard or undocumented in others, and it is frequently
unknown how to properly initialize the runtime environment of the ﬁrmware sample
4The operating system is self-contained in the binary, and we cannot rely on a-priori knowledge or
known interfaces to such systems.
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(or, even, at what oﬀset to load the binary and at what address to begin execution).
We term such ﬁrmware as binary blob ﬁrmware. These blobs can be very large and,
therefore, any analysis tool must be able to handle such complex ﬁrmware. Additionally,
embedded devices frequently require their ﬁrmware to be cryptographically signed by the
manufacturer, making modiﬁcation of the ﬁrmware on the device for analysis purposes
infeasible.
These challenges make existing approaches infeasible for identifying logic ﬂaws in
ﬁrmware. Systems that are based on the instrumentation and execution monitoring of
ﬁrmware on a real device [82, 77] would not be able to operate in this space, because
they require access to and modiﬁcation of the device in order to run custom software.
In turn, this is made diﬃcult by the closed nature (including the aforementioned crypto-
graphic veriﬁcation of ﬁrmware images) and the hardware disparity (any sort of on-device
instrumentation would represent a per-device development eﬀort) of embedded devices.
Additionally, existing ﬁrmware analysis systems that take a purely symbolic approach
(and, thus, do not require analyses to be run on the device itself) [76] would not be
able to scale their analysis to complex ﬁrmware samples, like those used by printers and
smart meters. Moreover, they require source code, which is typically not available for
proprietary ﬁrmware. As a result of these challenges, most detections of authentication
bypasses in ﬁrmware are done manually. This is problematic for two reasons. First,
manual analysis is impractical given the raw number of diﬀerent embedded devices on
the market. Second, even when manual analysis is performed, the complexity of ﬁrmware
code can introduce errors in the analysis.
To address the shortcomings of existing analysis approaches, we developed a system,
called Firmalice, that automates most of the process of searching ﬁrmware binaries for
the presence of logic ﬂaws. To the best of our knowledge, Firmalice is the ﬁrst ﬁrmware
analysis system working at the binary level, in a scalable manner, and with no requirement
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to instrument code on the original device.
We applied Firmalice to the detection of authentication bypass ﬂaws, as seen in several
recent, high-proﬁle disclosures of ﬁrmware backdoors. To allow Firmalice to reason about
such ﬂaws, we created a novel model of authentication bypass vulnerabilities, based
around the concept of an attacker's ability to determine the input necessary to execute
privileged operations of the device. Intuitively, if an attacker can derive the necessary
input for driving a ﬁrmware to perform a privileged operation simply by analyzing the
ﬁrmware, the authentication mechanism is either ﬂawed or bypassable. Additionally, this
model allows us to reason about complicated backdoors, such as cases when a backdoor
password is secretly disclosed to the user by the ﬁrmware itself, as we consider such
information determinable by an attacker.
Because the deﬁnition of a privileged operation (i.e., an operation that requires pre-
liminary authencation) varies between devices, Firmalice requires the speciﬁcation of a
security policy for each ﬁrmware sample, to locate such operations. Our system receives
a ﬁrmware sample and the speciﬁcation of its security policy, and then loads the ﬁrmware
sample, translates its binary code into an intermediate representation, and performs a
static full-program control and data ﬂow analysis, followed by symbolic execution of
ﬁrmware slices, to detect the presence of any violations of the security policy.
We evaluated our approach against three real-world ﬁrmware samples: a network
printer, a smart meter, and a CCTV camera. These devices demonstrate Firmalice's
ability to analyze diverse hardware platforms, encompassing both ARM and PPC, among
other supported architectures. Additionally, these samples represent both bare-metal bi-
nary blobs and user-space programs, and their backdoors are triggered in several diﬀerent
ways.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
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• We develop a model to describe, in an architecture-independent and implementation-
independent way, authentication bypass vulnerabilities in ﬁrmware binaries. This
model is considerably more general than existing techniques, and it is focused
around the concept of input determinism. The model allows us to reason about,
and detect, complicated backdoors, including intentionally-inserted authentication,
bugs in authentication code, and missing authentication routines, without being
dependent on implementation details of the ﬁrmware itself.
• We implement a tool that utilizes advanced program analysis techniques to analyze
binary code in complex ﬁrmware of diverse hardware platforms, and automate much
of the process of identifying occurrences of authentication bypass vulnerabilities.
This tool uses novel techniques to improve the scalability of the analysis.
• We evaluate our tool on three real-world ﬁrmware samples, detailing our experi-
ments and successfully detecting authentication bypass vulnerabilities, demonstrat-
ing that manual analysis is not suﬃcient for authentication bypass detection.
4.1 Authentication Bypass Vulnerabilities
The increased prominence of embedded consumer electronics have given rise to a
new challenge in access control. Speciﬁcally, many embedded devices contain privileged
operations that should only be accessible by authorized users. One example of this is
the case of networked CCTV cameras: it is obvious that only an authenticated user
should be able to view the recorded video and change recording settings. To protect
these privileged operations, these devices generally include some form of user veriﬁcation.
This veriﬁcation (i.e., only an authorized user can access privileged functionality) almost
always takes the form of an authentication of the user's credentials before the privileged
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functionality is executed.
The veriﬁcation can be avoided by means of an authentication bypass attack. Au-
thentication bypass vulnerabilities, commonly termed backdoors, allow an attacker to
perform privileged operations in ﬁrmware without having knowledge of the valid creden-
tials of an authorized user.
The backdoors that we have analyzed tend to assume one of several forms, which we
will detail here, before describing how we designed Firmalice to detect the presence of
these vulnerabilities.
Intentionally hardcoded credentials. The most common type of authentication by-
pass is the presence of hardcoded authentication credentials in the authentication
routine of an embedded device. Most commonly, this takes the form of a hardcoded
string against which the password is compared (e.g., using strcmp()). If the com-
parison succeeds, access is granted to the attacker. There have been many recent
high-proﬁle cases of such backdoors. We discuss one such case, a backdoor in the
web interface of a networked CCTV camera [83], in Section 4.8.2.
In some cases, the credentials might not be directly hardcoded in this manner, but
still predictable. One example is a popular model of smart meter, that calculates
a factory access password by hashing its publicly-known model number [84].
Intentionally hidden authentication interface. Alternatively, an authentication by-
pass can take the form of a hidden (or undocumented) authentication interface.
Such interfaces grant access to privileged operations without the need for an at-
tacker to authenticate. Hidden authentication interfaces have been featured in some
recent vulnerabilities [79, 85], and we describe one such case, aﬀecting a popular
model of network printer.
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Unintended bugs. Sometimes, unintended bugs compromise the integrity of the au-
thentication routine, or allow its bypass completely. One example is command
injection: some routers allow unauthenticated users to test connectivity by pro-
viding a web interface to the ping binary, and incorrect handling of user input
frequently results in command injections.
By analyzing known authentication bypass vulnerabilities in ﬁrmware samples, we
identiﬁed that a lack of secrecy, or, inversely, the determinism of the input necessary to
perform a privileged operation, lies at the core of each one. That is, the authentication
bypass exists either because the required input (most importantly, the credentials) was
insuﬃciently secret to begin with (i.e., a comparison with a hardcoded string embedded
in the binary), because the secrecy was compromised during communication (for example,
by leaking information that could be used to derive a password), or because there was no
authentication to begin with (such as the case of an administrative interface, listening,
sans authentication, on a secret port).
To reason about these vulnerabilities, we created a model based on the concept of
input determinism. Our model is a generalization of this class of vulnerability, leveraging
the observation that input determinism is a common theme in authentication bypass
vulnerabilities. Our authentication bypass model speciﬁes that all paths leading from an
entry point into the ﬁrmware (e.g., a network connection or a keyboard input handler)
to a privileged operation (e.g., a command handler that performs some sensitive action)
must validate some input that the attacker cannot derive from the ﬁrmware image itself or
from prior communication with the device. In other words, we report an authentication
bypass vulnerability when an attacker can craft (a possible sequence of) inputs that lead
the ﬁrmware execution to a privileged operation. Whenever the attacker is able to extract
such input from the analysis of the ﬁrmware itself, he has found an authentication bypass
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vulnerability.
This model is considerably more general than existing approaches: it is not important
how the actual authentication code is implemented, or, to an extent, what the actual vul-
nerability is; the analysis needs only to reason about the attacker's ability to determine
the input. Note that our model does not require any knowledge of a speciﬁc authentica-
tion function. In fact, as an interesting special case, our system reports an authentication
bypass for all instances where the authentication function is entirely missing.
Unlike classical memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buﬀer overﬂows, logic
vulnerabilities such as authentication bypasses require a semantic understanding of the
actual device in question. Speciﬁcally, the deﬁnition of a privileged operation will diﬀer
for diﬀerent devices. Firmalice requires the analyst to provide this information as part of
a Security Policy, which speciﬁes resources that a device may not access or actions that
a device cannot perform without authentication. We describe these policies in detail in
Section 4.4.
In the next section, we will provide an overview of Firmalice's operation, from the
input of a ﬁrmware sample and security policy to the detection of authentication bypass
vulnerabilities.
4.2 Approach Overview
The identiﬁcation of authentication bypasses in ﬁrmware proceeds in several steps.
At a high level, Firmalice loads a ﬁrmware image, parses a security policy, and uses static
analysis to drive a symbolic execution engine. The results from this symbolic execution
are then checked against the security policy to identify violations.
We summarize each individual step in this section, and describe them in detail in the
rest of the chapter.
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Firmware Loading. Before the analysis can be carried out, ﬁrmware must be loaded
into our analysis engine. We describe this process, and the special challenges that
ﬁrmware analysis introduces, in Section 4.3. The output of this step is an internal
representation of a loaded, ready-to-analyze ﬁrmware sample.
Security Policies. Firmalice has the capability to translate security policies into ana-
lyzable properties of the program itself. Speciﬁcally, Firmalice takes the privileged
operation, described by a security policy, and identiﬁes a set of privileged program
points, which are points in the program that, if executed, represent the privileged
operation being performed. Security policies, and how Firmalice translates them
into privileged program points, are described in Section 4.4.
Static Program Analysis. The loaded ﬁrmware is then passed to the Static Program
Analysis module. This module generates a program dependency graph of the
ﬁrmware and uses this graph to create an authentication slice from an entry point
to the privileged program point. This is detailed in Section 4.5.
Symbolic Execution. The authentication slice created by the Static Program Analysis
module is passed to Firmalice's Symbolic Execution engine, presented in Section 4.6.
The symbolic execution engine attempts to ﬁnd paths that successfully reach a
privileged program point. When such a path is found, the resulting symbolic state
(termed the privileged state), is passed to the Authentication Bypass Check module.
Authentication Bypass Check. Every privileged state found by the Symbolic Execu-
tion engine is passed to the Bypass Check module. This module uses the concept
of input determinism to determine whether the state in question represents the use
of an authentication bypass vulnerability. The authentication bypass model, and
the procedure to check a privileged state against it, are described in Section 4.7. If
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the state is determined to represent an authentication bypass, Firmalice's analysis
terminates, and the input required to trigger the bypass is extracted and provided
as Firmalice's output. If the input required to bypass authentication depends on
prior communication with the device, Firmalice produces a function that, given the
output of such communication, produces a valid input.
State Constraints Input
Backdoor input_0 = GO && input_1 = ON GO\nON\n
Normal input_0 = get_username_0 && (undetermined)
input_1 = get_password_0
Table 4.1: The privileged states resulting from Firmalice's symbolic execution.
To better explain how Firmalice operates on a ﬁrmware sample, we present an ex-
ample in this section. For simplicity, the example is a user-space ﬁrmware sample with
a hardcoded backdoor, shown in Listing 2 (the backdoor is the check in lines 2 and 3).
Note that while Listing 2 presents source code, our approach operates on binary code.
In this example, the security policy provided to Firmalice is: The Firmware should
not present a prompt for a command (speciﬁcally, output the string Command:) to an
unauthenticated user.
Firmalice ﬁrst loads the ﬁrmware program, using the techniques described in Sec-
tion 4.3, and carries out its Static Program Analysis, as described in Section 4.5. This
results in a control ﬂow graph and a data dependency graph. The latter is then used to
identify the location in the program where the string Command: is shown to the user. This
serves as the privileged program point for Firmalice's analysis. The control ﬂow graph,
which is part of the end result of the Static Program Analysis, is shown in Figure 4.1,
with the privileged program point marked with a dashed outline.
Firmalice utilizes its Static Program Analysis module to create an authentication
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slice to the privileged program point. In our example, this slice comprises the nodes in
Figure 4.1 that are not greyed out.
The extracted authentication slice5 is then passed to Firmalice's Symbolic Execution
engine. This engine explores the slice symbolically, and attempts to ﬁnd user inputs that
would reach the privileged program point. In this case, it ﬁnds two such states: one that
authenticates the user via the backdoor, and one that authenticates the user properly.
The symbolic constraints associated with these states are shown in Table 4.1.
As these privileged states are discovered, they are passed to the Authentication By-
pass Check module. In this case, the component would detect that the ﬁrst state (with
a username of GO and a password of ON) contains a completely deterministic input,
and, thus, represents an authentication bypass. Upon detecting this, Firmalice's analysis
terminates and outputs the input required to reach the privileged program point.
5Starting at the user input in line 19, traversing the auth() function, and ending at the privileged
program point in line 20.
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1 int auth(char *u, char *p) {
2 if ((strcmp(u, "GO") == 0) &&
3 (strcmp(p, "ON") == 0))
4 return SUCCESS;
5
6 for (int i = 0; i < 10000000; i++)
7 pointless();
8
9 char *stored_u = get_username();
10 char *stored_p = get_password();
11 if ((strcmp(u, stored_u) == 0) &&
12 (strcmp(p, stored_p) == 0))
13 return SUCCESS;
14 else return FAIL;
15 }
16
17 int main() {
18 puts("Hello!");
19 if (auth(input("User:"), input("Password:")))
20 system(input("Command:"));
21 }
Listing 2: Example of authentication code containing a hard-coded backdoor.
4.3 Firmware Loading
The ﬁrst step of analyzing ﬁrmware is, of course, loading it into the analysis system.
Firmware takes one of two forms:
user-space ﬁrmware. Some embedded devices actually run a general-purpose OS, with
much of their functionality implemented in user-space programs. A common ex-
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puts(Hello!) input(U:) input(P:)
strcmp(u, GO)strcmp(p, ON)
for (...) pointless()
stored_u = get_username()
stored_p = get_password()
strcmp(u, stored_u)
strcmp(p, stored_p)return SUCCESS
return FAILinput(Command:)
system(...)
Figure 4.1: Firmalice's CFG for the example. The darkened nodes are excluded from
the authentication slice.
ample of this is the wide array of Wi-Fi routers on the market, generally running
a stripped-down version of Linux. All of the OS primitives (i.e., system calls),
program entry points, and library import symbols are well-deﬁned.
Binary-blob ﬁrmware. Firmware often takes the form of a single binary image that
runs directly on the bare metal of the device, without an underlying operating
system. OS and library abstractions do not exist in such cases, and it is generally
unknown how to properly initialize the runtime environment of the ﬁrmware sample,
or at what oﬀset to load the binary and at what address to begin execution.
Analyzing user-space ﬁrmware samples is analogous to analyzing a normal user-space
program, whereas binary-blob ﬁrmware presents several challenges unique to ﬁrmware
analysis, which we discuss in this section. The output of this phase of the analysis
is an internal representation of the ﬁrmware, properly loaded in memory and ready to
be analyzed. This is then passed to the Static Program Analysis step, described in
Section 4.5.
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4.3.1 Disassembly and Intermediate Representation
Before an analysis of a ﬁrmware sample can be carried out, the binary must be
disassembled. This is complicated by the fact that, in the case of binary-blob ﬁrmware,
the base address where the binary should be loaded and the entry point are not known.
Disassembling binary code without this knowledge has been well explored by existing
work [60]. Therefore, we leverage existing techniques to acquire a reliable disassembly of
the ﬁrmware.
As with any static analysis tool, proper disassembly of the ﬁrmware sample is a strict
requirement for Firmalice's operation. However, modern disassembly techniques have
been honed on evasive code, such as malware, and we feel (and, in fact, it has been our
experience) that there are no issues disassembling ﬁrmware code. Unlike malware, and
due to the power and performance requirements of embedded devices, ﬁrmware is not
obfuscated, and the aforementioned techniques are eﬀective.
Firmalice supports a wide range of processor architectures by carrying out its analyses
over an intermediate representation (IR) of binary code. While the choice of a represen-
tation itself is not important for our analysis, we present the IR that Firmalice uses in
Appendix 3.2.
4.3.2 Base Address Determination
Binary-blob ﬁrmware typically comes with no information as to the memory location
at which it expects to be loaded in the device's memory. Before an analysis of the
ﬁrmware can be carried out, this value must be determined. Firmalice accomplishes this
by leveraging jump tables in the binary.
Jump tables comprise a set of absolute code addresses, stored sequentially in memory.
These addresses are read (in many cases, using absolutely-addressed memory accesses) by
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indirect jumps to determine the jump target. Firmalice identiﬁes the expected location
of a binary-blob ﬁrmware in memory by analyzing the relationship between jump table
positions and the memory access pattern of the indirect jump instructions.
The targets of jump tables tend to exhibit high spatial locality, as they are commonly
diﬀerent cases of a switch statement in the same function. That is, jump tables are
typically stored as consecutive values in memory, each of these values being a target
address. To identify jump tables, Firmalice scans a binary blob (in steps equal to the
architecture's address bit width) for consecutive values that diﬀer only in their least
signiﬁcant two bytes. Firmalice then analyzes all indirect jumps found in the disassembly
phase and identiﬁes the memory locations from which they read their jump targets. The
binary is then relocated so that the maximum number of these accesses are associated
with a jump table.
4.3.3 Entry Point Discovery
Unfortunately, without a standard executable ﬁle format, binary blobs lack entry
point information. That is, even after disassembling a binary, it is unclear from which
start instruction the analysis should begin. As an additional complication, there may be
multiple entry points to support features such as interrupt requests, with each interrupt
request handler representing an additional entry point into the ﬁrmware.
Firmalice's static analysis requires knowledge of the entry points to the ﬁrmware.
Prior work, such as Avatar [77], has required the manual speciﬁcation of entry points,
but in order to reduce the amount of required manual input, Firmalice attempts to
automatically identify potential execution entry points. This is done in several steps.
First, Firmalice attempts to identify functions in the binary blob. This is done by
scanning through the binary blob for common function prologue instructions (depending
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on the architecture in question) and analyzing the control ﬂow until a return is encoun-
tered. If the function being analyzed issues a call instruction, Firmalice adds the called
function to its analysis as well.
Next, Firmalice creates a coarse directed call graph from the list of functions, and
identiﬁes all the weakly-connected components of this graph. Any root node of a weakly-
connected component is identiﬁed as a potential entry point. This is based on the as-
sumption that, since it is not called in the code, it may be called as an interrupt handler.
For Firmalice's purposes, an over-estimation of entry points is acceptable in practice.
The reason for this is that the privileged program points are not reachable from most
of the entry points, and hence the static analysis discards superﬂuous entry points from
further consideration.
4.4 Security Policies
Traditional vulnerability detection systems such as KLEE [22], AEG [86], and May-
hem [24], among others, are designed to identify memory corruption vulnerabilities in
software. Since such vulnerabilities are easily described in a general way (i.e., a control
ﬂow hijack occurs whenever the program being analyzed jumps to a user-speciﬁed loca-
tion), these systems can be created with a speciﬁc vulnerability model and that is then
leveraged in the analysis of many diﬀerent programs.
Firmalice's task is more diﬃcult, as authentication bypass vulnerabilities are a class
of logic ﬂaws. Logic ﬂaws take many forms based on, intuitively, the actual intended logic
of the developers of the software (or, in our case, ﬁrmware) that is analyzed. Since a logic
ﬂaw is a deviation of a program's execution from the logic intended by the developers
of the program, what actually constitutes one is highly dependent on what the device
in question is designed to do. This holds true for authentication bypass vulnerabilities,
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the speciﬁc class of logic ﬂaws that Firmalice is designed to detect. For example, the
ability to watch videos without authentication might be acceptable when dealing with a
streaming media set-top box, but represents an authentication bypass when analyzing a
network-connected camera.
Automatically reasoning about the intended logic of a program requires reasoning
about the intentions of the programmer, which we consider outside of the scope of pro-
gram analysis. Thus, Firmalice requires a human analyst to provide a security policy.
For our purposes, a security policy must specify what operations should be considered
privileged (and, hence, must always require the user to be authenticated).
When provided a security policy, Firmalice analyzes the ﬁrmware in question to con-
vert the policy into a set of privileged program points : that is, a set of points in the code of
the ﬁrmware that, when executed, would cause the privileged operation to be performed.
This set of program points is then utilized by Firmalice in its analysis to identify if the
execution can reach the speciﬁed program point without proper authentication.
These policies vary in the amount of knowledge that they require the analyst to have
about the inner working of the ﬁrmware: from information that any user moderately
familiar with the device would possess, to intricate details about code reachability or
memory accesses. The rest of this section describes the policies that Firmalice supports
and discusses how Firmalice utilizes these policies to identify privileged program points.
Static output. A security policy can be speciﬁed as a rule about some static data (usu-
ally ASCII text, but in general any sequence of bytes) the program must not output
to a user that has not been properly authenticated. An example of such policy is
The program must not output AUTHENTICATION SUCCEEDED to an unauthenticated
user.
When provided such a policy, Firmalice searches the ﬁrmware for the static data and
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utilizes its data dependency graph (described in Section 4.5) to identify locations in
the program where this data can be passed into an output routine. These locations
become the privileged program points for the remainder of the analysis.
Behavioral rules. Another policy that Firmalice supports is the regulation of what
actions a device may take without authentication. In the case of a smart lock, this
policy might be The lock motor must never turn without proper authentication.
For Firmalice to be able to reason about such policies, the user must also specify
how this action would be accomplished. For example, for a device with peripherals
that should never read from an attached camera without authentication, this might
be A ﬁle in /dev must never be opened without authentication.
Firmalice processes this policy by analyzing its control ﬂow graph and data depen-
dency graph for positions where an action is taken that matches the parameters
speciﬁed in the security policy. In our example, this would be any location where
a string that is data-dependent on any string starting with /dev is passed to the
open system call.
Memory access. Embedded devices often communicate with and act on memory-mapped
sensors and actuators. To support identifying authentication bypass vulnerabili-
ties in such devices, Firmalice accepts security policies that reason about access
to absolute memory addresses. When supplied such a policy, Firmalice identiﬁes
locations in the data dependency graph where such memory locations are accessed,
and identiﬁes them as privileged program points.
Direct privileged program point identiﬁcation. If the analyst has detailed knowl-
edge about the ﬁrmware, the privileged program points can be speciﬁed directly
as function addressed in the security policy. These are then passed directly to the
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rest of the analysis.
These security policies are general enough to cover the intended behavior of the
ﬁrmware samples that we have seen so far.
Of course, Firmalice's Security Policy Parsing module can be extended to support
other types of security policies, if required. However, we see the creation and parsing of
more intricate security policy as an orthogonal problem to the identiﬁcation of authenti-
cation bypass vulnerabilities, and thus, consider further work in this area outside of the
scope of our contribution.
The security policy, along with the ﬁrmware sample itself, represent the inputs to
Firmalice.
4.5 Static Program Analysis
Symbolically executing entire binary ﬁrmware images is not feasible due to the size
of the ﬁrmware of complex embedded devices. Instead of analyzing entire binaries, Fir-
malice focuses on the portions of binaries that are relevant to authentication bypass
vulnerabilities. Speciﬁcally, the symbolic execution step only needs to be carried out on
the parts of the ﬁrmware leading to a privileged program point in the ﬁrmware. Firmalice
isolates this code by creating a slice through the ﬁrmware. Speciﬁcally, Firmalice creates
a backward slice, starting from the privileged program point, backwards to an entry point
in the ﬁrmware.
The static analysis module requires as input the loaded ﬁrmware sample (produced
by the Firmware Loading module, described in Section 4.3). The actual slicing step
also requires the address of one or more privileged program points. These should be
instructions in the ﬁrmware that should only be reached by authenticated users. As we
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discuss in Section 4.4, privileged program points are derived from an analyst-provided
security policy.
The identiﬁcation of privileged program points speciﬁed by a security policy, and the
creation of backward slices leading to them, requires the use of a program dependency
graph (PDG) to reason about the control and data ﬂow required to arrive at a speciﬁc
point in the program. The program dependency graph comprises a data dependency
graph (DDG) and a control dependency graph (CDG). Those, in turn, require a control
ﬂow graph to be created.
4.5.1 Control Flow Graph
The ﬁrst step in creating a PDG is the creation of a CFG, a graph of program
basic blocks and transitions between them. Firmalice creates a context-sensitive CFG by
statically analyzing the ﬁrmware, starting from each of the entry points and looking for
jump edges in the graph. Firmalice can support computed and indirect jumps (including
jump tables) by leveraging its Symbolic Execution module, described in Section 4.6.
Firmalice's analyses are performed with a call-site context sensitivity of 2, to improve
the precision of the static analysis. This threshold for the call-site context sensitivity can
be changed at the expense of an exponential runtime increase, but, in practice, we have
found that a threshold of 2 works well for the ﬁrmware samples that we analyzed.
Firmalice leverages several techniques to increase the precision of its control ﬂow
graph. During CFG generation, Firmalice utilizes forced execution to systematically ex-
plore both directions of every conditional branch [87]. When it encounters a computed
or indirect jump, Firmalice can leverage its symbolic execute engine (which will be de-
scribed in Section 4.6) to reason about the possible targets of that jump. By doing this,
Firmalice is able to handle complex control ﬂow transfers, such as jump tables. In turn, a
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precise CFG has a trickle-down eﬀect on the precision of the rest of Firmalice's analysis.
Firmalice stores the context-sensitive CFG as a graph, in which the contexts are nodes
and edges represent control ﬂow transfers between these contexts. This means that the
graph might contain several distinct instances of a basic block γ with a control transfer
edge to basic block α, as long as the call-sites of α and γ diﬀer.
4.5.2 Control Dependency Graph
A control dependency graph represents, for each statement X (generally, a binary
instruction, but in our case, an IR statement), which other statements Y determine
whether X is executed. Together with the CFG, the CDG can be used to identify
statements that may be executed before a given statement is executed.
Again, we use a context sensitivity of 2 when generating the CDG, which allows
Firmalice to reason about not only basic blocks that may be executed so that a given
statement is reached, but also the call context from which those basic block would be
executed. The CDG is generated via a straightforward transformation of the CFG [88].
The CDG is not used directly, but is combined with the data dependency graph to
create the PDG.
4.5.3 Data Dependency Graph
A data dependency graph (DDG) shows how instructions correlate with each other
with respect to the production and consumption of data. Eﬃciently generating a sound
DDG for a binary slice has several challenges. First, program slicing requires a ﬂow-
sensitive and context-sensitive data ﬂow analysis, with a runtime complexity exponential
to the number of all possible paths in a program. Second, analyzing the data ﬂow of
binary programs poses some unique problems. For instance, the precision of the DDG
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suﬀers from any imprecision in the CFG from which it is built, and creating a precise
CFG statically is a hard problem for arbitrary binary code. Additionally, all information
about data structures and types is discarded during compilation, which makes performing
a sound data ﬂow analysis even harder. Thus, most data ﬂow analyses are designed to
work with high-level languages, but not with binary code. Finally, the analysis result
should be sound, otherwise one risks removing instructions that are otherwise required
to achieve a proper result.
To handle the issues mentioned above, Firmalice adopts an existing, worklist-based,
iterative approach to data ﬂow analysis [89]. The approach is an inter-procedural data
ﬂow analysis algorithm that uses def-use chains, in addition to use-def chains, to optimize
the worklist algorithm.
As with the other algorithms in the static analyses phase, the DDG is generated with
a context sensitivity of 2.
4.5.4 Backward Slicing
Using the program dependency graph, Firmalice can compute backward slices. That
is, starting from a given program point, we can produce every statement on which that
point depends. This step leverages slicing techniques from existing work in the liter-
ature [88]. Slicing is used to improve the feasibility of the symbolic analysis on large
binaries, in two ways. First, it removes entire functions that are irrelevant to the analy-
sis. Since symbolic analysis, in the general case, must explore every path of a program,
this represents a substantial decrease in analysis complexity. Second, since our IR trans-
lates complex instructions into multiple simple statements, Firmalice's slicing allows one
to ignore irrelevant side-eﬀects of these instructions. This is especially relevant for archi-
tectures that implicitly update conditional ﬂags (speciﬁcally, ARM, x86, and AMD64),
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as it frees Firmalice from the need to evaluate the ﬂag registers when they are not used
(which, on such architectures, is the common case).
4.6 Symbolic Execution Engine
After an authentication slice is created by the Static Program Analysis module, Fir-
malice attempts to identify user inputs that successfully reach the privileged program
point. Recall that an authentication slice is a set of instructions between a proposed en-
try point and the privileged program point that the attacker tries to reach. To enable our
analysis, we have implemented a Symbolic Execution Engine. Our approach to symbolic
execution draws on concepts proposed in KLEE [22], FuzzBALL [90], and Mayhem [24],
adapted to our speciﬁc problem domain.
Speciﬁcally, the implementation of this module of Firmalice follows ideas presented
in Mayhem, adding support for symbolic summaries of functions (described in para-
graph 4.6.2), to automatically detect common library functions and abstract their eﬀects
on the symbolic state. This greatly reduces the number of paths that the symbolic ex-
ecutor must explore, since it prevents such functions from causing the analysis to branch.
We discuss several details speciﬁc to our symbolic execution engine in this section.
4.6.1 Symbolic State and Constraints
Firmalice's symbolic analysis works at the level of symbolic states. A symbolic state is
an abstract representation of the values contained in memory (e.g., variables), registers,
as well as constraints on these values, for any given point of the program (i.e., each
program point has an independent state).
Constraints are expressions limiting the range of possible values for a symbolic vari-
able. They may express relations between symbolic variables and constants (i.e., x < 5)
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or between multiple symbolic values (i.e., x < y + z).
For user-space ﬁrmware processes, the state also contains other program information,
such as the status of open ﬁles. States are modiﬁed by symbolic translations of IR
representations of binary instructions that consume an input state and produce one or,
in the case of conditional or computed jumps, multiple output states. As the execution
goes following paths in the program, Firmalice keeps tracks of symbolic constraints in
a set of path constraints. Whenever a path reaches the privileged program point, its
associated state is labeled as a privileged state and passed to the Authentication Bypass
Check module for further analysis, based on constraint solving6. The term constraint
solving refers to the problem of ﬁnding concrete or symbolic solutions that satisfy a set
of constraints on a variable (e.g., determining, in the case of x < 5 && x >= 0, that x
can be 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4).
4.6.2 Symbolic Summaries
Firmalice adopts the concept of symbolic summaries, a well-known concept in pro-
gram analysis, which involves descriptions of the transformation that certain commonly-
seen functions (or, generally, any piece of code) have on a program state [92]. The
intuition behind this concept is that the eﬀects of certain functions can be more eﬃ-
ciently explained through a manual speciﬁcation of constraints than by analyzing the
underlying binary code. This is because an initial analysis of a piece of binary code lacks
a semantic understanding of what that code is trying to accomplish. A process that had
such an understanding, however, could analyze the code as a whole and introduce con-
straints that took these semantics into account. In fact, we found that such a process has
two advantages: properly summarizing the code allows us to avoid branching the analysis
state during the execution of such functions, and the constraints that are generated are
6Firmalice utilizes Z3 [91] to perform symbolic constraint solving.
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often simpler than those that would be generated from an analysis of the code itself.
To explore this concept in our analysis, we implemented support for symbolic sum-
maries in Firmalice. A symbolic summary acts in the same way as a binary instruction: it
consumes an input state and produces a set of output states. We implemented symbolic
summaries for 49 common functions from the Standard C Library.
While this concept is well-known in the ﬁeld of program analysis, applying it to
automatic binary analysis is not trivial, as Firmalice needs to know which pieces of code
should be replaced by these summaries. To determine this automatically, we created a set
of test cases for each of the functions that we summarized. These test cases, comprising
an input state (representing a set of arguments to the function) and a set of checks of its
eﬀect on this state, attempt to determine whether or not an arbitrary binary function is
an implementation of the function summarized by the symbolic summary in question.
Generally, more than one test case is required to uniquely identify a library function.
For example, several diﬀerent test cases are required to distinguish between strcmp()
and strncmp(), since the two functions act in the same way for certain sets of inputs
(lower case strings for example). Similarly, multiple test cases are required to diﬀerentiate
between memcpy() and strncpy(). While this represents more work when writing test
cases, it also allows us to speed up the testing procedure, because if a function fails a
test case that should be passed by both memcpy() and strncpy(), we can conclude that
it is neither of those functions.
When Firmalice symbolically calls a function for the ﬁrst time (i.e., analyzing a call
instruction), the analysis is paused and the function-testing phase begins. Firmalice ﬁrst
attempts to run the function with the test case states. If all of the test cases of a symbolic
summary pass, Firmalice replaces the entry point to the function in question with that
symbolic summary, and continues its analysis. Any subsequent jumps to that address will
instead trigger execution of the symbolic summary. If no symbolic summary is identiﬁed
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as the right summary for a function, the function is analyzed normally. The test cases
should be mutually independent across all symbolic summaries. That is, for any given
function, if all test cases of symbolic summary A pass, then there must be no summary
B for which all test cases also pass. Such situations arise in the case of inadequate test
cases, and must be remedied before Firmalice can properly detect symbolic summaries.
While symbolic summaries allow Firmalice to perform a considerably deeper analysis
than would otherwise be possible, there is a trade-oﬀ. Because we do not fully analyze the
summarized code, our approach would miss any backdoors that were hidden in common
library functions. We feel that this trade-oﬀ is acceptable.
4.6.3 Lazy Initialization
Binary-blob ﬁrmware contains initialization code that is responsible for setting various
memory locations to initial values, setting up request handlers, and performing other
housekeeping tasks. However, since Firmalice has no prior knowledge of such code7 it is
not executed before beginning the analysis, leading to complications when, for example,
kernel-level functionality of ﬁrmware attempts to access certain global data structures.
If such data structures are not initialized, superﬂuous paths based on normally infeasible
kernel conditions are introduced into the analysis.
To mitigate this, Firmalice adopts a lazy approach to ﬁrmware initialization. When
the execution engine encounters a memory read from uninitialized memory, it identiﬁes
other procedures that contain direct memory writes to that location, and labels them
as initialization procedures. If an initialization procedure is identiﬁed, the state is du-
plicated: one state continues execution without modiﬁcation, while the other one runs
the initialization procedure before resuming execution. This allows Firmalice to safely
execute initialization code without the risk of breaking the analysis.
7the execution starts after the input related to the authentication routine
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4.7 Authentication Bypass Check
As discussed in Section 5.2, our model of an authentication bypass builds upon the
property of input determination. That is, if an attacker can analyze the ﬁrmware and
produce inputs, possibly including valid authentication credentials, to reach a privileged
program point, an authentication bypass is said to exist.
This model is not dependent on the implementation of the backdoor itself, but rather
on the fundamental idea behind authentication bypass vulnerabilities: the attacker can
create an input that, regardless of the conﬁguration of the device, will allow them to
authenticate (i.e., reach a privileged program point).
To detect such bypasses, Firmalice leverages the property of constraint solvability with
respect to the user input required to achieve authentication. Speciﬁcally, we model the
determinism of the input with the ability to concretize it to a unique value, as described
in Section 4.7.3. However, we make this determination after taking into account the
exposure of data from the device, in the form of output to the user. Thus, even in the
presence of a challenge-response protocol, Firmalice can detect an authentication bypass
vulnerability.
This model can also be expanded to reason about authentication bypasses with a
range of valid backdoor credentials. However, as we have not observed this in practice,
we did not include such detection in our implementation.
Given an privileged state (i.e., the ﬁnal state of a path that reaches a privileged
program point) from the Symbolic Execution engine, the Authentication Bypass Check
module identiﬁes the input and output from/to the user and reasons about the exposure
of data represented by the output. It then attempts to uniquely concretize the user
input (i.e., to solve the constraints associated to the user input when the privileged state
is reached). If the user input can be uniquely concretized, then it represents that the
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input required to reach the privileged program point can be uniquely determined by the
attacker, and the associated path is labeled as an authentication bypass. At this point,
Firmalice terminates its analysis. In cases where the user input depends on data exposed
by the device's output, a function that can generate valid inputs for a provided output
is produced.
4.7.1 Choosing I/O
What should be considered as user input to the ﬁrmware (and, similarly, output
from the ﬁrmware) is not always obvious. For example, devices might have complex
interactions with their environment, and receive input in unexpected ways. Therefore,
Firmalice uses several heuristics to identify input and output.
If the ﬁrmware is a user-space ﬁrmware, Firmalice checks for the presence of network
connections in the privileged slice. If a connection is found, it is assumed to represent
the user input. Alternatively, if no connection is found, user input is assumed to be stdin
(ﬁle descriptor 0), and output is assumed to be stdout (ﬁle descriptor 1).
In the case of a binary blob, Firmalice attempts a concretization on symbolic values
coming from every interrupt. If one of these inputs concretizes mainly to ASCII text, it
is considered to be the user input. Similarly, any symbolic value passed into an interrupt
that concretize mainly into ASCII text, is considered to be the output of the ﬁrmware.
Alternatively, to avoid these heuristics, Firmalice can accept a speciﬁcation of the Ap-
plication Binary Interface (i.e., which interrupts accept output and which provide input)
of the ﬁrmware and use that to choose between input and output.
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4.7.2 Data Exposure
The core intuition of our approach is that data seen by the user, via an output routine,
is exposed to the attacker. While seemingly obvious, this has important implications for
authentication bypass detection. Speciﬁcally, our intuition is that this exposure does
not just reveal information about the output data: information is also revealed about
any data that depends on or is related to the output. For example, if a hash of a user-
speciﬁed, secret password is revealed to the attacker prior to authentication, it reveals
some amount of information about the password itself (in the worst case scenario, such
a hash could then be brute-forced and the password would be completely revealed). In
essence, we take into account the fact that the attackers can deduce information about
authentication credentials by observing program outputs.
We implement this in Firmalice by leveraging its constraint solver and output routine
detection. Any data, D, that is passed into an output routine is identiﬁed as having been
exposed. To model this exposure, we use the constraint solver to retrieve a single concrete
solution, C, for D, and add the constraint D == C to the constraint set. Adding this
constraint has an eﬀect on the concrete solutions associated with other symbolic variables
(for example, if a symbolic variable E previously existed with a constraint E == D, then
the constraint D == C also implies E == C). This represents any loss of secrecy that
these variables experience from the revelation of D to the attacker.
To avoid false positives from after-the-fact credential revelation on the part of the
ﬁrmware, Firmalice only applies this policy to data that is output before any user input
is received.
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4.7.3 Constraint Solving
For each privileged state, Firmalice attempts to concretize the user input to deter-
mine the possible values that a user can input to successfully reach the privileged program
point. A properly-authenticated path contains inputs that concretize to a large set of val-
ues (because the underlying passwords that they are compared against are unknown, and
thus, unconstrained). Conversely, the existence of a path for which the input concretizes
into a limited set of values (for simplicity, and from investigating existing examples of
backdoors, we set this threshold to 1) signiﬁes that an attacker can determine, using a
combination of information within the ﬁrmware image and information that is revealed
to them via device output, an input that allows them to authenticate.
Since Firmalice limits its analysis to the authentication slice itself, irrelevant data
is not included in the produced user input. This makes Firmalice resilient to cases
that would be arbitrarily non-deterministic, such as when some data from the user is
ignored or not used (and, thus, concretizes to no speciﬁc value). While this means that
Firmalice's output might not be directly re-playable to achieve authentication bypass,
this functionality is outside of the scope of our design.
4.8 Evaluation
We evaluated Firmalice by vetting three devices for authentication bypass vulnerabil-
ities, two of which had actual backdoors. These devices, the Schneider ION 8600 smart
meter, the 3S Vision N5072 CCTV camera, and the Dell 1130n Laser Mono Printer,
represent a wide range of devices of disparate architectures. ARM (both little-endian
and big-endian) and PPC are both represented, as are both binary-blob and user-space
program ﬁrmware styles. Additionally, the devices have widely diﬀerent authentication
processes.
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We chose these devices because the authentication vulnerabilities that they contain
were already discovered manually, and, since these vulnerabilities have already been re-
leased, we are not endangering the users by discussing them (and providing examples).
We chose three devices because, despite the fact that Firmalice's analysis is automated,
a security policy needs to be provided for each device. This represents some manual
work, and a truly large-scale study was infeasible. Additionally, collecting and unpack-
ing ﬁrmware samples is extremely complicated to automate. Firmware is shipped in
many diﬀerent, non-standard formats, and the process to download ﬁrmware images is
frequently complicated, and varies from vendor to vendor. While this is an addressable
problem, as shown by Costin et al. [93], we consider it outside of the scope of our work.
However, we feel that these samples represent Firmalice's applicability to diﬀerent devices
of diﬀerent architectures.
In this section, we will describe each ﬁrmware, then detail their user interaction,
present our analysis results, and describe any backdoors that Firmalice identiﬁed. Aside
from the device-speciﬁc uses of these backdoors, each one can also be used as a pivot
point into the victim's network. The nature of some of these devices means that they
are frequently either physically positioned outdoors, exposed directly to the Internet, or
are otherwise not closely monitored, making them a prime target for attackers.
We carried out this evaluation on our prototype of Firmalice, comprising over 14,000
lines of Python and 3,000 lines of C. Our implementation is single-threaded, although
the approach itself would scale near-linearly in the symbolic analysis phase. Thus, the
execution time presented in this section is representative of what can be accomplished
using a single node of Firmalice, and signiﬁcant improvements in runtime can be achieved
by parallelizing the symbolic execution.
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Measurement ION 3S Dell
Total size (KB) 1,988 1,264 7,172
Basic blocks (total) 74,808 10,354 151,005
Basic blocks (slice) 1,144 212 532
Slice (statements) 56,977 7,808 24,387
Static analysis time (seconds) 2,323 315 857
Symbolic execution time (minutes) 12 26 705
Table 4.2: The results of Firmalice's analysis for the ION 8600, the 3S Vision N5072
and the Dell 1130n.
4.8.1 Schneider ION 8600 Smart meter
As the smart meter market exploded worldwide, Schneider Electric corporation re-
leased the ION 8600, a smart meter model meant for both residential and commercial
use. Such devices play a privacy-critical and safety-critical role: the information that
they process can be used to determine the habits of a home's resident, and any malicious
tampering can cause extremely dangerous situations due to the amount of electricity
involved.
A researcher from IOActive Labs presented a backdoor in the Schneider ION 8600
smart meter model at BlackHat in 2012 [84]. The backdoor was identiﬁed through
manual static analysis of the ﬁrmware. Schneider Electric acknowledged the backdoor in
a press release [94] and released an updated ﬁrmware image. Our interpretation of the
presentation by IOActive, and the press release by Schneider, led us to think that the
backdoor was remotely exploitable.
We saw this as a great opportunity to verify Firmalice's functionality. Even better,
the described authentication procedure is relatively complex: rather than being a simple
comparison against a hardcoded string, it relies on the exposure of the backdoor creden-
tials (which are dynamically generated by hashing the serial number of the device) to
the user during the authentication process. Detecting this type of authentication bypass
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requires reasoning about the determinism of the authentication credentials, in relation
to information provided by the device during the authentication process.
The security policy. We observed that the ION would output the string Access
Granted upon a successful authentication by a user. This was leveraged for the security
policy: we set the authenticated point to the location in the ﬁrmware where Access
Granted was printed.
The analysis. This ﬁrmware's binary blob contained 1,988 kilobytes of binary code
spanning 74,808 basic blocks. The static analysis completed in about 38 minutes, and
the resulting authentication slice contained 1,144 basic blocks and 56,977 statements.
The authentication slice identiﬁed by Firmalice ran from the input routine to the
privileged point. Because the ION's ﬁrmware places a bound on the size of the user in-
put, and because symbolic summaries of functions greatly reduce the number of branches
that Firmalice must analyze, Firmalice was able to exhaustively analyze all paths through
the authentication slice. This symbolic analysis ran in 12 minutes, analyzing 1,029,156
statements in 23,044 blocks across all analyzed paths. We present these results in Ta-
ble 4.2.
To our surprise, Firmalice's analysis yielded no bypasses. Since symbolic analysis is, in
practice, not sound, we assumed that our system must have missed the vulnerability. We
manually analyzed the ﬁrmware sample, and even attempted the bypass on an acquired
device with the vulnerable ﬁrmware (veriﬁed by the build number and release date)
to try to ﬁgure out where Firmalice was getting confused. It turned out that, due to
complex logic in the authentication routine (which spanned several nested functions with
intricate interactions), a user had to be already authenticated with valid credentials
before using the hardcoded credentials identiﬁed by IOActive. Using the hardcoded
credentials, after an actual, secure authentication, would grant access to more features
of a device. However, the backdoor account could not be accessed from the Internet,
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unless the attacker already had the user's actual, valid credentials. Therefore, there was
no remotely accessible backdoor.
We contacted the IOActive researcher, and he conﬁrmed that we were mistaken in our
interpretation. We feel that this anecdote demonstrates the need for a more automated
solution: even with manual analysis, it took us a signiﬁcant amount of time to verify the
results of our analysis due to the complexity of the code involved. Given the diﬃculty (and
cost) involved in updating ﬁrmware on embedded devices, such mistakes can represent a
real ﬁnancial impact, and a system to automate parts of this analysis can be extremely
valuable.
4.8.2 3S Vision N5072 Camera
The 3S Vision N5072 is a CCTV camera with networking functionality.
In April 2014, Craig Heﬀner presented backdoors in several common embedded devices
at the EELive 2014 conference [95]. Among them was the N5072 camera from 3S Vision.
This backdoor, which takes the form of a hardcoded authentication credential, allows an
attacker to control and view the camera over the network. Especially given the zooming
capability of this camera, such an attack can have serious implications with regards to
privacy intrusion.
The camera is built on a little-endian ARM architecture. We found that the ﬁrmware
of this camera is actually an embedded Linux system, comprising Busybox and several
camera-speciﬁc binaries, including a custom web server.
The security policy. Our security policy for this ﬁrmware reﬂected the purpose of
the device itself: the user must not be able to view camera footage without authentication.
However, the footage itself was not static, so we could not directly use it for the policy.
Instead, we used the static string Image Type:, which was included when requesting
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footage from the camera's web interface.
The analysis. Firmalice was able to identify the backdoor in the httpd binary, in a
total of 31 minutes. This binary, and the libraries that it depends on, contain a total of
1,264 kilobytes of binary code spanning 10,354 basic blocks. The static analysis completed
in 315 seconds, and the resulting authentication slice contained 3,553 statements from a
total of 7,808 in the corresponding 212 basic blocks. The detection of the backdoor took
just over 26 minutes, analyzing 550,660 statements in 34,544 blocks across all executed
paths. We present these results in Table 4.2.
The Backdoor. The backdoor in the N5072 was a hardcoded authentication creden-
tial during HTTP authentication. The backdoor allows an attacker to stream video from
the camera and modify the camera's conﬁguration. Firmalice provided an HTTP request
that would be suﬃcient to reach the privileged program point, in which an authoriza-
tion parameter is passed in the query string. The base64 decoding of the authorization
query string parameter is 3sadmin:27988303, which is the hard-coded username and
password of the backdoor. Interestingly, Firmalice also stumbled upon a benign bug in
the URL parsing code of the camera: query string parameters are parsed, even without
the presence of the ? character that denotes the start of a query string, if the provided
query path is blank.
4.8.3 Dell 1130n Printer
The Dell 1130n is a network-connected laser printer popular in many oﬃce and aca-
demic settings. Such printers are frequently connected directly to the Internet, with no
protection or ﬁltering in place. In fact, in January 2013, researchers made headlines by
pointing out the presence of 86,800 network printers that could be found in a Google
search [96].
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A backdoor aﬀecting a range of printers manufactured by Samsung, including the
Dell 1130n, was discovered in 2012 [85]. This backdoor allows an attacker to change
printer settings, intercept documents sent to the printer, and use the printer as a pivot
point into the victim's network. The backdoor is triggered by sending a specially-crafted
SNMPv1 packet to the printer, with a hardcoded community string. This attack works
even when SNMP is turned oﬀ.
This printer runs on a big-endian ARM CPU, and its ﬁrmware is a modiﬁed VxWorks
binary-blob containing 7,172 kilobytes of binary code across 151,005 basic blocks.
The security policy. We used the printer to evaluate our more ﬁne-grained security
policy, deﬁning a memory region, containing conﬁguration parameters, that should not
be changed by unauthenticated users. Firmalice identiﬁed all program points that write
to this memory region, and tagged them as privileged program points for the analysis.
The analysis. Firmalice ﬁnished its static analysis in just over 14 minutes, and
created an authentication slice that contained 13,592 of the total 24,387 IR statements in
532 blocks. The analysis of the slice took 11 hours and 45 minutes, executing a total of
134,536,875 statements in 4,264,568 blocks across all of the analyzed paths. The results
are presented Table 4.2.
The Backdoor. The backdoor in the 1130n took the form of a specially crafted
SNMP packet, allowing the attacker administrative access to the printer. Firmalice
provided an input representing the SNMP packet that would let the attacker reach the
privileged program point.
4.9 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications and the limitations of Firmalice and muse
about several ideas for future research directions.
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Firmalice's target application is the analysis of authentication bypass vulnerabilities
in ﬁrmware. In general, such software is not actively evasive (unlike, for example, tra-
ditional malware), and lends itself well to static analysis. However, it is possible that a
malicious ﬁrmware author could attempt to attack Firmalice's analysis. There are two
main attack surfaces: the static program slicing and the symbolic execution. Obfuscated
ﬁrmware could frustrate the former, while specially-crafted operations (designed to over-
whelm the constraint solver) could attack the latter. These are weaknesses inherent to
any tool based on static slicing or symbolic execution, and Firmalice is also vulnerable
to them. Given the status quo in ﬁrmware, the presence of such obfuscation or evasive
code would be, by itself, an excellent indicator of maliciousness, which Firmalice could
be adjusted to detect.
As an alternative to binary obfuscation, malicious ﬁrmware authors could attempt to
evade Firmalice's input determinism by performing irreversible operations. For example,
Firmalice's constraint solving module would be unable to solve the constraints generated
by a secure hash function, as doing that would be equivalent to reversing the function.
As a result, Firmalice, in its current implementation, can be evaded by an authentication
bypass that compares a hash of the user's password against the hash of a hard-coded
password. A possible mitigation of this evasion is the replacement of the hash function
with a symbolic summary that performs a reversible summary hash. In the case of SHA-
256, such a summary hash might simply expand or truncate the input to 256 bits. With
this summary hash replacing the original hash function, the constraints generated by
Firmalice would be reversible, and the required user input could be identiﬁed. However,
this represents a large sacriﬁce in accuracy of the analysis, and false positives could be
introduced as a result.
There are also other types of backdoors that Firmalice might fail to detect. Specif-
ically, math-based backdoors with multiple solutions (e.g., the password must be an
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integer that is divisible by 10) would, as a result of having multiple valid solutions,
be considered as a correct authentication. To reason about such backdoors, Firmalice
would need to reason about how restricted a set of solutions is. This ability would involve
extra complexity related to constraint solving and we feel that this analysis is outside of
the scope of this research.
Throughout Firmalice's design, we had to make many trade-oﬀs between soundness
and scalability. Symbolic analysis, in general, is infeasible to perform with full soundness,
because doing this would mean, in the general case, following every path through a
program. This would be exponential in the number of branches, and Firmalice makes
trade-oﬀs, similar to other tools in the ﬁeld.
Many of the challenges that Firmalice must deal with could be addressed through
the use of dynamic execution monitoring. For example, Firmalice's entry point detection
would be unnecessary if the entry point could be deduced from observing the boot process
of the device. However, the diﬃculty of this ranges from extremely complex to impossible
for most devices. Since many embedded devices require their ﬁrmware to be signed by the
device manufacturer, loading custom analysis code (such as that required by Avatar [77])
would require bypassing this protection. Even if this limitation could be bypassed, the
disparity between diﬀerent devices would necessitate a signiﬁcant implementation eﬀort
to analyze each new device, limiting the possible scale of such a system's analysis.
While Firmalice is geared towards detecting authentication bypass vulnerabilities in
ﬁrmware, the core approach lends itself to any logic ﬂaws that can be similarly mod-
eled. One potential direction of research is a formal language to enable the speciﬁcation
of custom logic ﬂaws for Firmalice to locate. In fact, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency has launched a project to explore exactly this, with the goal of assuring
the security of embedded devices [97]. DARPA's goal is to eventually be able to spec-
ify such models as Natural Language statements that can be converted into logic ﬂaw
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descriptions.
Firmalice, and symbolic analysis in general, can be greatly improved by a better
approach to symbolic loop analysis. When analyzed symbolically, a loop has the potential
to branch analysis states at each iteration (one that exits the loop and one that does
not), causing a state explosion. Firmalice partially mitigates this through the use of its
symbolic summaries, as many of the loops encountered during a program's execution are
actually within common library functions. However, in the general case, advances in loop
analysis would directly beneﬁt Firmalice's (and other analyzers') analyses.
4.10 Related Work
While a number of previous eﬀorts have been focusing on analyzing binary appli-
cations on commodity software and hardware platforms, including general frameworks
such as Valgrind [54], BitBlaze [98], and Pin[99], as well as symbolic execution based
frameworks like AEG [86] and Mayhem [24], focusing on automatic exploit generation
on binary programs, the case of embedded ﬁrmware received little attention and remains
challenging. Among existing research on ﬁrmware analysis, the current systems either
require access to the source code [76] (which in the case of embedded systems is rarely
available), or to the physical device [82, 77].
Schuster et al. [82], proposed an approach for automatically identifying software back-
doors in binary applications running on x86, x64, and MIPS32 architectures. This ap-
proach targets ﬂawed authentication routines as well as commands and services hidden in
server-side binaries such as FTP and SSH. The approach builds on top of execution mon-
itoring using GDB, and requires actual execution of the binaries on the target physical
system, making it diﬃcult to generally apply the technique to embedded devices. While
this work proposes a practical approach to detecting backdoors, it is limited to a speciﬁc
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kind of authentication bypass technique where pointers to handlers are actually present
as-is in memory8. Additionally, Schuster models authentication bypass as a control ﬂow
problem, leaving them unable to reason about authentication bypasses resulting from
disclosed credentials or buggy authentication routines. Not only is our system able to
analyze binaries with no hardware requirements, but our symbolic execution approach
also targets a wider range of malicious behaviors. In fact, the authentication deciders and
command handlers that Schuster's approach identiﬁes during the analysis can be used
as a security policy by Firmalice, allowing Firmalice to vet the ﬁrmware against complex
authentication bypass vulnerabilities.
Avatar [77] is a framework supporting dynamic analysis of ﬁrmware in embedded
systems. It is a hybrid approach, involving both the target physical device as well as an
emulator based on the selective symbolic execution engine S2E [100]. Communication
between the emulator and the target is orchestrated in such a way that I/O operations
can be forwarded and executed on the actual hardware and interrupts injected into
the emulator. Arbitrary context switches are also supported: execution can be started
on the real device and transfered to the emulator for analysis from a speciﬁc point in
the ﬁrmware. Returning execution to the hardware is also supported. In both cases,
the execution state is frozen and transferred from/to the hardware or the emulator.
While Avatar presents promising capabilities and support for reverse engineering and
vulnerability discovery, it requires access to the physical hardware, either through a
debugging interface, or by installing a custom proxy in the target environment, which
is generally not possible, e.g., in the presence of locked hardware. Our framework is an
alternative to such hardware-dependent approaches, by providing a model along with
tools for analyzing such ﬁrmware with no hardware requirements.
FIE [76] is a platform for detecting bugs in ﬁrmware running on the MSP430 family
8This approach does not address the cases of obfuscated or indirect addresses to such handlers.
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of micro-controllers, mainly focusing on memory safety issues. The source code of the
analyzed programs is compiled into LLVM bytecode, which is then analyzed using a
symbolic execution engine based on KLEE [22]. The latter has been modiﬁed to support
the target 16-bit architecture, its memory speciﬁcation, and its interrupt library. FIE
supports hardware speciﬁc layouts of memory and access to hardware through special
memory. It also considers the execution of enabled interrupts at any given point in the
program. It performs complete analysis of ﬁrmware images (i.e., all possible execution
paths are taken). In order to achieve this without falling into inﬁnite loops or state
explosion, state pruning is used, removing redundant (equivalent) states from the list of
states to explore, and memory smudging is used to concretize variables with respect to
a given ﬁnite set of values. FIE is limited to analyzing small ﬁrmware written in C, for
which the source code is available. In comparison, our current work is not bound to any
speciﬁc architecture (in fact, our symbolic execution engine currently supports multiple
architectures) and works directly on binary code with no source code requirement.
Recent advancements have also been made in the ﬁeld of automated ﬁrmware analysis.
Costin et al. [93] carried out an analysis of over 30,000 ﬁrmware samples. However,
their system performs no in-depth analysis: it instead extracts each ﬁrmware sample
and investigates it for artifacts such as included private encryption keys and known-
bad strings (i.e., known values of hardcoded authentication credentials). This latter
action makes the system quite well-suited for discovering backdoors in devices whose
ﬁrmware shares a codebase with devices that have known backdoors, but not for in-
depth analysis of individual ﬁrmware samples. With a further investment into analysis
automation, Costin's system could be used as an input to Firmalice, allowing for large-
scale, automated, in-depth ﬁrmware analysis.
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4.11 Conclusion
We presented Firmalice, a framework for detecting authentication bypass vulnerabili-
ties in binary ﬁrmware, for which no source code, and possibly no access to the underlying
hardware, is available. Additionally, we have presented a model of authentication bypass
vulnerabilities (or backdoors), based on the concept of input determinism and have shown
that Firmalice is capable of successfully detecting such vulnerabilities in the ﬁrmware of
two commercially-available systems. Finally, we have demonstrated that current tech-
niques for identifying authentication bypass in ﬁrmware, which are mostly limited to
manual analysis, are error-prone and insuﬃcient.
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Putting Humans Back in the Loop
Software has become dominant and abundant. Software systems support almost every
aspect of our lives, from health care to ﬁnance, from power distribution to entertainment.
This growth has led to an explosion of software bugs and, more importantly, software
vulnerabilities. Because the exploitation of vulnerabilities can have catastrophic eﬀects,
a substantial amount of eﬀort has been devoted to discovering these vulnerabilities before
they are found by attackers and exploited in the wild.
Traditionally, vulnerability discovery has been a heavily manual task. Expert security
researchers spend signiﬁcant time analyzing software, understanding how it works, and
painstakingly sifting it for bugs. Even though human analysts take advantage of tools to
automate some of the tasks involved in the analysis process, the amount of software to be
analyzed grows at an overwhelming pace. As this growth reached the scalability limits of
manual analysis, the research community has turned its attention to automated program
analysis, with the goal of identifying and ﬁxing software issues on a large scale. This
push has been met with signiﬁcant success, culminating thus far in the DARPA Cyber
Grand Challenge (CGC) [39], a cyber-security competition in which seven ﬁnalist teams
pitted completely autonomous systems, utilizing automated program analysis techniques,
against each other for almost four million dollars in prize money.
By removing the human factor from the analysis process, the competition forced the
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participants to codify the strategy and orchestration tasks that are usually performed
by experts, and, at the same time, it pushed the limits of current vulnerability analysis
techniques to handle larger, more complex problems in an eﬃcient and resource-aware
manner. These systems represented a signiﬁcant step in automated program analysis,
automatically identifying vulnerabilities and developing exploits for 20 of a total of 82
binary programs developed for the event.
Despite the success of these systems, the underlying approaches suﬀer from a number
of limitations. These limitations became evident when some of the CGC autonomous
systems participated in a follow-up vulnerability analysis competition (the DEFCON
CTF) that included human teams. The autonomous systems could not easily understand
the logic underlying certain applications, and, as a result, they could not easily produce
inputs that drive them to speciﬁc (insecure) states. However, when humans could provide
suggestions of inputs to the automated analysis process the results were surprisingly
good.
This experience suggested a shift in the current vulnerability analysis paradigm, from
the existing tool-assisted human-centered paradigm to a new human-assisted tool-centered
paradigm. Systems that follow this paradigm would be able to leverage humans (with
diﬀerent level of expertise) for speciﬁc well-deﬁned tasks (e.g., tasks that require an
understanding of the application's underlying logic), while taking care of orchestrating
the overall vulnerability analysis process.
This shift is somewhat similar to introduction of the assembly line in manufacturing,
which allowed groups of relatively unskilled workers to produce systems (such as cars)
that had, until then, remained the exclusive domain of specially trained engineers. Con-
ceptually, an assembly line shaves oﬀ small, easy tasks that can be carried out by a
large group of people, in loose collaboration, to accomplish a complex goal.
In this chpater, we explore the application of this idea to vulnerability analysis. More
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Figure 5.1: Tool-assisted Human-centered Analysis vs. Human-assisted Tool-centered
Analysis.
precisely, we develop an approach that leverages tasklets that can be dispatched to human
analysts by an autonomous program analysis system, such as those used in the Cyber
Grand Challenge, to help it surmount inherent drawbacks of modern program analysis
techniques (see Figure 5.1). We explore the question of how much our program anal-
ysis assembly line empowers humans, otherwise unskilled in the ﬁeld, to contribute to
program analysis, and we evaluate the improvement that external human assistance can
bring to the eﬀectiveness of automated vulnerability analysis1. Our results are signiﬁ-
cant: by incorporating human assistance into an open-source Cyber Reasoning System,
we were able to boost the amount of identiﬁed bugs in our dataset by 55%, from 36
bugs (in 85 binaries) using fully-automated techniques to 56 bugs through the use of
non-expert human assistance.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
1In the rest of the chapter, we refer to automated vulnerability analysis as the orchestration process,
even though it might include tasks that are outsourced to humans.
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• We introduce the design of a human-assisted automated vulnerability analysis sys-
tem, in which the result of well-deﬁned tasklets that are delegated to human actors
are integrated in the (otherwise) autonomous analysis process. These tasklets help
automated analysis systems to bridge the semantic gap in the analysis of complex
applications.
• We implemented a prototype human-assisted autonomous system on top of Me-
chanical Phish, a system that participated in the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge,
which was open-sourced by its authors. To support the community and drive the
state of (semi-) automated program analysis forward, we open-source our modiﬁ-
cations to Mechanical Phish.
• We experimentally evaluated the eﬀectiveness of our tasklets in aiding the vul-
nerability analysis process of our system by leveraging the assistance of unskilled
humans, showing that signiﬁcant contribution can be made without requiring ex-
pert hackers.
In the next section, we will discuss the background of automated program analysis
and pinpoint the challenges that we hope to solve with human-analyzed tasklets.
5.1 Background
The ﬁeld of vulnerability discovery has received a signiﬁcant amount of research
attention. In this section, we will describe the current state of the art of both automated
and manual vulnerability discovery techniques, show the challenges facing each of them,
and position our approach in the context of related work.
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5.1.1 Fully Automated Analysis
Individual techniques have been developed for identiﬁcation of vulnerabilities [24,
101, 36], automatic exploitation [67, 102, 68], and automatic application protection [103,
104, 105]. However, until recently, researchers did not focus on the integration of various
techniques into cohesive end-to-end systems. Over the last two years, DARPA hosted the
Cyber Grand Challenge which required contestants to develop Cyber Reasoning Systems
(CRSes). These are fully autonomous machines capable of identifying, exploiting, and
patching vulnerabilities in binary code.
A Cyber Reasoning System represents the culmination of years of research into auto-
mated binary analysis. However, being fully autonomous, CRSes suﬀer from the limita-
tions of their underlying techniques. These limitations were reﬂected in the Cyber Grand
Challenge results, in which only 20 out of the 87 vulnerable challenges were successfully
exploited by the machine contenders [106, 107].
5.1.2 Human-based Computation
While the assembly line pioneered the idea of splitting complex physical tasks (such
as the assembly of a car) into small, manageable micro-tasks as early as the 12th cen-
tury [108], the intellectual equivalent was not explored until modern times. This concept
was most popularized with the Manhattan Project, in which speciﬁc computation micro-
tasks were assigned to and carried out by human computers [109]. With the emergence
of modern computing capability, these micro-tasks came to be chieﬂy carried out by
machines. As computers developed to the point where they could oversee such eﬀorts,
a formal speciﬁcation of the diﬀerent roles that humans and computer components can
take on in computation emerged [110, 111, 112]. This speciﬁcation deﬁnes three roles:
Organization Agent. The organization agent is the overall intelligence. It tracks the
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progress of work toward an overarching goal, determines what should be done, and
creates micro-tasks. In the Manhattan Project, the organization agent was the
panel of scientists leading the research eﬀort.
Innovation Agent. The innovation agent is the entity responsible for carrying out
micro-tasks deﬁned by the organization agent. In the Manhattan Project, the
innovation agents were the human computers solving computation tasks.
Selection Agent. The selection agent collates the results produced by the innovation
agents and determines which are valid. In the Manhattan Project, this task was
performed by the scientists leading the eﬀort.
Systems are described using three letters, depending on whether a human or computer
agent is responsible for each role. For example, an HCH designation would imply a system
with a human deciding which tasks to execute, a computer executing them, and the
human deciding which of the results are useful. In a security context, this might be the
human specifying jobs to a symbolic execution engine, and then analyzing its output to
identify exploitable bugs in a piece of software.
Over the last few years, the Internet has achieved enough saturation to support
complex combinations of human and computer agents. For example, Amazon's Mechan-
ical Turk provides an API for automatically specifying micro-tasks for human consump-
tion [113], usually used in a CHC context. In fact, we use Mechanical Turk for many of
our experiments in this chapter. In a similar vein to Mechanical Turk, speciﬁc-purpose
platforms have been created to leverage human eﬀort in the pursuit of a single overarch-
ing goal. One such platform, Galaxy Zoo [114], utilizes human-completed micro-tasks for
the classiﬁcation of astronomical images, while another, Foldit[115], aids protein folding
algorithms by having humans play folding games.
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5.1.3 Human-Driven Automated Analysis
Because it is important to understand the interactions between manual and auto-
mated processes in binary analysis systems, we provide a few examples of their intersec-
tions outside of the context of our work.
Fuzzing. Generational fuzzers, such as Peach [116], attempt to create inputs conform-
ing to a speciﬁcation that a program is designed to process. Mutational fuzzers, such as
AFL [15], mutate previously-known inputs to identify program ﬂaws.
The most common way of creating these inputs and input speciﬁcations is manu-
ally, through human eﬀort. This results in an HCH system  a human creates the input
speciﬁcation, the computer performs the fuzzing, and a human analyzes the results.
An example of successful human-computer cooperation in binary analysis is the dis-
covery of the Stagefright vulnerability in the Android multimedia library. This vulnera-
bility was found by repeating the following steps [117]:
Organization - H. The analyst seeds a mutational fuzzer (in this case, AFL), and starts
it.
Innovation - C. The fuzzer identiﬁes vulnerabilities in the target application (in this
case, the Android multimedia library).
Selection - H. The human collects the vulnerabilities and ﬁxes them so that future
iterations of the full system will identify deeper vulnerabilities.
By repeating this HCH process, the analyst was able to identify many high-impact
vulnerabilities inside the Android multimedia library, requiring multiple patches and an
eventual rewrite of the entire library to ﬁx [118].
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5.1.4 Human-Assisted Automated Analysis
The Cyber Grand Challenge required a fully autonomous system (CCC, by the deﬁ-
nitions in Section 5.1.2). This necessitated the development, by participating teams, of
complex automation to handle the organizational, innovation, and selection roles. How-
ever, we propose that while the organizational and selection roles must be automated to
achieve high scalability, some human eﬀort can still be used in the innovation role to mit-
igate drawbacks currently impacting automated program analysis techniques. That is,
our intuition is that it is possible to create a Human-assisted Cyber Reasoning System
(HaCRS) that would sparingly use human assistance to improve its performance.
HaCRS provides a principled framework for such an integration of manual and auto-
mated analysis. It can be modeled as a C(C|H)C system: it does most of its work fully
autonomously, but relies on human intuition in the innovation phase, when the auto-
mated processes get stuck. In this chapter, we propose that limited human assistance
can be used in the scope of otherwise-automated binary analysis systems. While this
has been explored in the context of generating inputs for Android applications, it has
never been investigated in the context of an other-wise autonomous Cyber Reasoning
System [119]. In the next section, we will give an overview of our system, followed by
in-depth details and an evaluation of its improvement over fully-autonomous systems
from the Cyber Grand Challenge.
5.2 Overview
While DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge drove the integration of cutting edge au-
tomated binary analysis techniques, it also revealed the many limitations of these tech-
niques. Our work on HaCRS extends the concept of a Cyber Reasoning System by
deﬁning a method for human interaction that compensates for many of these limitations.
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Primarily, HaCRS is an autonomous Cyber Reasoning System. However, when it iden-
tiﬁes situations that can beneﬁt from human analysis, HaCRS dispatches self-contained
tasklets and assigns them to human assistants. These human assistants can vary in skill,
from abundant low-skill analysts to rare high-skill hackers.
Our HaCRS can dispatch a variety of tasklets to human assistants, depending on
changing requirements. Generally, each tasklet includes a speciﬁc program that must
be analyzed and a request for speciﬁc information that the human can extract from
this program. These tasklets are created by a centralized orchestration component and
disseminated to the assistant through a Human-Automation Link (HAL). In this chapter,
as an initial exploration of this idea, we focus on human-assisted input generation, leaving
the exploration of other tasklets to future work.
The Cyber Reasoning System. HaCRS is based onMechanical Phish, an open-source
Cyber Reasoning System that was created by Shellphish, the hacking team of the
SecLab of UC Santa Barbara, and competed in the DARPA Cyber Grand Chal-
lenge [106, 120]. Shellphish designed Mechanical Phish as a set of discrete com-
ponents, providing individual analysis tasks, united by a central component that
handles the overarching intelligence [106]. This makes it straightforward (though,
unfortunately, non-trivial) to extend Mechanical Phish with other analysis tech-
niques, such as tasklet dispatching.
To the interested reader, we describe the relevant design details of Mechanical Phish
in Section 5.3.
Human-Automation Link. We extend Mechanical Phish to request assistance, from
non-expert humans, in principled ways.
The prototype action that we explore in this chapter is input generation. In input
generation, input testcases are created through both automated and human-assisted
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techniques to form a base set of testcases to use in vulnerability discovery. We
describe this task, the conveyance of task-speciﬁc information in a human-friendly
format, and the use of the results in our Human-assisted Cyber Reasoning System
in Section 5.4.
Next, we will discuss relevant details of Mechanical Phish before delving into the
details of our tasklets. After this, we will evaluate human performance in the execution of
these tasklets against automated alternatives derived from the state-of-the-art in program
analysis.
5.3 The Cyber Reasoning System
We based our implementation on the Cyber Reasoning System developed for the
Cyber Grand Challenge and open-sourced by Shellphish [120]. While Mechanical Phish is
composed of modules that are spread over more than 30 diﬀerent source code repositories,
the core design appears to be fairly straightforward [120].
In this section, we will describe Mechanical Phish in terms of the computation frame-
work discussed in Section 5.1.2. First, we will discuss the type of software that Mechanical
Phish is designed to analyze. Then, we split the existing design into the Organization
Agent, Innovation Agent, and Selection Agent, as deﬁned in Section 5.1. Afterwards,
in the next section, we will detail our extensions on top of Mechanical Phish, and the
speciﬁc points at which we insert human interaction.
5.3.1 Program Analysis Targets
Mechanical Phish was built for participation in the Cyber Grand Challenge. The
Cyber Grand Challenge used a custom operating system, DECREE, to ease the imple-
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Innovation (Vulnerability Discovery)
Human-Automation
Link
Organization
Non-Experts
Task Creator
Task Scheduler
AFL (Fuzzer)
Symbolic Seed 
Synthesis
Driller
Directed Symbolic 
Execution
Automated Processing
Selection
Test-case 
Database Experts
Figure 5.2: The HaCRS conﬁguration. HaCRS builds upon the vulnerability discovery
component of the Mechanical Phish and expands it with a Human-Automation Link
to leverage non-expert human assistance in the vulnerability discovery process. Each
subsystem of the vulnerability discovery component, except for the fuzzer itself, has
both an automated and a human-assisted alternative. The components with a dashed
border were already present in Mechanical Phish. We created the solid-bordered com-
ponents for HaCRS.
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mentation load on participants. To simplify analysis tasks, DECREE supports software
written with a text-based interface, using seven system calls, roughly equivalent to the
Linux system calls exit, write, read, select, mmap, munmap, and getrandom.
Aside from this simpliﬁed environment, DECREE places no restrictions on the com-
plexity of the software itself. As such, applications written for the Cyber Grand Challenge
vary widely in complexity, from text-based video games to Computer-aided design soft-
ware to web servers, and provide signiﬁcant challenges to the current state-of-the-art in
program analysis. Additionally, it is important to stress that all analysis done by HaCRS
takes place on binaries, and thus functions without the semantic hints present in source
code.
5.3.2 Organization Agents
The Mechanical Phish is a state-less Cyber Reasoning System, where, for each de-
cision, all of the information available to Mechanical Phish, such as the binaries to be
analyzed and the currently-available results of analysis components, is re-analyzed from
scratch. According to the authors, this was done in an attempt to reduce the complexity
of the organizational components by freeing them from the requirement of tracking their
own prior decisions [120].
Mechanical Phish includes several organizational components:
Task Creator. The task creator analyzes currently available results and identiﬁes tasks
that should be created, and their priorities. This component is actually a conglom-
eration of individual, task-speciﬁc creators. Each task-speciﬁc creator schedules
its own tasks without input from other creators: the only interaction between the
creators of diﬀerent tasks happens when results of those tasks inﬂuence the current
set of analysis results (and, in turn, are used by the subsequent tasks created by
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these creators).
Task Scheduler. Each task is assigned a priority by its creator. The task scheduler
analyzes task priorities and available system resources and determines which tasks
to schedule.
Environment Interaction. In order to inject data into Mechanical Phish, and submit
the results, interaction with the environment is required. This component handles
the retrieval of input into and exposure of output out of the system. While in the
CGC this interaction was very straightforward, Cyber Reasoning Systems operating
in other environments (for example, in a real-world cyber warfare situation) might
require considerably complex agents for this task.
The ﬁrst task that the system must carry out is the integration of environment infor-
mation (for example, which binaries are available for analysis), after which the Innovation
and Selection Agents can run.
5.3.3 Selection Agents
The selection agents are responsible for the integration of the results that are produced
by the innovation agents. However, the Mechanical Phish does not make a distinction
between the innovation agents and the integration agents in most cases. One exception
is:
Vulnerability triaging. When crashes are identiﬁed by the vulnerability discovery
component, they are triaged to determine the feasibility of transforming them into
exploits. This information is then used by the Task Creator to prioritize exploita-
tion tasks based on the crash.
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Exploit selection. The exploits created by the Exploitation Agents are checked against
diﬀerent variations of the target binaries to verify that, for example, opponent
systems did not patch the vulnerability. Successful exploits are entered into the
database, to be submitted by the Environment Interaction Agent.
Patch selection. Mechanical Phish implements a simple patch selection criteria, pre-
ferring patches produced by advanced (but more failure-prone) techniques than
simple (but higher-overhead) ones.
The results of these agents are used by the organizational components to schedule
further innovation tasks.
5.3.4 Innovation Agents
The tasks that are created and scheduled by the Organization Agents are carried out
by the innovation agents. Speciﬁcally, Mechanical Phish includes the following agents:
Vulnerability discovery. Mechanical Phish uses a combination of fuzzing and symbolic
execution to analyze target binaries. These are implemented as separate agents that
interact through cross-pollination of dynamic test cases. Speciﬁcally, as proposed by
Driller, a coverage-based fuzzer is used in parallel with a symbolic tracing technique
to produce inputs that maximize code coverage [36].
Exploitation. Several diﬀerent exploitation agents are used by Mechanical Phish, de-
pending on the types of vulnerabilities that are discovered.
Patching. Mechanical Phish uses a complex patching agent, in several diﬀerent conﬁg-
urations, to patch the vulnerabilities that it identiﬁes in binary code.
These innovation agents process inputs and produce updates to the system state.
These updates are ﬁltered through selection agents before the system state accepts them.
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5.3.5 Automated Vulnerability Discovery - Fuzzing
The fuzzing approach in the Mechanical Phish is based on a mutational fuzzer known
as American Fuzzy Lop [15]. This approach requires, as input, a set of test cases that
exercise some functionality in the target binary. The seed quality, in terms of how well
they exercise the target program, has a scaling eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of AFL: the
more coverage these test cases provide, the more code AFL will be able to explore by
mutating them. Unfortunately, the creation of high-quality test case seeds is a compli-
cated problem, and this is generally seen as a human-provided input into a system. For
example, lacking human input, Mechanical Phish simply seeds its fuzzer with an input
comprised of the word fuzz.
These seeds are then mutated to explore more and more of the code base and increase
the chance of triggering bugs. Eventually, however, the fuzzer will get stuck and be unable
to exercise new paths through the code of the target program. This can happen for a
number of reasons, but is most frequently caused by the inability of the fuzzer's random
mutations to satisfy complex conditions, introduced by checks in the program, upon
input data.
5.3.6 Automated Vulnerability Discovery - Drilling
Driller proposed a mitigation for the stalling of the fuzzer due to the inability to
satisfy complex solutions. It uses concolic execution to trace the paths that the fuzzer
ﬁnds, identiﬁes conditional checks that the fuzzer fails to satisfy, and synthesizes inputs
to satisfy these conditions. Driller triggers its operation when the fuzzer gets stuck, and
is unable to ﬁnd further testcases (it detects this by checking AFL's progress evaluation
heuristics). Once this stall condition is detected, Driller symbolically traces and attempts
to mutate all test cases that AFL has found into test cases that reach parts of code not
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previously seen. These resulting test cases are then synchronized back into the fuzzer, so
that it can explore these newly-reached areas of code.
By pairing fuzzing with concolic execution, Driller achieves better results than the
naive union of the individual underlying techniques. However, Driller's automated ap-
proach to symbolic input synthesis has some drawbacks.
Driller's synthesis works by diverting a path and forcing it to satisfy a check that
it would have otherwise avoided. There are several limitations, inherent in Driller, that
hamper its eﬀectiveness in certain situations. These include, but are not limited to:
SMT solver. Driller uses an SMT solver to solve negated path predicates (constraints
on the input values to the program that must be satisﬁed in order to trigger the
path in question) to synthesize inputs that diverge from the original execution.
However, depending on the complexity of the path predicates involved, the SMT
solving process may not terminate. While this represents a signiﬁcant challenge for
Driller, the complexity of these predicates might not translate to the complexity of
interaction with the software. If this is the case, a human assistant might be able to
controllably divert the path taken through the program, even when the constraint
solver cannot.
Inﬂexible path predicates. Depending on implementation details in the program, ear-
lier path predicates might prevent the deviation of later path predicates. Such
predicates are frequently created by certain input transformation procedures. For
example, string-to-int translation (such as the atoi function) takes diﬀerent condi-
tional branches, based on the values in the input string, while converting an input
string to an integer. These conditional branches create path predicates. Later,
the program might perform some action based on the value of this integer. When
Driller attempts to divert this decision to take a diﬀerent action, the earlier path
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predicates on the input string prevent this diversion.
Humans, of course, do not share this inﬂexible way of reasoning about path predi-
cates.
Semantic transitions versus control ﬂow transitions. Driller cannot understand the
program semantically, and simply attempts to deviate the control ﬂow of the pro-
gram. A human, on the other hand, can identify much more intricate semantic
deviations (for example, winning, as opposed to losing, a game), allowing for the
triggering of whole new areas of code to deal with these new semantic settings.
These limitations conspire to erode Driller's ability to produce deviating inputs in
many cases. In the next section, we will discuss how these limitations can be worked
around with human assistance.
5.4 Human Assistance
As we discuss in the previous section, automated input synthesis techniques suﬀer
from limitations that cause them to eventually get stuck in the exploration of a program.
Even Driller, which leverages the power of symbolic execution to divert testcases, is only
a partial solution. This is because, while Driller can make major changes to the input
testcase it analyzes, it can only (by design and fundamental limitation) achieve only
minor deviations.
On the other hand, a human can leverage intuition and a semantic understanding of
the target program to achieve very large deviations, potentially allowing further analyses
to continue to make progress. In this chapter, we explore the integration of human assis-
tance into a Cyber Reasoning System as Innovation agents, keeping the Organizational
and Selectional agents fully automated. We focus on the vulnerability discovery stage of
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the analysis and explore ways to integrate human eﬀort to improve analysis eﬃciency.
Human assistance takes place over an interface (the Hardware Abstraction Link, or
HAL) which will be described later this section. To maximize the eﬀectiveness of this
eﬀort, HaCRS carries out a number of analyses that enhance the data it is able to expose
to the humans. In this section, we describe how human assistants are selected, the
interface over which HaCRS and humans communicate, and how the resulting data is
used to enhance the vulnerability detection ability of HaCRS.
5.4.1 Assistant Expertise
The style of human assistance diﬀers according to the assistant's expertise level. For
example, while HaCRS could reasonably ask an expert human to analyze a control ﬂow
graph and identify potential paths through it, a non-expert would be ﬂabbergasted by
such a request. The information presented, and the interfaces which are used, must be
adapted to the chosen assistant's level of expertise.
Since expert humans (i.e., binary analysts) are rare and expensive, the integration
of assistance from non-expert humans (i.e., an average internet citizen) is of particular
interest. While they do not scale to the extent of automated processes, non-expert
humans scale considerably easier than experts, due to their higher availability. When
more knowledge is required, semi-experts (i.e., undergraduates in Computer Science)
can be leveraged more readily than experts. Thus, in this chapter, we focus mainly on
techniques to integrate non-expert assistance, with a detour into semi-expert assistants
for completion.
Over the decades that humans have been interacting with software, the skill of per-
forming such interaction has become gradually instilled in the human population. As
such, even non-experts are well-trained to understand and drive computer software.
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Concept Computer Expert Non-Expert
Symbolic Equations X
Control-Flow Graph X X
Execution Path X X
I/O (Text) X X X
Semantic Meaning X X
Table 5.1: Program analysis concepts, as they are easily understood by automated
techniques, expert humans, and non-expert humans. To be understandable to non-ex-
perts, the Human-Automation Link must avoid complex program analysis topics.
Thus, we can tailor HAL to non-experts by sticking to concepts that they can grasp
and avoiding complex program analysis concepts, as shown in Table 5.1. For example,
rather than triggering transitions, we used the term triggering functionality, which
requires less technical knowledge to understand. Additionally, we expose non-experts
only to the input and output log associated with prior interactions with the programs
that the HaCRS is trying to analyze, and avoid any use of program analysis terms in
task descriptions.
5.4.2 Human-assisted Input Generation
HaCRS uses human assistance to break through the semantic barriers that limit
the eﬀectiveness of automated analyses described in Sections 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. It gives
its human assistants a goal: generate an input testcase that executes some amount of
code in the target program that has not been reached by previously-known testcases (i.e.,
those previously found by automated analyses or other humans).
Human assistants interact with the target program to generate testcases, and these
testcases are synchronized throughout HaCRS' components.
Human-to-automation. Human-produced testcases are synchronized to the automated
program exploration components, which proceed to mutate them in an attempt to
trigger new functionality.
134
Putting Humans Back in the Loop Chapter 5
Human-to-human. Humans can view and modify the testcases produced by other hu-
man assistants. This enables a collective eﬀort of the understanding and leveraging
of program semantics toward a higher code coverage. HaCRS
Automation-to-human. The resulting automation-mutated testcases can then be shown
to the human assistants (we term such a testcase an example testcase), who
can review them, understand possible further improvements and changes that can
be made, and relay those changes back to the automation by producing human-
modiﬁed testcases.
Testcase conversion. The synchronization of testcases from automated components
to a human assistant poses a challenge: automated systems, driven by either random
input generation or input synthesis via constraint solving, have no guarantee to produce
printable characters when the target program does not require it. Non-printable testcases
look like gibberish when shown to a human, which hinders the human's ability to reason
semantically about what actions the testcase is causing the target program to take.
To address this issue, we use the existing afl-tmin utility shipped with AFL [15].
This utility is a testcase minimizer. It takes an input testcase and uses lightweight
dynamic techniques to a) remove unnecessary input characters and b) convert as many
characters as possible to be printable, without changing the code coverage achieved by
the input. In practice, it achieves very good results on programs with a text interface.
5.4.3 Automation-assisted Human Assistance
Simply presenting previously-discovered testcases to human assistants enables an im-
provement over a base-case Cyber Reasoning System (we show this in Section 5.5). How-
ever, since the communication between HaCRS and humans takes place over a well-
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deﬁned interface, HaCRS can provide extra information and capabilities to enhance the
humans' abilities to complete the assistance task.
Interaction assistance. One such capability provided by HaCRS is the automated
re-formatting of input data. HaCRS traces each program testcase to detect if input data
must be provided in a speciﬁc format. It achieves this by leveraging existing techniques
in protocol recovery [121, 122, 123]. Depending on conﬁguration (and expertise of hu-
man assistants), this information can either be presented to the human assistants or
utilized automatically to mutate human-created inputs into a format understood by the
application.
In our prototype, we mainly utilize these techniques to automatically recover non-
standard ﬁeld delimiters used by the binaries in our dataset, but they can also be used
to support information packing protocols, such as ASN1.
High-level guidance. Having enabled human interaction for binaries with complex
input data speciﬁcations, HaCRS turns to the question of maximizing the ability of its
humans to understand how to interact with the target program. It does this by identifying
and categorizing constant string references in the binary.
HaCRS identiﬁes static string references by analyzing its CFG, and performs a static
data ﬂow analysis to categorizes these into strings produced as output by the program
and strings compared against user input into the program. HaCRS identiﬁes output
strings by detecting when they are passed into common output functions (such as puts
and printf). Input strings are considered to be anything that is passed to a string
comparison function. In the case of statically-linked binaries, HaCRS can leverage the
function identiﬁcation functionality built into the Mechanical Phish, which detects com-
mon functions in programs using pre-deﬁned dynamic test-cases [106]).
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HaCRS provides a list of potential output strings in the target program to help its
human assistants, relaying which of these strings have not yet been triggered (i.e., caused
to be output by the program) by other testcases. These can provide useful semantic
information regarding the untapped functionality of the target program.
While HaCRS focuses on text-based software, it is important to keep in mind that
analogous information can be recovered for software with a graphical user interface. For
example, a similar analysis can identify GUI widgets, render them, and display them as
potential directions of exploration for human assistants.
Symbolic tokens. First, HaCRS creates suggestions for human assistants for ways
that testcases might be modiﬁed to divert program ﬂow. This is done through a process
of symbolic tokenization. HaCRS symbolically traces the target program in the context of
each testcase to recover constraints placed on the input by the target program. It analyzes
these constraints to identify contiguous bytes on which the constraints are similar (in
terms of the number of constraint expressions and the types of arithmetic and boolean
operations the constraint expressions are composed of). These contiguous bytes represent
tokens processed and reasoned about by the binary.
HaCRS then identiﬁes alternate values for each symbolic token. It rewinds its sym-
bolic trace to the address at which the ﬁrst constraint of the token was introduced, and
performs a symbolic from that point to retrieve other potential values. The symbolic
exploration runs until a timeout (we found 30 seconds to be a reasonable timeout in our
experiments). At the end of the timeout, the constraints of the various resulting paths
are solved to alternate values for the token. These values are further reﬁned by matching
them against the input strings retrieved previously, and HaCRS produces two diﬀerent
sets of suggestions to its assistants: educated guesses, which are the input strings that
are preﬁx-matched by the recovered alternatives and brute-force guesses, which are the
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raw alternatives themselves.
Note that, while the concept of generating alternatives for input is shared with Driller,
the goal is diﬀerent. Driller generates alternative testcases to drive execution down
diﬀerent paths. However, the alternatives generated by this method are meant to be
learned by humans, understood, and reasoned about to produce new inputs through
human intuition and previously-learned experience.
Input type annotation. Programs process diﬀerent inputs diﬀerently, and HaCRS
exposes this to its assistants by highlighting input bytes that are constrained by similar
constraints (as with the symbolic token analysis, we use constraint count and operation
types to compute constraint similarity). Input bytes highlighted with similar colors in
the input testcases will be bytes that have been treated similarly to each other by the
program, and may represent similar type of data. Most importantly, this diﬀerentiates
string input (such as a command) against numeric input (which is passed to functions
such as atoi, which impose speciﬁc constraints on the data).
5.4.4 Human-Automation Link
The interface between the HaCRS and its human assistants must be designed in
such a way as to be understandable by both parties. To do this, we created a Human-
Automation Link (HAL) that exposes, to the humans, only the concepts of program
analysis that non-experts might be familiar with. For the curious reader, we reproduce
a mock-up of the HAL interface in Figure 5.3.
The HAL interface in Figure 5.3 consists of the following elements:
Program description. When a description of the target program is available, it can
aid assistants in interacting with it. In the case of Cyber Grand Challenge binaries,
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this description includes a very brief (usually four to ﬁve sentences) summary of
the program's purpose, as written by the program authors. In a real-world setting,
human assistants can be provided with the technical manual for the piece of software
being tested.
Tasklet instructions. The HaCRS provides human-readable instructions, which are
presented to the assistant alongside each tasklet.
Example interactions. The HaCRS provides logs of previous interactions with the
software, in the form of input and output data. For the text-based software of
DECREE OS, to help assistants understand what data was originated from them
(program input) and what came from the program (program output), the input
and output are displayed in diﬀerent colors. A version of HaCRS for software with
a graphical user interface could instead have a video record of the interaction, but
this is not supported by our prototype.
CRS-Generated Suggestions. To help assistants understand how to deviate from a
test case, they can invoke the deviation annotation interface. This interface displays
data recovered through the automated analyses described in Section 5.4.3 to present
the assistant with a better idea of how to make a program behave diﬀerently than
in the example testcase.
Interaction terminal. To facilitate the interaction between human assistants and the
target program, a terminal is presented to interact with the software. Again, to
help assistants understand diﬀerentiate user input from program output, the input
and output are displayed in diﬀerent colors.
Tasklet goal and feedback. Any human-facing task must have an understandable end
goal to avoid confusion on the part of the assistants. HaCRS requires its human
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assistants to trigger previously-unseen functionality in the target programs. To this
end, it provides feedback to the assistant regarding the amount of previously-unseen
control ﬂow transitions that the assistant was able to trigger.
Along with this, it provides a display of untriggered output strings, as described
in Section 5.4.3. With their human ability to reason about semantic information,
assistants can leverage the bounty strings to better target untriggered functionality
in the program.
Each tasklet also has a timeout and an abort button: if the assistant is unable
to complete the tasklet before a timeout, or presses the abort button, the tasklet is
terminated. This acts as a guard against the situation when the tasklet is not actually
completable (for example, if the remaining untriggered functionality is dead code).
In the next section, we will explore the implication of human assistance by evaluating
the performance of HaCRS against the performance of the unaided Mechanical Phish.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact produced by our integration of non-expert
human eﬀort into the Cyber Reasoning System paradigm. We measure the result of this
as a whole, in terms of the overall number of vulnerabilities identiﬁed in our dataset, but
also explore certain low-level details of the system.
5.5.1 Dataset
As previously mentioned, Mechanical Phish was designed to operate on binaries for
DECREE, the operating system designed for the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge. A
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Tasklet Instructions
- Program Description
- Tasklet Directions
Example Interactions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PAPER> PAPER
TIE
ROCK> SCISSORS
YOU LOSE
Feedback
Score: 223/1225
MINIMUM GOAL MET!
Bonuses:
- 10 more functions
- Output "INVALID"
✔ Output "YOU WIN!!!"
✔ Output "EASTEREGG!!"
Terminal
PAPER> 0000
EASTER EGG!!!
PAPER> SCISSORS
YOU WIN!!!
CRS-Generated
Suggestions
Educated Guesses:
- ROCK
- SCISSORS
- LIZARD
- SPOCK
Brute Force:
- ~~~!@
- 0000
Figure 5.3: A diagram of the HaCRS user interface, showing diﬀerent components
for seeding tasklets (all solid-bordered components), drilling tasklets (dotted-bordered
components), and seeking tasklets (d ashed-bordered components).
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total of 250 binaries were produced by DARPA for the Cyber Grand Challenge2. These
binaries vary in complexity, but are designed to mimic a wide range of vulnerabilities
and behaviors found in real-world software. Each Cyber Grand Challenge binary is
guaranteed to have at least one vulnerability, and proof-of-concept exploits, along with
high-quality testcases, are provided for each. This makes it possible to measure, with
some degree of certainty (after all, previously-unknown vulnerabilities might also be
present), the eﬀectiveness of vulnerability detection techniques. As such, they have
already been used in the evaluation of various other scientiﬁc work [124, 36, 103].
Our dataset is the subset of DECREE programs that present a human-usable text
protocol or for which the interaction assistance provided by HaCRS (as discussed in
Section 5.4.3) was able to facilitate a human-usable text protocol. We selected these by
automatically detecting the presence of non-printable characters in the author-provided
testcases (we did not otherwise use these testcases in the experiments). We ﬁltered
binaries in this way because, to our human assistants, such protocols are understandable,
and, therefore, they allow for manual interaction. Among the CGC binaries, a total of
85 binaries meet this criteria.
While this requirement to ﬁlter the dataset to binaries designed for human interaction
is limiting, certain approaches do exist to alleviate it. For example, IARPA funded a
multi-year eﬀort, dubbed STONESOUP [125] that developed a number of approaches to
gamify software. Such approaches can be used to expand the amount of binaries with
which humans can assist, but they generally fail to recreate the valuable semantic hints
in software designed for humans. We leave the integration of such program mutation into
our interaction assistance component as future work.
Even though a protocol might be text only, it might still be hard for humans to
2DARPA recently funded the creation of a human-readable repository with information on these
applications, hosted at http://www.lungetech.com/cgc-corpus.
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understand. As an example of this, consider PDF, which is a text-only ﬁle format that
is designed to be parsed exclusively by computer programs. To better understand the
implications of human assistance on the binaries in our dataset, we manually categorized
them according to the following qualities:
Technical expertise. We determined whether a program requires technical expertise to
be used. For example, some of the programs in the dataset are language interpreters
or databases, requiring users to be familiar with such Computer Science concepts as
programming languages. These programs would be rated as requiring high technical
expertise.
Semantic complexity. We attempted to identify whether actions taken by the program
yield themselves to high-level reasoning about the program's intent. For example,
a move taken in a chess match would have high semantic complexity, whereas an
iteration of a compression algorithm would not. Thus, a chess engine would be
ranked as having high semantic complexity, whereas a compression utility would
not.
CGC binaries are fairly small, and the small size of these binaries makes them well-
suited for such classiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, because the binaries tend to be single-purpose
(i.e., a recipe storage application, as opposed to a web browser), most binaries do not have
diﬀerent modules with diﬀerent semantic complexity or technical expertise requirements.
The binaries, by their various classiﬁcations, are presented in Table 5.2. We expect
human assistants to do best on binaries with a high semantic complexity, and unskilled
humans to do best with binaries requiring a low technical expertise.
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Semantic
Com-
plexity
Technical
Exper-
tise
Binaries
High Low CADET_00001 CADET_00003 CROMU_00001 CROMU_00003 CROMU_00005 CROMU_00017
CROMU_00029 CROMU_00031 CROMU_00037 CROMU_00040 CROMU_00041 CROMU_00044
CROMU_00046 CROMU_00054 CROMU_00065 CROMU_00076 CROMU_00087 EAGLE_00005
KPRCA_00011 KPRCA_00017 KPRCA_00018 KPRCA_00022 KPRCA_00023 KPRCA_00026
KPRCA_00030 KPRCA_00042 KPRCA_00043 KPRCA_00049 KPRCA_00051 KPRCA_00052
KPRCA_00053 KPRCA_00055 KPRCA_00071 KPRCA_00079 NRFIN_00004
NRFIN_00005+ NRFIN_00065 TNETS_00002 YAN01_00001
High High CROMU_00002 CROMU_00008 CROMU_00009 CROMU_00010 CROMU_00011 CROMU_00014
CROMU_00015 CROMU_00021 CROMU_00022 CROMU_00023 CROMU_00035 CROMU_00042
CROMU_00048 CROMU_00051 CROMU_00071 CROMU_00083 CROMU_00096 CROMU_00098
KPRCA_00007 KPRCA_00013 KPRCA_00021 KPRCA_00028 KPRCA_00031 KPRCA_00036
KPRCA_00041 KPRCA_00045 KPRCA_00054 KPRCA_00068 LUNGE_00002
NRFIN_00001+ NRFIN_00009+ NRFIN_00054 NRFIN_00055 YAN01_00002
YAN01_00007 YAN01_00011
Low Low NRFIN_00008* NRFIN_00064 NRFIN_00069+ YAN01_00015
Low High CROMU_00025* CROMU_00030* CROMU_00034* KPRCA_00010* KPRCA_00064*
NRFIN_00071
Table 5.2: The binaries in our dataset, grouped by semantic complexity of their op-
eration and the required technical (Computer Science) expertise. These binaries were
ﬁltered for receiving mostly printable input, but some of them (marked with *) de-
coded that into raw binary input, making them suboptimal for human interaction.
Others (marked with +) received their inputs in protocols which were automatically
translated by HaCRS' interaction assistance layer to be easily human-interactable. We
expect humans to do best on binaries with a high semantic complexity, and unskilled
humans to do best with binaries requiring a low technical expertise.
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5.5.2 Human Assistants
HaCRS was designed to support diﬀerent levels of assistant expertise, from non-
experts to experts. We evaluated the impact of both non-expert and semi-expert assis-
tants.
Non-experts. For the non-experts, We used Amazon's Mechanical Turk service to
dispatch tasklets to humans with no required Computer Science knowledge [113]. This
provided HaCRS with an API to interact with human intelligence in a scalable way,
allowing it to submit tasklets, as Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs),
without concerning itself with human availability.
Because we had ﬁnite funds for our experiments, we implemented a human interaction
cache. When the HaCRS would create tasklets for non-expert human assistance, we would
ﬁrst check the interaction cache to determine if this human assistance task had already
been requested in by a prior experiment. If it had, and if at least one of the cached human
testcases solved the tasklet (in the sense of triggering new code), the HaCRS would reuse
it instead of paying for a HIT. We used the human interaction cache whenever we were
running experiments on identical conﬁgurations of the Hardware-Automation Link. This
allowed us to re-run some of the experiments throughout the design and development of
the system and remain within our budget.
In the end, between the diﬀerent experiments to fully understand our system, we
spent about $2000 on Mechanical Turk HITs, resulting in 21268 unique testcases across
our experiment. While this is a large amount for a research lab, it would be trivial
spending for a nation state or large corporation looking to scale out their analyses.
Semi-experts. We recruited ﬁve undergraduate Computer Science students, familiar
with programming topics but not with program analysis, to act as our semi-expert human
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assistants. These undergraduates interacted with a random sampling of 23 binaries from
our dataset, generating a total of 115 testcases.
Ethics. As our experiments involve human assistants, we were careful to ensure that
ethical procedures were followed. We worked with the Institutional Review Board of our
institution to evaluate our testing protocol. The IRB approved our experiments, and we
were careful to follow ethical guidelines throughout our work.
5.5.3 Human-Automation Link
As we proposed a number of optimizations to the Human-Automation Link in Sec-
tion 5.4.3, it is important to understand whether this actually enhances the eﬀectiveness
of human assistances. To determine this, we performed two separate experiments in
having non-experts interact with programs in the HAL, with our optimizations in Sec-
tion 5.4.3 disabled in the ﬁrst and enabled in the second.
For each binary, we dispatched tasklets to the human assistants until they were unable
to make further progress in code coverage, given an hour-long timeout. We collated the
results by the semantic complexity of the binaries involved, and computed the median
number of testcases at which progress stopped being made.
Our improvements to the HAL allowed our assistants to contribute a signiﬁcantly
higher amount of testcases than they were previously able to. For semantically complex
binaries, the number of testcases was roughly double, but for binaries that were not
semantically complex, the improvement was considerably higher, approach a three-fold
increase in the number of successful testcase generations. On further investigation, this
makes sense  analyzing the testcases generated by the human assistants, we were able to
see them quickly guess how to interact with semantically-complex programs, but struggle
with less complex ones. However, with the improved HAL interface, they were given extra
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information that they could leverage to provide high-quality testcases.
5.5.4 Comparative Evaluation
HaCRS improves the vulnerability detection process by injecting human intuition into
the Cyber Reasoning System. To understand how eﬀective this is, we analyze the impact
that non-expert and semi-expert assistance has on CRS eﬀectiveness. To explore these
questions, we ran several diﬀerent experiment conﬁgurations:
Non-expert humans. As a baseline to understand the ability of humans to generate
inputs for binary code, we disabled the automated components of the Mechanical
Phish and relied solely on human assistants for testcase creation.
Semi-expert and non-expert humans. With the amount of semi-experts at our dis-
posal, it did not make sense to have them work alone. As such, we ran an integrated
semi- and non-expert experiment. To understand the impact of expertise, we added
the semi-experts to our assistant pool and reran the human-only experiment. Test-
cases produced by non-experts are presented to semi-experts as examples, and test-
cases created by the semi-experts are synchronized into the system and eventually
presented to the non-experts.
Unassisted fuzzing (AFL). This conﬁguration, with both symbolic and human assis-
tance disabled, achieves a baseline for comparing the other experiments to under-
stand the relative gains in code coverage and crashes.
Symbolic-assisted fuzzing (Driller). This is the reference conﬁguration of the Me-
chanical Phish: a fuzzer aided by a dynamic symbolic execution engine, as proposed
by Driller. We consider this as the prior state-of-the-art conﬁguration.
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Conﬁguration
Semantic
Com-
plexity
Expertise
Re-
quired
Median
Code
Cov-
erage
Median
#AT
Median
#HT
Binaries
Crashed
Median
Time-
to-
Crash
Non-expert Humans High Low 46.68% 0 137 0 N/A
High High 48.83% 0 150 0 N/A
Low Low 48.69% 0 168 0 N/A
Low High 16.81% 0 297 0 N/A
Total 47.19% 0 151 0 N/A
All Humans High Low 46.83% 0 137 0 N/A
High High 48.83% 0 150 1 2815
Low Low 48.69% 0 168 0 N/A
Low High 17.39% 0 298 0 N/A
Total 47.19% 0 151 1 2815
Unassisted Fuzzing High Low 41.82% 410 0 12 807
High High 43.32% 526 0 14 1278
Low Low 56.17% 187 0 1 143
Low High 17.46% 211 0 1 7
Total 42.87% 361 0 28 897
Symbolic-assisted Fuzzing High Low 42.90% 663 0 14 1302
High High 48.85% 764 0 17 1426
Low Low 56.07% 156 0 2 62
Low High 41.88% 1500 0 3 390
Total 44.91% 649 0 36 1298
Human-assisted Fuzzing High Low 49.70% 326 136 21 1378
High High 60.45% 472 126 24 1442
Low Low 64.03% 125 35 2 48
Low High 17.46% 207 9 1 10
Total 52.38% 308 84 48 1334
Human-assisted Symbolic- High Low 48.98% 369 69 23 1140
assisted Fuzzing High High 59.68% 485 11 28 1855
Low Low 64.03% 121 46 2 47
Low High 48.52% 641 5 3 584
Total 53.45% 403 34 56 1301
Table 5.3: The crashes found and code coverage achieved by diﬀerent conﬁgurations
of the automated and human components of HaCRS. The full HaCRS conﬁguration
includes human non-expert, human semi-expert, and automated innovation agents.
#AT, and #HT are the numbers of automation-originated testcases and human-orig-
inated testcases, respectively, that were deemed unique by the Mechanical Phish's
testcase evaluation criteria.
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Human-assisted fuzzing. In this conﬁguration, Driller is replaced with our Human-
Automation Link. Rather than symbolically tracing fuzzer-generated testcases, we
present them to our human assistants and synchronize their testcases back into the
fuzzer. This conﬁguration, together with the Driller and AFL conﬁgurations, allow
us to understand the relative eﬀectiveness of Drilling versus Human Assistance.
Human-assisted Symbolic-assisted fuzzing. This is the complete conﬁguration of
HaCRS, all components, representing the new state-of-the-art in Cyber Reasoning
System.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 5.3.
End-to-end system. The most obvious result is the improvement in the number of
vulnerabilities that were identiﬁed with the full HaCRS conﬁguration. By iteratively
combining human assistance and symbolic assistance to its internal fuzzer, the HaCRS
was able to identify an additional twenty bugs in diﬀerent binaries over symbolically-
assisted fuzzing (a whopping 55% improvement) and twice as much as the base-case
fuzzer alone. This result is signiﬁcant: non-expert humans, overwhelmingly likely to
have no security or program analysis training, are able to make real contributions toward
the analysis of binary software.
Comparison to Driller. In HaCRS, human assistants take on a very similar role to
Driller: they provide extra inputs that the fuzzer can leverage to avoid stalling in its
exploration of the target program. Rather than making small control-ﬂow diversions,
human assistants make semantic divergences based on their understanding of the oper-
ation of the target program. This is reﬂected in the results  for semantically-complex
programs, the human assistants signiﬁcantly beat out Driller, achieving an improvement
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of up to 11.6% improvement in coverage. However, for binaries that did not have seman-
tic complexity but required computing expertise, the human assistants suﬀered, being
unable to understand the concepts presented by the program and intuit how to inter-
act with it. This is where the combination of human and automated analysis shines 
Driller picks up the slack in these binaries, and the combination of human and symbolic
assistance achieves higher code coverage than either alone.
Impact of expertise. Interestingly, the inclusion of semi-experts in our analysis did
not seriously impact the achieved code coverage. This is an example of the diﬀerent scale
achievable for experts and semi-experts. While we were able to get just over 300 Me-
chanical Turk workers to assist HaCRS, we were only able to recruit ﬁve undergraduate
students, and they could not make a strong impact on the results (in fact, because the
results are presented in aggregate, there was almost no impact on the median measure-
ments). However, they did have localized success: due to their ability to intelligently
interact with more complex binaries, the experts were able to identify a bug in one of
the applications without any human assistance. Speciﬁcally, they triggered a bug in
CROMU_00021, which implements a simple variable storage and arithmetic engine, but
contains an exploitable bug when a variable with a blank name is created.
5.5.5 Case Studies
In the course of our experiments, our human assistants achieved some results that are
interesting to explore more in-depth. This was despite the fact that the human assistants
were completely unskilled in program analysis, and were recruited with absolutely no
training. Here, we delve deeper into these bugs, and discuss why human eﬀort helped
with these speciﬁc binaries.
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Coverage case study: CROMU_00008. This binary implements a database with
a SQL-inspired interaction interface. Proper use of this binary required understanding
the concepts of storing and retrieving data records. Interestingly, our human assistants
quickly developed an understanding for how to do this, taking the suggested keywords
from the CRS suggestions and combining them into expressions the program understood.
They achieved a code coverage of 55.5%, compared with 12.1% for the automated anal-
yses. Manual investigation into the delta between automation and human assistance
revealed that, as expected, the humans produced inputs that were meaningful for the
program, while the symbolic seed synthesis attempted to optimize for code coverage,
triggering many meaningless states (such as incorrect commands) without ever getting
to the actual operation of the program.
Coverage case study: KPRCA_00052. This binary is surprisingly complicated:
the assistant is presented with a pizza order menu system. To properly navigate this
system, the assistant must understand how a pizza is made: the crust is chosen ﬁrst,
then the cheese, then the toppings. This makes it very hard for the automated system
to explore this binary and, in fact, our automation achieved a 19% code coverage over
the course of the experiment, as opposed to 52% achieved by human assistants.
Vulnerability-detection case study: KPRCA_00043. This binary includes a lyri-
cal storage engine that disallows certain words from being provided as lyrics. Further-
more, these words are checked by a bloom ﬁlter. Because this ﬁlter is implemented as a
hash map, the resulting symbolic memory references make it diﬃcult for symbolic execu-
tion to produce these words. The vulnerability consists of an overﬂow in the lyrics buﬀer
if enough words are entered that trigger the bloom ﬁlter but then pass the secondary
check against the blacklist. For example, enough misspellings of the blacklisted words
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can overﬂow the ﬁlter.
Interestingly, the binary includes a semantic hint  a depressing message is printed
when the program starts. We observed that our assistants quickly picked up on this hint
and produced inputs containing blacklisted words, whereas the symbolic seed synthesis
produced gibberish and failed to trigger the blacklist. While both approaches actually
had a similar level of code coverage, we hypothesized that the human-assisted inputs
would be a better seed set for a fuzzer to ﬁnd the vulnerability. We veriﬁed this by
running AFL for an hour with the human-provided seeds, and for an hour with the
automation-created seeds. As expected, the former triggered the vulnerability, while the
latter did not.
Vulnerability-detection case study: NRFIN_00055. This binary implements a
complex mathematical calculator. In this case, the assistants were given no guidance 
simply an input prompt. Over time, they ﬁgured out that mathematical expressions led to
the output of mathematical solutions, and their apparent knowledge of mathematics came
into play. Assistants submitted a number of equations, exploring diﬀerent operations in
semantically-valid inputs (i.e., proper use of parenthesis and so forth). By comparison,
the symbolic seed synthesis became overwhelmed by the number of paths in the parsing
engine, resulting in an inability to produce reasonable inputs.
Again, we suspected that the seeds provided by humans would be more useful to a
fuzzer, and tested this by an hour-long execution of AFL. As with the previous case, AFL
was able to mutate the human-produced testcases into a crashing input by introducing
a modiﬁer symbol missed by the assistants into one of their testcases, resulting in a
type confusion. The automatically-generated testcases were less useful, and no crash was
found from them within an hour.
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5.6 Conclusion
The use of principled human-assistance in Cyber Reasoning Systems constitutes a
paradigm shift in our view of how binary analysis is done. Instead of the dichotomy
between human-led, semi-automated systems (HCH, as discussed in Section 5.1) and
fully automated systems (CCC), we propose a C(H|C)C system, where computers, which
scale beyond human ability, make organizational calls and humans, whose intuition has
not yet been replicated, assist when able. This system can utilize the insight of non-
expert humans, who are more abundant than expert humans and thus scale better. In
the absense of these humans, these systems are able to operate fully autonomously, just
at a lower eﬀectiveness.
In this report, we have taken a ﬁrst look at how non-experts impact the automated
vulnerability discovery pipeline. The results are signiﬁcant: humans, with no security
training, were able to seriously improve the bug detection rate of a state-of-the-art vul-
nerability analysis engine. Further exploration is warranted. For example, humans can
conﬁrm or repudiate results of static analysis, combine behavior observed in diﬀerent
testcases into one, and help verify automatically-generated patches. All of this is chal-
lenging or simply infeasible with modern techniques, but the use of human assistance can
greatly augment Cyber Reasoning Systems with these capabilities regardless.
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What Now?
Through my graduate studies, I have led the creation of a base upon which cyber-
autonomy can be built. More importantly, I had contributed this base as an open source
platform for the community. Going forward, it is my hope that this base will spur re-
search in the area, and that a PhD student working on their dissertation thirty years
from now will look back and be shocked at how far the ﬁeld has come.
For now, as I discussed in Chapter 4, the problem is not solved. While we have
achieved a lot of capability in the autonomous analysis of binary software, we have not
made much progress in the autonomous understanding of it. This is almost more of a
philosophical problem than a technical one, but we can speculate on technical implications
and techniques that might address it.
For example, it is interesting that the large increase in the number of crashes found
in CGC binaries by HaCRS (a 55% improvement compared to a CRS with no human
assistance) does not have an associated increase in code coverage (which is only improved
by 8%). It is possible to interpret this in several ways, but I suspect, based on initial
examination of possible causes of this phenomenon, that this has to do with the fact that
humans optimize the exploration of the state space of the program, while autonomous
techniques prioritize the increase of code coverage. Thus far, there is no clear path to
making automated techniques understand program state on an abstract level (i.e., that
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a given bit X signiﬁes that the program has entered phase Y ).
As HaCRS demonstrates, we can continue to use the crutch of human assistance until
automated techniques can address this problem. In the meantime, a better semantic
understanding of programs would make a great research direction.
If someone reads this dissertation and is inspired to solve the problem, make sure to
send a pull request!
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